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1 Introduction
This dissertation focuses on fundamental economic problems of occupational choice
and mobility. Theoretical and empirical research using the rational choice frame-
work has identified a wide variety of macro- and micro-level factors that affect eco-
nomic behaviour.1 More recently, the challenges of explaining different choices of
individuals confronted with observationally identical choice situations called for an
extension of the standard theory by including parameters reflecting heterogeneity
in unobserved characteristics, such as preferences.2 The relevance of (risk) pref-
erences for economic decision-making has been recognised already in the classical
economic literature (Schumpeter, 1934; Arrow, 1972; Kanbur, 1979). During the
last decennia, wider availability of micro-data facilitated the accumulation of em-
pirical evidence investigating the role of preferences for economic decision-making
in different domains (for example, Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Viscusi and
Hersch, 2001; Zak and Knack, 2001; Borghans, Ter Weel, and Weinberg, 2008;
Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008; Krueger and Schade, 2008; Dohmen and Falk, 2011).
Nevertheless, many issues including the origin of preferences and causality of the
documented relationships are still contested.
In this dissertation, I exploit structural changes in political and economic
institutions to provide field evidence on the effects of directly measured preferences,
such as risk aversion and trust, on economic choices. In particular, I argue that the
economic and political transition of Ukraine from a Soviet Union republic with a
planned economy and an authoritative political system to a sovereign state with a
market economy and a democracy-oriented political system provides a unique set-
up that allows to shed some light on the causal impact of economic preferences.
The purpose of this dissertation is thus to identify the effects of preferences on
economic choices using transition as a source of exogenous variation in labour
market organisation and not to describe specific issues related to adaptation to
new economic and political conditions resulting from transition.
1To name a few contributions, occupational choice and mobility are influenced by occupational
wage structures (Killingsworth, 1984; Banerjee and Newman, 1993); tax and interest rates
(Blau, 1987; Parker, 2004; Cullen and Gordon, 2007); compensating wage differentials (Roy,
1951; Heckman and Honore, 1990); liquidity constraints (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Blanchflower
and Oswald, 1998); job match productivity (Burdett, 1978; Johnson, 1978); human capital in
terms of ability, training, experience and tenure (Benewitz and Zucker, 1968; Boskin, 1974;
Miller, 1984; Shaw, 1987; Iyigun and Owen, 1998).
2Throughout this dissertation, preferences are treated as ‘economic preference parameters’,
i.e. stable, measurable, quantifiable features of character or personality that affect individual
behaviour. This definition can encompass personality traits as in McCrae et al. (2000) and
non-cognitive skills as in Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006).
2
Figure 1.1 displays the time-line from 1986 to 2012 to provide a general back-
ground of Ukraine in recent years.3 A Soviet republic before 1991, Ukraine became
independent and set off on the transition path in the early 1990’s. The transi-
tion period was characterised by major economic restructuring, large-scale privati-
sation, development of private entrepreneurship, opening up of the borders and
reorganisation of the political system into a more open representative democratic
state. In contrast to other Eastern European countries, the process of adjustment
in Ukraine was accompanied by a substantial drop in real GDP and real wages.
Even though Ukraine is still lagging behind other countries in Eastern Europe,
the average purchasing power of Ukrainian citizens measured in current PPP US
dollars has returned to its pre-transition level during the period of 2005-2012, as
Figure 1.2a shows. Self-employment, barely non-existent in the 1980’s, increased
significantly since the beginning of the 1990’s (Figure 1.2b) but the share of self-
employed among the employed individuals is still substantially lower than in the
OECD countries (OECD, 2008).
The transition phenomenon and the transition adjustment processes have
been addressed elsewhere (Svejnar, 1999; Boeri and Terrell, 2002; A˚slund, 2007;
Kupets, Leshchenko, Osinkina, Taran, and Komarov, 2009; Lehmann and Mu-
ravyev, 2012). However, I focus on three particular features of the political and
economic systems that changed during the transition caused by the break-up of the
Soviet Union. First, citizens of the Soviet Union republic of Ukraine were restricted
in the choice of political or economic systems during the period between 19454 and
1991. A strong suppression of ideas contradicting the communist ideology made it
more difficult to transmit information or preferences about different political and
economic systems that existed before Ukraine had become Soviet. This feature is
exploited in Chapter 2. Second, because wages were set centrally through a wage
grid system for all occupations in the Soviet Union, the earnings risk was low and
it was very similar across all occupations. The earnings risk increased dramati-
cally after transition. This feature is further discussed in Chapter 3. Third, the
command economy of the Soviet Union relied on the centrally-controlled large en-
terprises. It banned private entrepreneurship, which led to the situation that there
were no self-employed individuals in the beginning of the 1990’s. This aspect of
transition is addressed in Chapter 4. The following paragraphs further elaborate
on the content and methods used in the chapters of this dissertation.
3A more detailed account of Ukrainian history is in Appendix 2.B.
4Different parts of Ukrainian territory had not become Soviet Union simultaneously. The East of
Ukraine had became a part of the Soviet Union during the early 1920’s, however the occupation
of Western districts was finalised only in the course of World War II.
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Figure 1.1: Ukraine before and after transition
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(b) Size of enterprises and self-employment
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Chapter 2 sets up the background and introduces the history of Ukraine. His-
torical events are used to shed light on the origins of such an important economic
preference as social trust. The research question of Chapter 2 is motivated by the
4
unresolved puzzle of the direction of causality between the development of economic
and political structures, which has been discussed extensively in the recent litera-
ture (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Helliwell, 1994; Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005;
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared, 2008). Given inconclusive evidence on
whether democratic development stimulates growth or whether market liberali-
sation is beneficial for democracy, I argue that a ‘third factor’ is likely to affect
the co-evolvement of political and economic structures. Relying on the turbulent
history of Ukraine with heterogeneous experiences of being occupied by different
political entities before the country had become a part of the Soviet Union, I show
that historical institutions affect the development of preferences for certain types of
economic and political systems through their influence on the accumulation of civic
capital (a set of shared cooperative norms of behaviour facilitated by social trust).
The eastern part of the Ukrainian territory was subjected to the harsh rule of the
Russian Empire since 17th century (until World War I), which adversely affected
civic capital of its population. A more lenient rule of the Polish-Lithuanian Com-
monwealth (1569-1772) and the Habsburg Empire in the West (1772-1918) were
more conductive to the development of civic capital. Since the Soviet occupation
limited the transmission of political preferences, it is likely that the post-transition
differences in the level of support for democratic political structures and market-
based economic systems are brought about by inherited differences in civic capital.
Chapter 3 considers more modern economic and political developments in
Ukraine to investigate the role of economic preferences in occupational sorting.
The problem of occupational choice between different professions, as well as in
terms of choosing employment status, has received close attention in the liter-
ature. Roy (1951) developed a model explaining occupational choice based on
comparative advantage of individual skills.5 Blau, Gustad, Jessor, Parnes, and
Wilcock (1955) proposed a comprehensive theoretical framework discussing inputs
from three disciplines: economics, psychology, and sociology. Empirical evidence
by King (1974) suggests that the earnings risk is a relevant aspect of occupational
choice for entrants in occupations with higher earnings risk are compensated by
higher earnings.6 In Chapter 3, I study empirically whether individuals with dif-
ferent risk attitudes choose occupations varying in earnings risk. The economic
transition exogenously affected wage structure in Ukraine, such that the earnings
distribution across occupations, which was narrow before transition, increased dra-
5Heckman and Honore (1990) analysed the implications when the normality assumptions of the
original model (Roy, 1951) are relaxed.
6The relationship between earnings risk and wage compensation has recently been studied, for
example, by Hartog and Vijverberg (2007a) and by Schweri, Hartog, and Wolter (2011).
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matically after transition (Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 illustrates this phenomenon).
The finding that risk averse individuals are more likely to switch to occupations
with low earnings variance after transition and that more risk tolerant individu-
als, in contrast, are more likely to switch to occupations with high earnings risk
after transition suggests that risk attitudes have a causal impact on the choice of
occupation.
In Chapter 4, the recent histories of two countries affected by the transition
from the command to the market economy, Ukraine and East Germany,7 are used to
identify the effect of risk attitudes on self-employment. Self-employed individuals
have a larger variance of earnings than individuals in regular employment (Parker,
1999; Rosen and Willen, 2002; Falter, 2007b); however, earnings risk is only one of
the components of uncertainty the self-employed face. The importance of willing-
ness to take risks for entrepreneurship has been already discussed in early literature
(Cantillon, 1755; Knight, 1921; Schumpeter, 1934, 1939). Recent empirical studies
suggest a causal effect of risk attitude on the probability of becoming self-employed
(Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2009; Brown, Dietrich, Ortiz-Nun˜ez, and Taylor,
2011). In Chapter 4, I extend the understanding of the role of risk attitudes for
self-employment in conditions when no previous information on self-employment is
available. The fact that many existing businesses are transmitted through family
channels (Hout and Rosen, 2000; Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Andersson and Ham-
marstedt, 2010) suggests that some specific knowledge about what it is like to be
self-employed can decrease risk of self-employment. Since risk attitudes are cor-
related across generations (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde, 2012; Zumbuehl,
Dohmen, and Pfann, 2013), it might be possible that there is no causal relationship
between risk attitudes of the children of self-employed parents and their decisions
to become self-employed. Lack of self-employment between 1945 and 1990’s in the
Soviet Ukraine and in the German Democratic Republic provides an original set-
up to study whether risk attitudes matter for self-employment when parents were
very limited in how much knowledge about self-employment they could transmit
to their children.
Chapter 5 continues the investigation of the role of risk attitudes for occupa-
tional mobility. In this chapter, I explain why risk attitudes contribute to different
wage growth patterns resulting from job mobility of individuals who are heteroge-
nous in their risk attitudes and provide field evidence that is consistent with the
explanation. The relationship between job mobility and wages spurred an extensive
7I use East Germany because of the similar restrictions on self-employment that were in force
during the Soviet Union time. The data from East Germany contain a unique measure of
intentions to become self-employed elicited right before the reunification of Germany.
6
debate in the literature, resulting into several theoretical models with contradic-
tory predictions regarding a positive effect of job changes on wage growth (Burdett,
1978; Johnson, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979a,b). The empirical findings were also mixed
(Topel and Ward, 1992; Light and McGarry, 1998; Munasinghe and Sigman, 2004;
Dustmann and Pereira, 2008). In Chapter 5, I argue that since changing job is
a risky decision, risk averse individuals require higher compensation to make a
job change. This implies that, ceteris paribus, risk averse individuals will make
less job changes than more risk-tolerant individuals. However, job changes of risk
averse workers will be associated with larger wage increases from each job change
compared to more risk-tolerant workers. In this way, heterogeneity in risk atti-
tudes affects job changing behaviour, which in turn generates a different pattern of
wage increases associated with job changes of risk averse and of more risk-tolerant
workers. My findings using the data on German workers during their early career
support these two predictions.
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2.1 Introduction
Whether economic growth is responsible for democratisation or whether democratic
institutions provide fertile ground for economic development remains a heated de-
bate in the literature (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Barro, 1999; Tavares and
Wacziarg, 2001; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004; Sunde,
2006; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared, 2008).1 In this chapter, we test
whether a third factor affects both preferences for a market economy and prefer-
ences for a democratic political system, thereby generating a spurious correlation
between preferences for systems with little government regulation as opposed to
systems with strong government regulation. In particular, we investigate the role
of civic capital, as a set of shared cooperative beliefs, norms and values facilitated
by social trust, for the formation of political preferences. While civic capital is an
inherited trait, a stable economic preference parameter, which is only malleable to
a certain extent during the individual life course, ‘political preferences’ are choices.2
The arguments for the role of economic growth in facilitating the develop-
ment of democratic structures are commonly referred to as ‘modernisation’ theory
that was first proposed by Lipset (1959). It is argued in this literature that eco-
nomic growth can facilitate democracy through mechanisms such as human capital
development, expansion of the middle class, aﬄuence, urbanization, improved liv-
ing standards, reduction of income inequality, better protection of property rights,
and emancipation of women (Barro, 1999; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Giavazzi and
Tabellini, 2005; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008b). A different literature, on
the other hand, maintains that economic development is promoted by democratic
institutions, such as autonomy of the state, checks and balances on executives’
authority, reduction of uncertainty, reduction of income inequality, protection of
property rights, and promotion of human capital development (Przeworski and
Limongi, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Tavares
and Wacziarg, 2001; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005). While some factors that are
thought to affect the relationship between democracy and economic development,
e.g. human capital accumulation, protection of property rights, and reduction of
income inequality are the same in both classes of models, the way that causality
runs is juxtaposed.
Empirical evidence on the direction of causality is also controversial: support
1This chapter is joint work with Thomas Dohmen and Ben Kriechel. This chapter was presented
at Maastricht University (2011) and at the Scottish Economic Society conference (SES, 2013).
2Our definition of civic capital follows from Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011) and differs
from ‘social capital’, which is sometimes treated as an outcome that can be altered by individual
investment (i.e. in Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote, 2002).
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for both arguments has been found. The outcomes range from supporting the role
of economic development for democratisation (for example, Giavazzi and Tabellini,
2005) to no effect at all after including the relevant controls or fixed effects (Boix
and Stokes, 2003; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared, 2008). Estimates of
the effect of democracy on growth were sometimes found to be positive (Pettersson,
2004; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008a), zero or
even negative (Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
and Shleifer, 2004), depending on the estimation technique or the sample used. In
a recent study, Grosjean and Senik (2011) find that market liberalisation has no
causal effect on preferences for democracy but that democratisation affects support
for market economy. In summary, the empirical literature indicates that although
there is a strong correlation between economic and democratic developments, no
clear-cut picture emerges on the direction of causality. Possibly, this relationship is
not causal, but driven by another factor which has an impact on the development
of both political and economic structures.
In this study, we argue that a factor which can affect the relationship between
economic growth and democracy is civic capital. There are theoretical models sup-
ported by empirical evidence indicating that civic capital plays an important role
in promoting economic development by reducing transaction costs and enhancing
efficiency (Arrow, 1972; Fukuyama, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack,
2001; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Tabellini, 2010).
Another strand of literature shows that civic capital is a determinant of political
institutions’ viability and of the stability of a democracy because it is conductive
to democratic beliefs and principles (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1988;
Putnam, 1993; Badescu and Uslaner, 2003; Tabellini, 2008a). Trusting individuals
are less likely to demand excessive regulation from the state (Glaeser and Shleifer,
2003; Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003; Pinotti,
2008; Aghion, Algan, and Shleifer, 2010). It is plausible that societies with much
civic capital will be more likely to prefer a market economy and a more democratic
political structure. On the other hand, societies with little civic capital might be
more likely to prefer systems with more governmental control over economic and
political affairs.
We hypothesize that civic capital is a decisive factor that puts a society on
a path towards either a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ state. A ‘good’ state is characterised by
freedom of speech, protection of human rights and property rights, and economic
prosperity. In a ‘bad’ state, citizens are exploited by their government, state regu-
lation prevails, and economic development is limited. In the ‘good’ state, individ-
uals possess a set of cooperative norms, beliefs, and values towards a wide range
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of (unknown) people making them less likely to demand governmental regulation
in political and economic life. As a result, well-balanced institutions are estab-
lished and conditions for free trade emerge, setting off for economic prosperity. In
the ‘bad’ state, citizens lack trust in strangers. They behave cooperatively only
towards a circle of close family members and friends. In contrast, civic norms of
behaviour do not apply to unknown people, because strangers are perceived as
untrustworthy. Negative externalities expected from unregulated market entry of
uncivic entrepreneurs raise the demand for more government regulation (Pinotti,
2008). In turn, more regulation triggers increase in distrust (Aghion, Algan, and
Shleifer, 2010). We posit that individuals choose to establish systems and insti-
tutions that are well-aligned with their preferences. Civic capital and individual
preferences for institutions will be highly correlated if trusting citizens favour sys-
tems with little government intervention, whereas uncivic citizens demand more
state regulation because they lack trust.
In this study, we propose a method to relate historically determined variation
in civic capital to current political and economic systems, and establish that civic
capital has an impact on both. We build on the argument that civic capital forma-
tion is affected by historical events (Paldam and Swedsen, 2001; Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2008b; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Grosfeld, Rodnyansky, and Zhu-
ravskaya, 2010; Heineck and Su¨ssmuth, 2013; Jacob and Tyrell, 2010), and that it
is transmitted through the generations (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2008a; Tabellini, 2008b; Cesarini, Dawes, Johannesson, Lichtenstein,
and Wallace, 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde,
2012). Based on these two propositions, we contend that civic capital is relatively
stable (at least, within a time horizon that is relevant for the study), and that the
effect of historical institutions can be used as an exogenous source of information
about the level of its accumulation.
More specifically, our identification strategy is based on the arguably exoge-
nous variation across regions in contemporary Ukraine that are rooted in history.
The first element is the fact that the territory of the country has been split up
for centuries under different political regimes which heterogeneously affected the
level of civic capital accumulation. In particular, during the 18th - 19th centuries,
the East of Ukraine was ruled by the Russian Empire, which was characterised
by an oppressive style of governance, with strict orthodox religion, harsh rules,
and even serfdom. On the contrary, the West of Ukraine experienced a more pre-
dictable, stable, and lenient rule of the Habsburg Empire (Becker, Boeckh, Hainz,
and Woessmann, 2011). The second element of the identification based on the
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historical events is the uniform rule of the Soviet Union, which enforced the same
economic and political system on the whole territory since 1945. Ukraine has been
a unitary republic since then. Its political and, to a large extent, economic situation
has been alike across the regions. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
citizens residing in any part of Ukraine had virtually no influence on the economic
and political system in the country. We argue that contemporaneous differences in
political preferences across the regions can partly be attributed to these two histor-
ical experiences that operated as quasi-natural experiments, as civic capital which
was affected by the historical events has been transmitted to today’s generations.
Our analysis mainly uses data from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey (ULMS), a nationally and regionally representative household survey, which
aside from a rich set of social and demographic characteristics of respondents, also
contains data on political preferences and trust. Additionally, we rely on supple-
mentary data sets such as: the World Values Survey (WVS), the Central and East-
ern Eurobarometer (1990-1997), and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central
and Eastern Europe (1990-2001) to trace the development of political preferences
since the early transition period.
We develop a conceptual framework building upon recent theoretical advance-
ments and empirical findings that links theories explaining the formation and trans-
mission of civic capital to empirical analyses of the relationship between trust and
economic and political outcomes. In the empirical part, we present heterogeneity in
civic capital across Ukrainian regions resulting from different historical experiences
and analyse effect of civic capital on political preferences of Ukrainian citizens. Our
results indicate that it is plausible to interpret the effect on preferences for eco-
nomic systems as causal and support the conjunction that civic capital has an
impact on preferences for political systems. We find that high level of shared civic
capital is a significant predictor of preferences favouring economic and political
systems with little control from the government, such as a market economy and a
democratic state. On the contrary, in the regions with little shared civic capital,
economic and political systems with more government control are preferred. Civic
capital is likely to stimulate co-development of political and economic systems that
is generally observed around the globe.
The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section sketches our conceptual
framework, section 2.3 presents our empirical approach. Section 2.4 describes the
data and main variables. Section 2.5 presents and discusses the results. The last
section concludes.
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historical events is the uniform rule of the Soviet Union, which enforced the same
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has been alike across the regions. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
citizens residing in any part of Ukraine had virtually no influence on the economic
and political system in the country. We argue that contemporaneous differences in
political preferences across the regions can partly be attributed to these two histor-
ical experiences that operated as quasi-natural experiments, as civic capital which
was affected by the historical events has been transmitted to today’s generations.
Our analysis mainly uses data from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey (ULMS), a nationally and regionally representative household survey, which
aside from a rich set of social and demographic characteristics of respondents, also
contains data on political preferences and trust. Additionally, we rely on supple-
mentary data sets such as: the World Values Survey (WVS), the Central and East-
ern Eurobarometer (1990-1997), and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central
and Eastern Europe (1990-2001) to trace the development of political preferences
since the early transition period.
We develop a conceptual framework building upon recent theoretical advance-
ments and empirical findings that links theories explaining the formation and trans-
mission of civic capital to empirical analyses of the relationship between trust and
economic and political outcomes. In the empirical part, we present heterogeneity in
civic capital across Ukrainian regions resulting from different historical experiences
and analyse effect of civic capital on political preferences of Ukrainian citizens. Our
results indicate that it is plausible to interpret the effect on preferences for eco-
nomic systems as causal and support the conjunction that civic capital has an
impact on preferences for political systems. We find that high level of shared civic
capital is a significant predictor of preferences favouring economic and political
systems with little control from the government, such as a market economy and a
democratic state. On the contrary, in the regions with little shared civic capital,
economic and political systems with more government control are preferred. Civic
capital is likely to stimulate co-development of political and economic systems that
is generally observed around the globe.
The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section sketches our conceptual
framework, section 2.3 presents our empirical approach. Section 2.4 describes the
data and main variables. Section 2.5 presents and discusses the results. The last
section concludes.
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2.2 Conceptual framework
If people’s preferences ultimately determine what kind of political and economic
system will prevail in a state, it is important to ask how these preferences are
formed. We argue that preferences for a particular kind of economic or political
system are affected by shared norms of cooperation, values and beliefs, facilitated
by social trust, to which we refer as civic capital. The current level of civic capital
depends on the experience of previous generations because of intergenerational
transmission of preferences and beliefs. Parents educate their children based on
their own perceptions of the social environment. Prominent models of cultural
transmission (for example, Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Tabellini, 2008b) show that
preferences, norms and beliefs are transmitted from one generation to the next.
Empirical evidence (Uslaner, 2008; Cesarini, Dawes, Johannesson, Lichtenstein,
and Wallace, 2009; Aghion, Algan, and Shleifer, 2010; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman,
and Sunde, 2012) supports these models.
It has been shown empirically that norms of cooperative behaviour, which
determine how well citizens can solve a public good problem, vary dramatically
across societies around the globe. Evidence suggests that these norms are histor-
ically determined since it has been shown experimentally in various contexts that
pro-cooperative behaviour is hardly related to any demographic characteristics of
group members (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and McElreath,
2001; Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter, 2008; Ga¨chter and Herrmann, 2009).
Numerous empirical investigations show that historical events affect pop-
ulation’s civic capital (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006, 2008b; Nunn and
Wantchekon, 2011; Rainer and Siedler, 2009; Heineck and Su¨ssmuth, 2013; Ja-
cob and Tyrell, 2010; Tabellini, 2010; Becker, Boeckh, Hainz, and Woessmann,
2011). Favourable historical events and favourable experience with institutions
help to build up civic capital. Individuals who grow up in a trusting environ-
ment are more likely to expect other individuals to be trustworthy. Civic norms
of behaviour foster cooperation, which brings clear benefits to a community and
facilitates its development.
On the contrary, harmful historical events, such as wars and experience with
totalitarian political institutions, reduce civic capital by destroying social trust,
i.e. trust in strangers (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Becker, Boeckh, Hainz, and
Woessmann, 2011). It is costly to trust in an environment in which a random
individual is likely to be an uncivic one. When social trust is lacking, people choose
to only trust people who are close to them in terms of social distance (Tabellini,
2008b), such as family members and friends. Closing up social networks eventually
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leads to acceptance and even encouragement of unfair behaviour towards strangers.
These uncivic norms of behaviour will be persistent, because parents transmit
conservative priors to their children (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008a).
Although conservative priors might be individually rational, in general, un-
civicness leads to an inefficient increase in demand for state control over political
and economic affairs (Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer,
2003). However, because public officials are also recruited from the same pool
of uncivic citizens, it is likely that public officials are also uncivic and corrupt
(Aghion, Algan, and Shleifer, 2010). Uncivic officials reinforce the belief that no
one can be trusted. When this path is launched, a following generation would only
demand more regulation, leading to even more distrust.
On the other hand, when no negative historical events hinder accumulation
of civic capital, an efficient cooperative outcome can be reached.3 Civic norms
of behaviour, i.e. norms of cooperation not limited to the inner circle of family
and close friends, are transmitted and reinforced, thereby reducing demand for
regulation (Pinotti, 2008). Social trust and widespread norms of pro-cooperative
behaviour decrease demand for state regulation and promote development of trade
and market structures by reducing transaction costs (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La-
Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales,
2004; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Tabellini, 2010). Such a society will also tend to
avoid autocratic political regimes by establishing systems of power checks and bu-
reaucratic regulations, setting up basis for a properly functioning democratic state
(Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 1999; Badescu
and Uslaner, 2003; Tabellini, 2008a).
2.3 Empirical strategy
To empirically analyse the effect of civic capital on preferences for economic and
political systems, two main assumptions need to be satisfied. First, civic capital has
to be exogenously determined. Second, we need to make sure that no third factor,
such as current institutions, can potentially confound the relationship between civic
capital and political preferences. In this study, we propose and empirically test the
link between civic capital and preferences for economic and political systems, under
the conditions that plausibly satisfy the above mentioned assumptions. We analyse
3Because of institutional inertia, conservatively transmitted priors and interaction between be-
liefs and institutions, positive shocks to civic capital do not have such long lasting consequences
as negative shocks do. Therefore, longer periods of adjustment are needed before a path to-
wards another, more cooperative outcome, can be launched (Jacob and Tyrell, 2010).
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the relationship between civic capital and preferences for economic and political
systems in a transition country with a rich historical background, Ukraine, because
of two sources of exogenous variation that its history provides.
The first element is the fact that Ukraine has been split under and ruled
by various political regimes for centuries. Its population was affected by different
institutions and events depending on the region. We argue that the current level
of civic capital reflects different historical circumstances which Ukrainian citizens
experienced before the Soviet Union occupation, because of a conservative nature
and intergenerational transmission of civic capital.
The eastern part of current Ukrainian territory was under the influence of
Russian tsardom that later became the Russian Empire in the 17th century (a
more detailed account of the history of Ukraine is in Appendix 2.B.). The regime
of the Russian Empire was highly oppressive and unpredictable, characterised by
harsh rules, pervasive orthodox religion and serfdom (A˚berg, 2000; Subtelny, 2005;
Riabchuk, 2008). Ukrainians in the East were subject to constant persecutions
(Subtelny, 2005), which is likely to have had an adverse effect on their civic capital.
The western part, on the contrary, was integrated into a Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth during the 17th century. Later it became a part of the Habsburg
Empire. While these circumstances were not necessarily favourable for the accu-
mulation of civic capital, when compared to the conditions of the Russian Empire,
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Habsburg Empire were more toler-
ant towards the local population. The rule of the Habsburgs was described as an
honest and reliable bureaucracy which respected the identity and local differences
of various parts of the empire (Magocsi, 2010; Becker, Boeckh, Hainz, and Woess-
mann, 2011). It is likely that these differences in historical treatment affected civic
capital accumulation differently in the two parts, such that more civic capital was
preserved in the West compared to the East.
The second element of the experiment in the Ukrainian history is the existence
of the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union in Ukraine since the early 1920’s in
the East and since the World War II in the West. Citizens could not choose their
own political and economic structures until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Moreover, obsessive control by the totalitarian structures of the Soviet authorities
did not allow citizens to freely express and discuss their opinions about the desir-
ability of other political and economic systems. It is unlikely that preferences for
economic and political systems, which could have been inherited from before the
Soviet Union period, were transmitted to the following generations. In contrast,
civic norms of behaviour and beliefs about strangers are more persistent because
they are formed through intra-family interactions (Tabellini, 2008b). Civic capital
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would require at least several generations to re-accumulate following a favourable
exogenous change in the environment (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008a). In
other words, the period of Ukrainian history between 1946 and 1991 represents a
‘frozen’ state, in which inherited differences in civic capital were transmitted from
one generation to another, while preferences for economic and political systems
were not.
The sudden end of the Soviet Union in the 1991 was an exogenous shock
that removed totalitarian governmental control. Ukrainian population started to
develop preferences for economic and political systems which would be in line with
their civic norms. In the West, where civic capital was less damaged by oppressive
regimes, pro-social norms of behaviour are likely to stimulate demand for systems
with little regulations, such as a market-based economy and a democratic state. In
contrast, lack of social trust and uncivic norms of behaviour in the East is likely
to generate demand for strong government regulation, i.e. for a centrally planned
(command) economy and an autocratic Soviet style political system.4
2.4 Data and variables
The main data source that we use for testing our predictions is the 2007 wave of the
Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS).5 We restrict the sample to the
regions to which we refer as West and East based on the historical background. The
territory of Ukraine consists of 24 ‘oblasts’ (territorial and administrative units),
of which seven western oblasts are defined as ‘West’ and five eastern oblasts are
defined as ‘East’. Shaded areas on the map on Figure 2.1 picture the location of
these regions. We use outermost regions for the empirical analysis, since these are
territories for which clear predictions can be made with respect to civic capital.6
The summary statistics of the variables for the sample used in the estimation are
presented in Table 2.A in Appendix 2.A.
Our two dependent variables reflecting demand for a more or less regulated
economic and political systems are defined using answers to the following ques-
tions: “What kind of economic system, in your opinion, is most suitable for
Ukraine?” and “What kind of political system, in your opinion, is most suit-
4Analysis of the relationship between preferences for political and economic systems and the
development of such systems is beyond the scope of this study. We assume that citizens’
preferences reflect their beliefs about desirability of a certain system.
5More details on the ULMS can be found in Lehmann, Muravyev, and Zimmermann (2012).
6Because of the turbulent history of Ukraine, the center, North and South territories were
changing hands frequently, thereby creating an overly complex mix of influences.
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Figure 2.1: Map of Ukraine
Note: West and East regions are shaded on the map.
able for Ukraine?”.7 The categories for the variable ‘economic system preference’
are: (1) The centrally-planned economy which was in our country until perestroika;
(2) A centrally-planned economy with elements of a market economy; (3) The eco-
nomic system which exists today; (4) A market economy with strong government
regulation; (5) A market economy with little government regulation; (6) A free
market economy without government regulation. The ‘political system preference’
categories are as follows: (1) The Soviet system which was in our country until
perestroika; (2) The Soviet system, but in a different, more democratic form; (3)
The political system which exists today; (4) A western-type democracy. Figure 2.2
plots the distribution of preferences for economic and political systems in the pop-
ulation. Remarkably, the current economic system and the current political system
has the lowest share of supporters.
For the first part of our empirical analysis, we construct two binary variables
reflecting a preference towards the system with more or less state control. The
dummy ‘preference for a market-based’ economic system is equal to one if categories
(4), (5), or (6) of the economic preference are chosen, and to zero otherwise. The
dummy ‘preference for a democratic political system’ is equal to one if the preferred
political system is a western-type democracy (category (4)), and it is equal to
zero otherwise. In the second part of the analysis, a multinomial logit model
7All the questions are translated from Ukrainian or from Russian, which are two main languages
spoken in Ukraine.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of political preferences
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(b) Preferences for political systems
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(1) Soviet system before perestroika
is estimated, which better accounts for the categorical nature of the dependent
variables.
Our explanatory variable, ‘shared civic capital’, reflects the level of ‘civicness’
or readiness to act pro-socially towards (unknown) individuals relative to inner cir-
cle of family because destroyed social trust is likely to be compensated by excessive
reliance on close social networks (LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny,
1997; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008b). To illustrate the negative relationship
between trust in strangers and trust in family, Figure 2.4 plots the oblast mean
levels of the two dimensions of trust against each other. To construct the ‘shared
civic capital’ measure, we first define civic capital as the ratio of trust in strangers
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Figure 2.4: Correlation of trust in strangers and trust in family
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Source: ULMS, 2007.
Note: The data points represent averages of trust in strangers and trust in family per
oblast. Higher values reflect more trust.
to trust in family on individual level.8 We take the mean of civic capital per oblast
as the measure of shared civic capital.9
Table 2.1 shows the mean values of various indicators of inherited civic norms
and values per West and East. According to our civic capital measure, there is
significantly more civic capital in the West than in the East (p-value<.01). Civic
capital should also be reflected in other norms facilitating collective action, such as
pro-social orientation, willingness to contribute to a public good, and disapproval
of anti-social behaviour. Table 2.1 shows that most of the differences across West
and East along various facets of civic capital are significant.
8Trust in strangers is measured by a survey question reading as “How would you assess your
attitude towards other persons: Are you a person who in general trusts other persons, or are
you a person who rather does not trust other persons? Please mark a number on the following
scale, where the value 0 means: ‘I do not trust other persons at all’ and the value 10: ‘I trust
other persons completely”. Trust in family is measured by an answer to an identical questions
referring to trust in ‘family members’ instead of ‘other persons’.
9For each individual, his or her own value of civic capital is excluded from calculation of the
shared civic capital measure.
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Table 2.1: Difference in civic capital across West and East of Ukraine
West East t-value1 Observations
Civic capital (individual level) 0.43 0.39 −3.10 2467
How justifiable is...
Claiming government benefits2 2.92 2.94 0.23 2259
Avoiding a fare on public transport 3.62 4.34 6.07 2406
Cheating on taxes 2.99 3.50 4.49 2357
Someone accepting a bribe 1.82 2.16 4.13 2478
Lying 2.77 3.39 2.90 615
Political assassination 1.26 1.57 2.65 610
Orientation towards society
It is better to stick to own affairs3 2.15 2.62 5.11 578
Concerned with immediate family4 1.22 1.39 3.40 630
Concerned with people in the neigh-
bourhood
3.14 3.21 0.81 624
Concerned with people in the region 2.95 3.16 2.60 613
Concerned with fellow countrymen 2.81 3.04 2.83 610
Concerned with Europeans 3.57 3.90 4.08 587
Concerned with human kind 3.19 3.38 2.02 584
Willing to fight for the country5 0.87 0.72 −7.92 1871
Control and responsibility over one’s life
Freedom of choice and control over
your life6
5.98 5.12 −7.97 2345
Living day to day because of uncer-
tain future7
0.48 0.62 3.45 584
Perceived extent of political
corruption8
3.20 3.41 5.37 1290
Source: World Values Survey; pooled waves 1996, 1999, 2006.
Note: Columns ‘West’ and ‘East’ report means of the variables named in the first column.
1 t-value refers to the t-test statistic on the significance of the difference between West and East.
2 The variables in this set “How justifiable is...” are measured on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means ‘never
justifiable’ and 10 means ‘always justifiable’. The full wording of the item is ‘Claiming government benefits
one is not entitled to’.
3 ‘It is better to stick to own affairs’ is measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means ‘strongly agree’ and 5
means ‘strongly disagree’.
4 The following variables (“Concerned with...”) are measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means ‘very much’
and 5 means ‘not at all’.
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6 ‘How much freedom of choice and control you have over your life’ is measured on a scale from 1 to 10, 1
meaning ‘none at all’ and 10 meaning ‘a great deal’.
7 ‘Living day to day because of uncertain future’ is a dummy variable, where 1 means ‘tends to agree’.
8 Perceived extent of political corruption is measured on a scale from 1 to 4, in which 1 means ‘almost no public
officials are corrupt’ and 4 means ‘almost all public officials are corrupt’.
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Figure 2.4: Correlation of trust in strangers and trust in family
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Note: The data points represent averages of trust in strangers and trust in family per
oblast. Higher values reflect more trust.
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as the measure of shared civic capital.9
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2.5 Results
In Ukraine, the demand for regulation of economic and political affairs is highly
correlated. Figure 2.5 plots preferences for a market-based economy and a demo-
cratic state against each other. The Spearman’s correlation coefficient of .87 (p-
value<.01) is line with widely documented tendency of economic and political
systems to co-evolve along the dimension of regulation (Barro, 1999; Rodrik and
Wacziarg, 2005; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008b; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robin-
son, and Yared, 2008).
Figure 2.5: Correlation of preferences for economic and political systems
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Source: ULMS, 2007.
Note: The data points represent are shares of individuals who have preferences for systems
with little regulation, per oblast.
Table 2.2 presents the estimates of the effect of shared civic capital on the
preferences for economic and political systems. To simplify the exposition, we first
present the results of the logit model estimation. The dependent variable is the
(binary) preference for a market economy-based system in columns (1) and (2), and
preference for a democratic political system in columns (3) and (4). The variables
are as defined in section 2.4. Each model includes an interaction term between
residence in the West and shared civic capital in the oblast of residence. Table 2.2
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Table 2.2: Civic capital and political preferences
Market-based economy Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Civic capital in the East 2.450∗∗∗ 1.563∗∗∗ 2.617∗∗∗ 1.198
(0.272) (0.438) (0.480) (0.760)
Civic capital in the West 0.253∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.099) (0.120) (0.138)
Control variables:
Individual demographic and socio-
economic characteristics
No Yes No Yes
Opinion about the Orange Revolution
events in Ukraine
No Yes No Yes
Parental background No Yes No Yes
Characteristics of region and place of
residence
No Yes No Yes
Difference between the effects in the East and in the West:1
Chi-squared 57.54 8.38 18.51 0.64
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42
Sample 2505 2414 2415 2340
Source: ULMS.
Note: Estimation: logit. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is equal to 1 if market-based economy
is preferred (categories 4, 5, and 6 in the original categorical variable); the dependent variable in columns
(3) and (4) is equal to 1 if a democratic political system is preferred (category 4 in the original categorical
variable). Otherwise the dependent variables are equal to zero. Entries in the table are elasticities.
1 These results are based on Wald tests of the equality of the predicted marginal effects.
reports the marginal effects evaluated at sample means and reported in the form of
elasticities of civic capital on preferences for systems with low government control
for the West and for the East.
In columns (1) and (3) no control variables are included. The difference
between the effect of civic capital in the East and in the West is statistically sig-
nificant, as indicated by Chi-square test reported in the bottom of Table 2.2, sup-
porting the findings on the aggregate level. When including of a large set of control
variables in columns (2) and (4), the findings remain qualitatively intact, although
the difference in the effect of civic capital in column (4) is no longer significant.
The set of control variables includes individual characteristics (demographics, ed-
ucation, employment and marital status, number of children, nationality, size of
place of residence, log of household income per household member), parental edu-
cation background, and regional characteristics (regional unemployment rate and
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log of regional GDP), own civic capital and the opinion about the developments
in Ukraine during the last two years following the Orange revolution.10
Table 2.3: Preferences for a market-based economic system
(2)1 (3) (4) (5)
Civic capital in the East 1.639∗∗ −2.744 1.699∗∗ 2.290∗∗∗
(0.640) (1.789) (0.676) (0.784)
Civic capital in the West −0.379 −0.653 0.395∗ 0.122
(0.424) (0.693) (0.219) (0.203)
Control variables:
Individual demographic and socio-economic characteristics Yes
Opinion about the Orange Revolution events in Ukraine Yes
Parental background Yes
Characteristics of region and place of residence Yes
Difference between the effects in the East and in the West:2
Chi-squared 6.22 1.12 3.28 7.01
p-value 0.01 0.29 0.07 0.01
Source: ULMS.
Note: Estimation: Multinomial logit. This table presents results of a single model estimation. Observations:
2414. Table entries are elasticities. The coefficients represent the change in probability of choosing an economic
system resulting from an increase in civic capital of 1% relative to the base category.
Dependent variable is the preference for economic systems in the following categories:
(1) Centrally-planned economy that was in Ukraine before perestroika (base category);
(2) Centrally planned economy but with elements of market economy;
(3) The economic system that exists today in Ukraine;
(4) Market economy with strong government regulation;
(5) Market economy with little government regulation and a free market economy without government regu-
lation.
1 The column numbering corresponds to the categories of the dependent variable. 1 is omitted because it is the
reference category.
2 These results are based on Wald tests of the equality of the predicted marginal effects.
Although the logit model results are easier to interpret, to properly account for
a categorical nature of our dependent variables, we proceed to the multinomial logit
results presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The models include an interaction term
between shared civic capital and residence in the West, which allows to interpret
the effect of civic capital separately for the West and for the East. The models also
include a full set of control variables, as specified above. Column numbers represent
the categories of the political preferences variables as described in section 2.4,11
10Although this opinion variable is important to control for, since the West of Ukraine was much
more supportive of European integration and pro-democratic development than the East, the
findings are not affected by the inclusion.
11We merge categories (5) and (6) in economic system preference, i.e. preference for an economic
system with little government regulation and a free market economic system.
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Table 2.4: Preferences for a democratic political system
(2)1 (3) (4)
Civic capital in the East 2.350∗∗∗ −1.253 1.993∗∗
(0.515) (1.294) (0.781)
Civic capital in the West −0.608 −1.354∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.672) (0.137)
Control variables:
Individual demographic and socio-economic characteristics Yes
Opinion about the Orange Revolution events in Ukraine Yes
Parental background Yes
Characteristics of region and place of residence Yes
Difference between the effects in the East and in the West:2
Chi-squared 19.49 0.00 3.48
p-value 0.00 0.95 0.06
Source: ULMS.
Note: Estimation: Multinomial logit. This table presents results of a single model estimation. Observations:
2340. Table entries are elasticities. The coefficients represent the change in probability of choosing an economic
system resulting from an increase in civic capital of 1% relative to the base category.
Dependent variable is the preference for political systems in the following categories:
(1) Old style Soviet system (reference category);
(2) Soviet system with elements of democracy;
(3) The political system that exists today in Ukraine;
(4) Western type democracy.
1 The column numbering corresponds to the categories of the dependent variable. 1 is omitted because it is the
reference category.
2 These results are based on Wald tests of the equality of the predicted marginal effects.
such that each table entry corresponds to the change in probability to support a
particular kind of an economic or a political system relative to the base category
(the centrally planned economy before perestroika in Table 2.3 or the old-style
Soviet political system in Table 2.4) resulting from a 1% increase in shared civic
capital.
For example, column (4) of Table 2.3 shows that a 1% increase in shared civic
capital is associated with a 1.7% increase in the probability of supporting a market
economy with strong government regulation relative to the base category. The size
of the effect in the West is much smaller, only a 0.4% increase in the probability
of supporting a market economy with strong government regulation is predicted,
resulting from a 1% increase in shared civic capital (p-value<0.01). Similarly, from
Table 2.4, a 1% increase in shared civic capital in the East increases support for a
democratic political system by 2%, whereas in the West by 0.5%.
Differences in political preferences across East and West can be attributed to
the inherited differences in civic capital if the conditions under which these political
preferences remained stable until 1991. Given lack of data on preferences and
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beliefs during the Soviet time, this is impossible to verify directly. An indirect way
of testing this assumption is to reconstruct the evolvement of political preferences
since the beginning of the transition period. If there is a causal effect of civic
capital on political preferences, we should observe virtually no difference in the
beginning of transition, since political preferences were similar (or undefined) under
the Soviet regime. With the years, inherited civic capital in the West should affect
the formation of political preferences such that an increasing share of population
will develop preferences for economic and political systems with little government
intervention.
Figure 2.6: Share of citizens supporting the development of a market-based eco-
nomic system
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Source: World Values Survey (WVS), Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Consolidation of Democ-
racy in Central and Eastern Europe, ULMS. Unweighted averages per year, combined where available.
Using a combination of all available (to our knowledge) data sources on polit-
ical preferences of Ukrainian population, we construct a measure which reflects a
share of the population that supports a market-based economy (against a planned
economy) or a democratic political state (as opposed to an authoritarian state)
in the West and in the East. Figure 2.6 displays the development of preferences
for a market-based economy starting from 1992, when the earliest year for which
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2.5 Results
we have data on the regional level. The line with hollow triangles indicating data
points displays the share of supporters of a market economy in the West, whereas
the solid line with squares reflects the share of supporters of a market economy in
the East.
Figure 2.7: Share of citizens supporting the development of a democratic political
system
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Source: World Values Survey (WVS), Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Consolidation of Democ-
racy in Central and Eastern Europe, ULMS. Unweighted averages per year, combined where available.
The development path of the market economy preference is diverging dramati-
cally across the regions. The initial share of the population (about 45%) supporting
a market-economy based system was uniform across West and East. However, in
the West, after an initial dip during the early 90’s, possibly attributable to a poorly
performing economy with 60% reduction in yearly GDP,12 the share of the popu-
lation which prefers a market- economy based system was steadily increasing up
to 2007. In contrast, in the East, the share of market economy supporters in 2007
still did not reach the same level as in 1990.
Figure 2.7 plots the development of preferences for a democratic political
structure in Ukraine. For this measure, the earliest available regional level data
12See Figure 1.2a in Chapter 1.
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come from 1995, therefore we have no information on the regional fractions of
the population that supported democracy at the dawn of the transition period.
The development paths look similar to the economic system preference: there is
a higher demand for democracy in the West, which is relatively stable during the
observation period, whereas in the East, the initially high share of citizens who
preferred a democratic political system declines from about .65 to less than .20
from 1995 to 2007.13
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we offer and test a potential third factor explanation of the possibly
spurious relationship between economic growth and democratic development. We
investigate the role of civic capital, a set of cooperative norms, values, and beliefs
in shaping preferences for economic and political systems. Using a special situation
that occurred in Ukraine, the country that experienced different political regimes
on its territory before the second half of the 20th century, after which it was a
part of the Soviet Union until 1991, we exploit exogenous sources of variation in
civic capital across the regions of the country to test our predictions. More specif-
ically, under the assumption that during the Soviet Union period civic capital was
transmitted trough the generations while preferences about political and economic
systems were not, we examine the relationship between the inherited civic capital
and the political preferences.
We use the fact that the accumulation of regional civic capital was affected
by the rule of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Habsburg Empire
(West) or the Russian Empire (East). We document a significant difference in
civic capital between the West and the East, which is attributable to the effect of
historical institutions.
We find a positive effect of civic capital on both preferences for a democratic
political system and for a market-based economic system. We also document that
civic capital has a diminishing marginal effect on demand for systems with little
government intervention. In the West, where much civic capital was preserved,
the increase in preference for democratic structures and a market-based economy
resulting from a small increase in shared civic capital is significantly lower than in
the East.
We trace the development of preferences for economic and political systems
since the transition to provide empirical evidence that it is unlikely that political
13In 2006, a different definition of regions was used in the data set (WVS) than the one we use
in this study, which might explain an outlier in the East in 2006.
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preferences were formed during the Soviet Union period. The same share of popu-
lation had a preference for a market-based economy in the beginning of transition
(1992), regardless whether it was in the West or in the East. After the mid-1990’s,
the development paths diverge dramatically. A similar picture emerges for the
preference for a political system, although we do not have the data for the early
1990’s.
The analysis reported in this chapter sheds light on the important interrela-
tionship between economic growth and development of democracy. We argue that
a third factor, which has been shown to play a role in facilitating economic de-
velopment and in promoting democracy, causes the co-evolution of economic and
political structures. Following the well-established literature which shows that his-
torical events have long-lasting effects on trust, we argue that civic capital accumu-
lation across the territory of Ukraine was affected differently by various historical
institutions. Subsequently, we provide empirical evidence which suggests that civic
capital has a causal effect on the development of preferences for a market-economy
based system and hints at the causality of the relationship between civic capital
and preferences for a democratic political system.
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2.A Descriptive statistics
Table 2.A: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Preference for a market-based economic system 0.49 0.50 0 1
Preference for a democratic political system 0.33 0.47 0 1
Civic capital 0.41 0.29 0.1 6
Age 45.3 16.1 18 73
1 if Male 0.43 0.49 0 1
1 if Medium education 0.65 0.48 0 1
1 if Higher education 0.23 0.42 0 1
1 if Unemployed 0.05 0.21 0 1
1 if Out of labour force 0.39 0.49 0 1
Log per head household income 3.53 1.57 1.2 9.7
1 if Not married 0.21 0.40 0 1
1 if Separated or missing 0.17 0.38 0 1
Number of children 1.44 1.01 0 6
1 if Lives in an urban settlement 0.13 0.33 0 1
1 if Lives in a town 0.34 0.48 0 1
1 if Lives in a city 0.26 0.44 0 1
1 if Ukrainian 0.77 0.42 0 1
Opinion on the past two years since Orange Revolution 2.12 0.95 1 5
1 if Medium education mother 0.28 0.45 0 1
1 if Higher education mother 0.08 0.28 0 1
1 if Unknown education mother 0.03 0.17 0 1
1 if Medium education father 0.23 0.42 0 1
1 if Higher education father 0.09 0.28 0 1
1 if Unknown education father 0.11 0.32 0 1
Log regional GDP 8.73 0.13 7.9 8.9
Regional unemployment rate 6.67 1.25 5.4 13
Source: ULMS, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
Note: For details on variables definition refer to section 2.4. Omitted categories are: Female, Lower education,
Employed, Married, Lives in a village, Lower education mother, Lower education father. ’Opinion on the past
two years since Orange Revolution’ is a categorical variable, which is equal to 1 if ’the situation got much
worse’ and it is equal to 5 if ’the situation got much better’.
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The political entity of Kyiv Rus (10th–11th centuries) is the earliest state formation
on the territory of current Ukraine. After it was devastated in 1240 by the Mongols,
the successor became a Western Kingdom of Galicia and Volhynia (Magocsi, 2010).
The Kingdom played an important role in the region for the next 100 years, when
it was dismayed and the territory came under control of Poland and Lithuania
(Subtelny, 2005). The Eastern part was constantly under attack by the Golden
Orde, the Mongolian and Tatar nomads, when the Grand Duchy of Muscovy started
uniting Russian lands (Magocsi, 2010).
In the meantime, an autonomous and well-regulated Cossack military state
was created on the Dnieper banks (Subtelny, 2005). The state had an indepen-
dent government, adopted a democratic election procedure for designation of com-
manding officers and hetman (chief commander), organized a general assembly as
a supreme authority elected and provided other liberties for its citizens. According
to some sources (Riabchuk, 2008), high moral values, like honour, honesty and
patriotism were important in socializing the population of the Cossack state. In
1649, Russian tsardom fully sanctioned serfdom, attaching peasants to the lands
and the landlord (Magocsi, 2010). Serfs were seeking refuge in the Cossack state,
to escape the punishment for leaving their land.
In 1654, the Cossacks made an agreement with Muscovy, seeking protection
against the Polish, but this eventually lead to the integration of Eastern Ukraine
into Russian tsardom (A˚slund, 2007). Cossack lands came under complete control
of Russia from 1686 (Subtelny, 2005). On the other hand, a treaty singed in
1658 created the powerful Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which included the
Western part of Ukraine. Since mid-17 century, Ukraine lived under two different
political systems: the rule of the elected Polish king was limited by the nobility, who
were almost autonomous in how they ran their properties, whereas in territories
under the Russian control, the nobility lost their privileges and power, and the
administration was becoming more and more centralised (Magocsi, 2010).
During the 18th-19th centuries the East (and South) of Ukraine constituted
a part of the Russian Empire, called ’Little Russia’. Ukraine was considered be-
longing to the Russian Empire by right (Subtelny, 2005). The Orthodox church,
an essential part of life, was ruled by the Russian patriarch. The centralisation
of local administration ran from Saint-Petersburg was becoming stronger than
ever, local nationalities were suppressed and local governance was not tolerated.
The administration was organised along military lines such that superiors bullied
their subordinates and corruption became a wide-spread, though for Ukrainians a
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new phenomenon (Subtelny, 2005). Additionally, the army of the Russian Empire
needed recruits. Those were drafted and taken away from home against their will
to serve for the Tsar for 25 years.
At the end of the 18th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth weak-
ened and came under the Habsburg Empire. The outmost Western regions of
Ukraine became a part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire in 1772. Several im-
portant differences existed in the organisation of the two Empires that separated
Ukrainian territory and its people. In contrast to the Russian Empire, the Hab-
sburg Empire was characterised by well-run, predominantly local administration.
Reforms, starting from 1740, were meant to transform the Empire into a modern
bureaucratic state (Magocsi, 2010). Moreover, the German language never gained
so much dominance as the Russian language and culture in the neighbouring em-
pire. In contrast to the Russian empire, where the majority of the population
was Russian, in the Habsburg Empire 11 major ethnic groups were presented, not
counting the smaller ones (Subtelny, 2005). The Habsburgs respected local cus-
toms and traditions and allowed teaching children in peoples’ own language at the
elementary school. In Russia, Ukrainian language and nationality were forbidden
and prosecuted, which is officially declared in the so-called ‘Ems order’ of 1876.
Teaching at schools was only allowed in Russian. The ‘Little Russian dialect’ was
prohibited for use (Magocsi, 2010).
In 1781, serfdom was severely restricted in the Austrian Empire. At the same
time, compulsory elementary schooling was introduced, increasing the education
level, especially among the poorest strata of society: the peasants (Magocsi, 2010).
In the Russian Empire, the number of schools actually declined from the 18th to
the 19th century. There was no compulsory education and the investments in
education, for that period of time, were among the lowest in the world (Magocsi,
2010). The Tsar organised a secret police and informers in 1826, following a series
of revolts. Serfs could be bought and sold in the Russian Empire, they had no
rights until 1861, when serfdom was finally abolished.
In the beginning of the 20th century, between the years 1917 and 1922, Ukraine
had several attempts of establishing an independent nation state. However, soon
the major part of the territory was occupied by Bolsheviki, and Soviet authority
was established over the whole country that became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic
Republic, with the exception of Western oblasts (shaded region in the West, see
map on Figure 2.1). The Western oblasts were divided between Poland, Romania,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia between 1919 and 1939 (Grytsak, 2000).
The Soviet troops invaded Poland in 1939 and appropriated Eastern Galicia
and Volhynia (Western regions of Ukraine and North-Eastern parts of contempo-
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rary Romania and Poland) to the Ukrainian SSR. The last Western oblast (Za-
karpatska, or Transcarpathia) was added after the war, in 1945. Since that time
Ukraine exists as a unitary republic with similar political and economic condi-
tions across the whole territory, initially as a part of the Soviet Union, and as an
independent state since 1991.
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3 Risk attitudes and occupational choice
3.1 Introduction
Occupational choice is an important decision that individuals have to make at
the beginning of their career, and that has a profound impact on their future
labour market outcomes.1 Not surprisingly, there is a long tradition of research in
the social sciences on the determinants and consequences of occupational choice
(Blau, Gustad, Jessor, Parnes, and Wilcock, 1955; Miller, 1984; Ham, Junankar,
and Wells, 2009; Bentolila, Michelacci, and Suarez, 2010). Economists have doc-
umented a relationship between risky characteristics of occupations and risk atti-
tudes of workers in these occupations. For example, DeLeire and Levy (2004) show
that single parents with dependent children are less likely to work in occupations
with high fatality risk.2 More direct measures of risk attitudes have also been used
in the literature to document a correlation between workers’ willingness to take
risks and the earnings risk of their chosen occupation (e.g. Bonin, Dohmen, Falk,
Huffman, and Sunde, 2007; Fouarge, Kriechel, and Dohmen, 2012).3 Since average
earnings tend to be higher in occupations with a higher earnings variance (King,
1974; Leigh, 1981; Hartog and Vijverberg, 2007b), it is plausible that a causal sort-
ing pattern exists.4 Workers who are more willing to take risks profit from working
in more risky occupations that pay a risk premium. However, with field data from
Western labour markets it is typically difficult to identify a causal impact of work-
ers’ willingness to take risks on occupational sorting due to endogenous evolution
of wage structure and worker composition.5
In this chapter, we investigate whether a change in relative earnings risk of
occupations that was not anticipated when labour market participants chose their
occupation triggers occupational (re-)sorting of workers based on their risk atti-
tudes. Such a sorting pattern leads to a better alignment of workers’ risk prefer-
ences to the earnings risk of their occupation. In particular, we study occupational
1This chapter is joint work with Thomas Dohmen and Ben Kriechel. We would like to thank
Juerg Schweri, Olivier Marie, Arnaud Dupuy, Didier Fouarge for their helpful comments. The
chapter was presented at the DUHR seminar at Maastricht University (2011), SOLE (2012),
ESPE (2012), IWAEE (2012), EALE (2012) and the ZEW (2012).
2Grazier and Sloane (2008) replicate the findings of DeLeire and Levy (2004) in the USA for
the UK.
3Other studies investigated the relationship between risk preferences and employment contract
type (Guiso, Jappelli, and Pistaferri, 2002; Brown, Farrell, Harris, and Sessions, 2006), or
a choice for self-employment (Van Praag and Cramer, 2001; Cramer, Hartog, Jonker, and
Van Praag, 2002; Ekelund, Johansson, Ja¨rvelin, and Lichtermann, 2005).
4Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2005) build on the idea that risk preferences are related to
the choice of sector in their study of the importance of precautionary savings motive.
5A laboratory experiment by Dohmen and Falk (2011) shows that risk attitudes affect the
decision to select into variable payment schemes. Fouarge, Kriechel, and Dohmen (2012)
suggest causality of the relationship between risk attitudes and unexplained earnings variance
as they study a population of recent labour market entrants.
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sorting in the Ukrainian labour market, which experienced profound changes in its
occupational wage structure that were initiated by the economic transition from a
Soviet type planned economy to a market economy. This setting provides a unique
opportunity to investigate how risk attitudes affect the decision to sort into oc-
cupations that differ with respect to earnings risk. More specifically, we exploit
the fact that the (unexplained) earnings variance was very low and similar across
occupations in Soviet times, as wages were centrally set by the government and
highly regulated. When Ukraine became independent in 1991, the transition from
a centrally planned economy to a market economy set in. During this transition,
the wage structure of the Ukrainian labour market changed markedly. The vari-
ance of earnings increased in almost all occupations. But what is more important
for our analysis, differences in earnings risk between occupations became also much
larger. The differential evolvement of earnings risk across occupations is expected
to affect occupational choice and occupational mobility.
When occupations do not differ with respect to earnings risk, there is no
reason to take it into account when choosing an occupation. Since earnings risk was
very similar across occupations in Soviet times, it was probably not an important
criterion in occupational choice, so that the correlation between earnings risk and
risk preferences is expected to be low before transition.6 Market liberalisation
during the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy brought about
an increase in earnings risk and, importantly, increased heterogeneity of earnings
across occupations. If workers sort into occupations based on their risk preferences,
we should expect the correlation between risk preferences and earnings risk to
become positive during the transition.
We relate risk attitudes to the occupation-specific earnings variance before
and after transition, to check whether the occupational earnings variance was in-
deed irrelevant for occupational choice before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and
whether it has evolved to become a significant determinant of occupational choice
during the transition period. We then investigate whether individuals switch occu-
pations such that their risk attitudes are better aligned to the occupational earnings
risk. We use the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) as our main
data source. The ULMS is a household panel survey that contains the current
wage and employment information for all three waves (2003, 2004, and 2007), as
well as retrospective information on labour market status, occupations and wage
income going back to 1986, thus covering the period prior to the collapse of the
command economy.
6We also expect this correlation to be close to zero for purely mechanical reasons, simply because
there was virtually no variation in occupational earnings risk.
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. We sketch a conceptual framework
in section 3.2. The data and main variables are described in section 3.3. We proceed
by presenting our empirical approach and important features of the changes in the
occupational wage structure during transition that are relevant for our study in
section 3.4. The findings are presented and discussed in section 3.5. Section 3.6
addresses sensitivity of the findings by checking the relationships by varying the
estimation sample, using an external data set to derive an alternative earnings risk
measure, and discussing possible bias sources, such as heterogeneity and ability-
based selection. The last section concludes.
3.2 Conceptual framework
Our conceptual framework builds on the following observations and ideas: Occu-
pations differ with respect to their riskiness. Sources of occupational risk include
occupational health hazard, fatality risk, unemployment risk and earnings risk, i.e.
the variability of wages that is not explained by differences in human capital.7 In
this study we focus on the earnings risk dimension, which arises from two sources
(cf. King, 1974). First, earnings cannot be perfectly predicted based on personal
characteristics (e.g. talents, skill, knowledge and any other type of human capital)
even if ability was known (Weiss, 1970; Arcidiacono, 2004), and hence we assume
that individuals do not know where they will end up in the earnings distribution
at the time when they sort into an occupation. Second, variability in earnings can
result from cyclical and structural shocks.
In an expected utility framework, risk averse agents demand a compensation
to accept earnings uncertainty (Hartog, 2011). In the most simple model, in which
the number of slots in occupations is fixed and workers can be ranked in terms of
their risk aversion, the least risk averse n workers fill the available n slots in the most
risky occupation. The risk premium is determined by the marginal worker, i.e. the
nth most risk averse worker. The n-1 least risk averse workers have an incentive
to sort into the most risky occupation as the offered risk premium more than
compensates them for the risk they have to incur in that occupation. King (1974)
was probably the first to provide empirical evidence by showing that occupations
that entail higher earnings risks offer entrants higher expected earnings, and that
individuals from wealthier families work in occupations which are more risky.
We adopt the approach taken by McGoldrick (1995) and Bonin et al. (2007)
and measure the earnings risk in different occupations by the residual distribution
7See, for example, Hamermesh (1999); Guiso, Jappelli, and Pistaferri (2002); DeLeire and Levy
(2004); Grazier and Sloane (2008).
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of wages, i.e. the random component of wages after conditioning on measures of
human capital. We interpret the cross-sectional unexplained wage variation as
representing wage uncertainty that labour market participants are confronted with
when they choose an occupation. If labour market participants, who differ in
willingness to take risk, take the earnings risk of an occupation into account when
they make their occupational choice, a positive correlation between earnings risk
and risk attitudes results.
In this chapter, we shed light on the causal nature of this relationship by
analysing how the correlation between earnings risk and risk attitudes develops
in the aftermath of a historical shock that affected earnings risk in occupations
differently.
3.3 Data
The data in this study come from a nationally representative household panel data
set, the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS), which covered about
6700 adults in the 2007 wave. The data set is structured similarly to the German
Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The first ULMS wave (2003) contained a
retrospective appraisal of respondents’ labour market status, such as occupation
and earnings, in 1986, the year of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster which is certainly
recalled by respondents.8 Recall bias regarding wages is likely to be low for another
reason: wages were public information and did not change much for decades during
the era of the centralised economy of the Soviet Union. In order to verify our claim
that respondents’ retrospective information is accurate, we collected data provided
by the Central Statistics Bureau of the Ukrainian SSR on wages per industry for
the late 1980’s. Since these official wage statistics are not available for occupations
but for industries, we compare retrospective wage information of respondents from
the ULMS on the industry level with official statistics on industry-specific wages in
Table 3.1. Averages constructed from the ULMS are remarkably similar to the ones
reported by the official sources, which confirms the reliability of the retrospective
information in our data-source.
Availability of directly measured risk attitudes is another feature of the ULMS.
Risk attitudes are measured from the answer to the survey question: “How do you
see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully willing to take risks or do you
8Such major events serve as reference points that make it easier to remember one’s own living
conditions that prevailed at that time, thereby diminishing recall bias (Eisenhower, Mathiowetz,
and Morganstein, 2004).
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Table 3.1: Earnings per industry sector, data from the Ukrainian Statistics cf. the
ULMS
Statistics Office Ukrainian SSR1 1985 ULMS data2 1986
Building and construction 207.1 Construction 221.6
Heavy industry 201.5 Industry 206.4
Transport and Communication 165.0 Transport, telecommunications 177.5
Credit and insurance 168.9 Financial intermediation, real estate 162.2
Agriculture 162.8 Agriculture, forestry 144.6
Public administration 152.8 Public administration and defense 210.1
Trade and purchasing 133.8 Sale, maintenance, repair of vehicles 137.1
Service 134.2 Other service, municipal services 143.7
Health and social care, Education 131.5 Education, health, and social care 126.2
ICT 131.5 —
Science 183.0 —
Art 140.7 —
Culture 107.9 —
— Electricity, gas, and water supply 180.6
— Other 189.0
Total 173.9 Total 172.8
Source: 1Central Statistics Bureau of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 2Ukrainian Longitudinal Mon-
itoring Survey.
Note: All wages are reported in roubles. Central Statistics Bureau data are available for 1985. Data from
the ULMS is based on the mean per industry as reported by the ULMS respondents. The classification of
industries differs across the data-sources. For comparison purposes, the official statistics wages per industry
were averaged in: “Transport and communication” (original value for ‘Transport’ is 186.1, for ‘Communication’
it is 143.9); and in “Health and social care, Education” (original value for ‘Health and social care’ is 121.4,
for ‘Education’ it is 141.6).
try to avoid taking risks? Please give me a number from 0 to 10, where the value 0
means: ‘Completely unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 means: ‘Completely
willing to take risks’. You can use the values in between to make your estimate.”9
Table 3.A in the Appendix shows the distribution of the dependent and indepen-
dent variables, demographic control variables per occupation per year, as well as
the relative size of occupations (in this sample).
3.4 Empirical strategy
To build ideas, imagine that the earnings risk is the same in all occupations. In
that case, it is not a distinguishing characteristic of occupations, and therefore it
9The wording is translated from Ukrainian. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and
Wagner (2011) show that this question is significantly correlated with lottery choices and
explains behaviour in a range of important real life decision domains.
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should not be a relevant choice criterion. Then, individuals’ risk attitudes should
be unrelated to occupational earnings risk.10 If, on the other hand, occupations
differ in the degree of earnings risk, we should expect that individuals who are more
willing to take risks are more likely to work in risky occupations, especially if risk
is compensated for. Our empirical strategy builds on the fact that the Ukrainian
labour market developed from the first described situation to the latter.
The labour market in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was character-
ized by a virtual absence of earnings risk and by high rigidity. In the centrally
planned economy, wage setting took place centrally, at the governmental level, and
wages were defined in strict wage grids. In addition, the wage distribution within
an occupation was narrow. Thus, there was little uncertainty about an occupa-
tion’s wages. Our estimates reveal that the unexplained variability in earnings as
measured by the standard deviation of residuals from a Mincer type wage equation
per occupation, was narrow and very similar across occupations.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine in
1991, drastic changes were initiated. As the centrally planned economy ceased to
exist, market structures started to evolve. In particular, with the beginning of pri-
vatisation and evolution of private business, the wage grid system was abolished, at
least in the private sector, and it became possible to differentiate wages. The wage
risk has increased to different degrees across occupations, creating heterogeneity in
the wage risk distribution. If labour market participants care about the wage risk
in their occupation, individuals who are not willing to take risks are expected to
switch to occupations with low earnings risk after transition, and individuals who
are more willing to take risks should be expected to change to occupations with
larger earnings risk.
Figure 3.1 depicts the change in earnings risk across occupations during the
transition period. We measure occupation-specific earnings risk following the ear-
lier literature (Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde, 2007; Hartog and Vi-
jverberg, 2007b). To construct this measure, we estimate the following augmented
Mincer wage regression:
Log(wage)ij = Xiβ + Ziγ + εi
in which the dependent variable is monthly log wages11 of individual i that is
employed in an occupation j,12 Xi is a matrix of standard human capital con-
10Risk aversion might affect the decision to participate in labour market when the earnings risk
is high, but there will be no heterogeneity with respect to occupational choice (in terms of
heterogeneity of the earnings risk).
11We use nominal wage data, because we never pool observations from across years.
12Occupations in the ULMS are classified according to the International Standard Classification
of Occupations (ISCO-88) on the two-digit level.
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trol variables (gender, age, age squared and cubed, tenure and tenure squared,
years of education, capital residence and public sector employment) and Zi is a
set of occupation dummies. Standard errors are clustered on the level of occupa-
tions. Years of education are calculated based on the highest completed level of
education. We define the standard deviation of the estimated residual from this
regression (εˆi), as the measure of the earnings risk (unexplained earnings variance)
per occupation (σˆj).
Figure 3.1 displays the range of occupation-specific earnings risk (horizontal
axis) and the fraction of workers exposed to that risk, i.e. working in a particular
occupation (vertical axis) prior to transition in 1986 (panel A), and in 2007, to
which we refer as the post-transition period (panel B). The range of the earnings
risks measure has increased from .28 – .61 in 1986 to .32 – 1.35 in 2007.
The evolution of earnings risk is expected to affect the decision of a risk averse
individual to work in a particular occupation. In fact, Ukraine offers a particularly
interesting setting to study the relationship between earnings risk and occupa-
tional sorting, because the transition to the market-based economy in Ukraine,
that brought about substantial heterogeneity in earnings risks across occupations,
was not expected when workers who participated in the labour market in 1986
made their occupational choice. If the hypothesis that workers sort into occu-
pations based on their risk preferences is correct, we should expect a stronger
positive correlation between earnings risk and risk attitudes of workers to evolve
during transition. Moreover, this effect should partly result from workers switching
to occupations in which their risk attitudes are better aligned to the occupational
earnings risk.
To investigate whether this latter pattern exists in our data, we restrict the
analysis to the balanced panel of respondents who were employed in 1986 and in
2007, and investigate the correlation between earnings risk and risk attitudes for
individuals who switch their occupation and individuals who stay in the same occu-
pation from 1986 to 2007. Sorting on preferences implies that individuals, initially
randomly distributed across occupations with respect to a characteristic that was
not important at the time of the distribution (in this case, the occupations-specific
earnings risk), would leave occupations in which their preferences are badly aligned
with the earnings risk when this occupational characteristic would suddenly gain
importance, and switch to occupations in which their preferences are better aligned.
Likewise, we should expect those whose risk preferences are by chance aligned to
the occupational earnings risk that evolved during transition to stay in their ini-
tially chosen occupation. In that case, we should also observe a positive correlation
between risk preferences and earnings risk among stayers. However, if there are
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Figure 3.1: Earnings risk before and after transition
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constraints to mobility or if occupational mobility is costly, this relationship is
expected to be weaker.
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3.5 Results
We start by documenting Spearman rank correlations between individual risk at-
titudes and occupation-specific earnings risk (σˆj) as defined in section 3.3 before
and after transition. In 1986, the correlation coefficient not significantly different
from zero (see column (1) of Table 3.2, Panel A). To confirm that this result was
not merely brought about by a lack of variation in earnings before the transition,
we correlated the risk attitudes of individuals working in a particular occupation
in 1986 with the earnings risk as measured in 2007, when there is substantial vari-
ability in earnings risk across occupations. This correlation was 0.03 and it was
also not statistically significant (p-value> 0.9, not reported).
Table 3.2: Earnings risk and risk attitudes before and after transition
Panel A: Before the transition (1986)
(1) (2)
Spearman’s ρ 0.154 −0.061
p-value 0.452 0.766
Occupations 26 26
Panel B: After the transition (2007)
(1) (2)
Spearman’s ρ 0.454 0.332
p-value 0.017 0.091
Occupations 27 27
Source: ULMS.
Note: Table reports Spearman rank correlation coefficients (ρ) between the earnings risk (the standard
deviation of residuals from a Mincer type wage regression, see section 3.4 for details) and the mean
of individual risk attitudes per occupation. Panel A refers to the pre-transition period (1986), panel
B refers to the post-transition period (2007). All available observations on employed individuals are
used for the estimation reported in column (1). In column (2), the sample is restricted to include panel
observations: individuals who were employed in 1986 and in 2007. The estimation in column (1) is based
on the sample of 2991 workers in 2007 (2489 in 1986) and in column (2) on 964 panel observations.
In 2007, however, the correlation coefficient is positive and statistically signif-
icant (ρ = 0.454 with a p-value< 0.02, see column (1) in Panel B of Table 3.2). The
correlation in 2007 is also significantly different from the correlation in 1986. This
finding confirms our hypothesis that the unexplained component of earnings vari-
ance was not a relevant parameter for occupational choice in the centrally planned
economy, but that a positive and statistically significant relationship between risk
attitudes and occupational earnings risk emerged during transition when earnings
risk became a distinguishing characteristic of occupations.
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In column (2), the sample is restricted to include a balanced panel of indi-
viduals who were employed in 1986 and in 2007. We find essentially the same
result which shows that our findings are not affected by sample composition.13
Figure 3.3 summarises the results graphically for the balanced sub-sample of indi-
viduals who were employed in 1986 and in 2007. We relate the occupation-specific
earnings risk to the mean of individual risk attitudes per occupation before and
after the transition period has started. The left panel shows the correlation in
the pre-transition period (1986) and the right panel shows the correlation in the
after-transition period (2007). The mean of individuals’ risk attitudes working in a
particular occupation can be read off the horizontal axis. The vertical axis depicts
the occupation-specific earnings risk (σj). The size of the squares corresponds to
the size of the occupation in that year.
Figure 3.3: Earnings risk and risk attitude: Balanced panel
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Source: ULMS.
Note: Sample: individuals employed in 1986 and in 2007 (balanced panel sub-sample).
The graph plots the correlation between mean of individual risk attitudes (measured
on the scale from 0 to 10, 0 meaning that one is not at all willing to take risks) and
occupation-specific earnings risks (the standard deviation of residuals from Mincer type
wage regression, as defined in section 3.4) in 1986 (the pre-transition period) and in 2007
(the post-transition period). Squares represent occupations, the size of squares is weighted
by the number of observations per occupation.
13As an additional check, we estimated a specification using the data from two age cohorts,
i.e. two samples between 36 and 52 years of age in 1986 and in 2007. The results remain
qualitatively unchanged.
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the pre-transition period (1986) and the right panel shows the correlation in the
after-transition period (2007). The mean of individuals’ risk attitudes working in a
particular occupation can be read off the horizontal axis. The vertical axis depicts
the occupation-specific earnings risk (σj). The size of the squares corresponds to
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Figure 3.3: Earnings risk and risk attitude: Balanced panel
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Source: ULMS.
Note: Sample: individuals employed in 1986 and in 2007 (balanced panel sub-sample).
The graph plots the correlation between mean of individual risk attitudes (measured
on the scale from 0 to 10, 0 meaning that one is not at all willing to take risks) and
occupation-specific earnings risks (the standard deviation of residuals from Mincer type
wage regression, as defined in section 3.4) in 1986 (the pre-transition period) and in 2007
(the post-transition period). Squares represent occupations, the size of squares is weighted
by the number of observations per occupation.
13As an additional check, we estimated a specification using the data from two age cohorts,
i.e. two samples between 36 and 52 years of age in 1986 and in 2007. The results remain
qualitatively unchanged.
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Next, we focus on the 2007 sub-sample in order to analyse whether the corre-
lation between the occupation-specific earnings risk and individual risk attitudes
found on the aggregate level, also holds on individual level in a regression set-up.
Table 3.3 presents the results of OLS regressions of occupation-specific earnings
risk, σj, on risk attitudes (with standard errors clustered at the level of occupa-
tions). No controls are included in the specification reported in column (1). In
column (2), a set of controls (gender, age, tenure, capital residence, public sector
employment, height, and the natural logarithm of individual wage) is added. The
specification in column (3) additionally controls for self-employment status.
The estimates in column (1) reveal a positive and significant correlation be-
tween risk attitudes and earnings risk, thus corroborating the descriptive results of
the previous section. Columns (2) and (3) show that adding control variables does
not affect the coefficient on risk attitudes: it is positive and significant, regardless
of the specification.14
An intriguing question to ask is whether the positive relationship between
willingness to take risks and the occupational earnings variance observed after
transition is a consequence of individuals switching to jobs that better match their
preferences. If no one would change occupations during the transition period that
we observe, the positive correlation in the post-transition period might be a result
of endogenous formation of preferences.15
To answer this question, we restrict the analysis to the balanced panel of 964
individuals who were employed in 1986 and in 2007. Of this sample, 74% has
changed their occupation between 1986 and 2007. We relate risk attitudes of these
job-switchers to the unexplained earnings variance in their current job in order to
find out whether their preferences are better aligned with the earnings risk in their
occupation than the preferences of individuals who did not change their occupation
during this time period.16 To check whether individuals move out of occupations
14These findings are similar to the results reported by Brown, Farrell, Harris, and Sessions (2006),
Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2007) and Fouarge, Kriechel, and Dohmen (2012)
for the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands respectively.
15Another way of testing whether individuals sort into jobs based on the available information and
their preferences would be to examine the sub-sample of new entrants to the labour market (see
Fouarge et al. 2012). However, we do not find a significant difference between the correlation
coefficients (between risk attitudes and occupation-specific earnings risks) for workers who
entered the labour market prior to transition or after transition. This might be a result of
rigidity and high youth unemployment, which is likely to restrict the choice set of labour
market entrants.
16In our sample, risk attitude is not related to the probability of switching occupations per se:
the correlation coefficient between the probability of changing occupation between 1986 and
2007 and risk attitude is insignificant, as well as the regression coefficient on risk attitude
controlling for gender and age.
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Table 3.3: Relationship between earnings risk and individual risk attitudes
(1) (2) (3)
Risk attitude 0.036∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.016) (0.012) (0.010)
1 if Male 0.164 0.166
(0.152) (0.151)
Tenure 0.010 0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
Age 0.001 −0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
Years of schooling 0.062∗ 0.061∗
(0.035) (0.035)
1 if Public sector −0.095 −0.039
(0.144) (0.129)
1 if Capital residence −0.093 −0.076
(0.113) (0.115)
Log wage 0.090 0.071
(0.086) (0.075)
Height 0.006∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003)
1 if Self-employed 0.466
(0.384)
Constant −0.139 −2.645∗∗ −2.542∗∗
(0.210) (1.163) (1.135)
R2 0.0105 0.0601 0.0749
Observations 2991 2912 2912
Source: ULMS.
Note: OLS regression coefficients are reported. Dependent variable: earnings variance (the standard
deviation of residual fromMincer type wage regression, as defined in section 3.4, standardized). Clustered
on the level of occupation standard errors in parentheses. Significance stars indicate *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Occupations containing less than 10 observations are dropped. Risk attitude is
measured on a scale from 0 to 10, 0 meaning that one is not at all willing to take risks.
that did not correspond to their preferences, we also relate risk attitudes of the
job-switchers to the earnings variance (measured in 2007) of the occupation in
which they were employed in 1986 (would they have stayed in the same job).
Table 3.4 summarises the results. Panel A displays the correlation between
risk attitudes of job switchers and the earnings risk in the new (i.e. current)
occupation, Panel B reports the correlation between risk attitudes of job switchers
and earnings risk (measured in 2007) of their previous occupation. Panel C shows
the results for job-stayers. Risk attitudes of those who change occupations are
significantly positively related to the measure of earnings risk in the occupation
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Table 3.4: Earnings risk and individual risk attitudes in the balanced panel
sub-sample
Panel A: Job-switchers: current job
Spearman ρ 0.142
p-value 0.000
Observations 712
Panel B: Job-switchers: would they have stayed in the old job
Spearman ρ 0.022
p-value 0.558
Observations 712
Panel C: Job-stayers
Spearman ρ 0.014
p-value 0.827
Observations 252
Source: ULMS.
Note: Table reports Spearman correlation coefficients (ρ) between earnings risk (defined as the standard
deviation of occupational wage residuals on ISCO88 2-digit level) and individual risk attitudes (on the
scale from 0 to 10) for balanced panel sample of individuals employed in 1986 and 2007. In panel A
and panel B job-switchers are analysed. The correlation coefficient in panel A refers to the new job of
job-movers, i.e. their risk attitude is related to the occupation to which they have switched. In panel
B the correlation with the earnings risk in 2007 of the old occupation of job-switchers is shown (if they
would have stayed in the same job). In panel C risk attitudes of job-stayers are correlated with the
earnings variance in their job, variance is calculated on 2007 data.
they switched to. If these individuals had stayed in their previous occupation,
we would not have observed a significant correlation (see panel B). These results
support the hypothesis that individuals sort into occupations with characteristics
that are better aligned with their risk preferences. In panel C, the correlation of
the preferences of job-stayers with the earnings risk in their job is insignificant.
The absence of a significant relationship between risk attitudes of occupational
stayers and the earnings risk in their occupation might be a result of constrained
occupational mobility.
Occupations with strict entry requirements are likely to constrain occupa-
tional mobility. Few workers would move out of such occupations because it would
be difficult for them to switch to another occupation on a comparable level. For
example, 74% of workers employed in occupation life sciences professionals (22) in
1986, remained in this occupation in 2007, as can be read of the shaded cell in the
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diagonal in Table 3.5. Workers who switched their occupation from occupation
22, moved to only four other occupations in 2007. On the contrary, workers who
were employed as personal and protective service workers (occupation 51) in 1986,
moved to 15 different occupations, which suggests that it is relatively easy to enter
this occupation. Table 3.5 presents an occupational transition matrix, in which
occupations in 1986 are listed in rows and occupations in 2007 in columns. Shaded
cells on the diagonal show the percentage of occupational stayers.
Table 3.5: Occupational transitions from 1986 to 2007
86
07
11 12 13 15 21 22 23 24 31 32 33 34 41 42 51 52 61 71 72 73 74 81 82 83 91 92 93 Total
11 0 0 0 0 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
12 2 0 4 6 0 0 4 14 6 6 2 8 2 6 2 6 0 4 2 0 8 0 0 2 12 2 2 100
13 0 14 29 0 0 0 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 14 0 100
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
21 3 5 0 8 21 3 5 13 11 0 0 0 5 3 3 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 3 100
22 5 0 5 0 0 74 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
23 3 3 2 2 2 2 66 2 0 0 10 0 3 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 100
24 0 4 4 8 0 0 4 24 6 0 2 22 6 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 2 4 4 0 100
31 0 6 4 2 7 0 2 4 19 6 6 2 6 2 0 2 4 6 0 0 7 0 2 0 9 4 4 100
32 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 70 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 12 0 0 100
33 3 0 0 0 0 0 28 3 0 7 21 0 0 3 0 3 3 0 0 3 10 0 7 0 7 0 0 100
34 3 0 3 6 6 3 3 13 6 3 0 6 9 6 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 3 0 100
41 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 11 0 0 0 15 19 4 4 7 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 7 7 4 100
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 8 8 23 15 0 0 8 0 0 8 0 0 0 15 0 0 100
51 0 0 0 8 0 3 0 5 0 5 10 0 0 10 5 10 0 3 0 3 5 3 3 0 21 3 5 100
52 0 0 0 8 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 8 4 4 29 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 8 0 17 100
61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 10 10 0 40 10 0 100
71 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 0 4 0 2 4 0 0 2 39 2 2 16 0 2 0 11 4 7 100
72 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 2 6 0 1 1 1 4 2 1 0 6 11 2 28 4 5 3 9 3 8 100
73 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 36 9 0 0 27 0 9 100
74 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5 5 0 1 0 4 4 5 5 1 3 8 3 22 3 3 4 10 0 10 100
81 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 8 13 0 21 4 8 4 21 0 4 100
82 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 13 0 3 3 3 10 0 13 10 13 3 10 3 3 100
83 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 4 4 2 0 2 3 0 14 2 2 31 12 7 11 100
91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 3 0 3 7 10 0 3 0 0 10 0 0 0 45 3 3 100
92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 13 25 38 0 100
93 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 4 4 24 0 0 8 12 4 28 100
Source: ULMS.
Note: The first column displays 2-digit ISCO occupation codes in 1986, the first row shows occupation codes in
2007. The numbers are percentages switching occupation from 1986 to 2007. Shaded cells in the diagonal show
the share of stayers in a given occupation. The overall share of stayers is 26%.
We also analyse the relationship between risk attitudes of individuals and
earnings variance in their occupation separately for occupations with relatively
many stayers and those with relatively few stayers (split by above or below the
sample mean, which is 26% of job-stayers). For the sub-sample of occupations with
many stayers, the correlation coefficient (on occupational level) is insignificant,
49
3 Risk attitudes and occupational choice
Table 3.4: Earnings risk and individual risk attitudes in the balanced panel
sub-sample
Panel A: Job-switchers: current job
Spearman ρ 0.142
p-value 0.000
Observations 712
Panel B: Job-switchers: would they have stayed in the old job
Spearman ρ 0.022
p-value 0.558
Observations 712
Panel C: Job-stayers
Spearman ρ 0.014
p-value 0.827
Observations 252
Source: ULMS.
Note: Table reports Spearman correlation coefficients (ρ) between earnings risk (defined as the standard
deviation of occupational wage residuals on ISCO88 2-digit level) and individual risk attitudes (on the
scale from 0 to 10) for balanced panel sample of individuals employed in 1986 and 2007. In panel A
and panel B job-switchers are analysed. The correlation coefficient in panel A refers to the new job of
job-movers, i.e. their risk attitude is related to the occupation to which they have switched. In panel
B the correlation with the earnings risk in 2007 of the old occupation of job-switchers is shown (if they
would have stayed in the same job). In panel C risk attitudes of job-stayers are correlated with the
earnings variance in their job, variance is calculated on 2007 data.
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the share of stayers in a given occupation. The overall share of stayers is 26%.
We also analyse the relationship between risk attitudes of individuals and
earnings variance in their occupation separately for occupations with relatively
many stayers and those with relatively few stayers (split by above or below the
sample mean, which is 26% of job-stayers). For the sub-sample of occupations with
many stayers, the correlation coefficient (on occupational level) is insignificant,
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while it is positive and significant (ρ = .44, p < 0.06) for the sub-sample with
higher mobility.
The lack of correlation between risk attitudes of job-stayers and the earnings
risk in their occupation also serves as indirect evidence that a correlation between
earnings risk and risk attitudes is not the result of individuals adapting their pref-
erences because of exposure to a risky environment. Evidence that exposure is
unlikely to drive the results stems from recent empirical work that indicates that
risk attitudes are rather stable over time (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m,
2008; Reynaud and Couture, 2012; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and
Wagner, 2012).17 Taken together, our findings in Table 3.4 and in Table 3.5 thus
support the hypothesis that individuals sort into occupations that differ with re-
spect to earnings risk based on their risk attitudes.
In order to investigate whether less risk-averse people indeed switch to occu-
pations with higher earnings risk, while more risk-averse people switch to occupa-
tions with lower earnings variance, we next examine the direction of job change
in greater detail. More specifically, we define a categorical variable with three
categories based on the actual sample distribution of risk attitudes: the variable
is labeled “Low risk attitude” for individuals with risk attitudes below the 33rd
percentile, “Medium risk attitude” for individuals with risk attitudes between the
66th and the 33rd percentile, and “High risk attitude” for individuals with risk
attitudes above the 66th percentile. Likewise, we define a categorical occupation-
specific earnings risk variable, with categories “Low earnings risk” if the earnings
risk is below the 33rd percentile, “Medium earnings risk” if the earnings risk in
this occupation is between the 33rd and the 66th percentile of earnings risk distri-
bution, and “High earnings risk” if the occupation has earnings risk which is above
the 66th percentile. The results of ordered probit estimates on the sample of job
switchers are presented in Table 5. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2)
is the categorical earnings risk variable on the level of occupations. In columns (3)
17There is a recent literature that addresses the stability of risk preferences over time, using
measures based on subjective assessments and (hypothetical and incentivised) lottery choices
(e.g., Harrison, Johnson, McInnes, and Rutstro¨m, 2005; Sahm, 2012; Andersen, Harrison, Lau,
and Rutstro¨m, 2008; Baucells and Villas´ıs, 2009). These studies do not find evidence for
systematic changes in risk preferences, with the exception of age. Sahm (2012), for example,
reports a general increase in risk aversion with age, but finds that risk preferences are the
rank-order stable. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2012) also provide
evidence that risk attitudes measured by the survey question that we use in this study, are
rather stable, although measured with error. They document that the correlation over a very
short period of 4 to 6 weeks, a period over one could assume that preferences are stable, is
about 0.6 in different samples. Using data on the risk attitude measures available in the SOEP,
they then report correlations of 0.5 between the measures taken with time interval of two years.
After five years, the correlation is still 0.47. These results indicate that risk preferences are
persistent, even if somewhat malleable over time.
50
3.5 Results
and (4) the scale of this variable is reversed, such that higher values correspond to
lower earnings risk.
Table 3.6: Switching to an occupation with high or low earnings risk
High earnings risk Low earnings risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 if Medium risk attitude −0.060 −0.086
(0.112) (0.089)
1 if High risk attitude 0.383∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.099)
1 if Medium risk attitude 0.442∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.097)
1 if Low risk attitude 0.383∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.099)
Constant 1 −0.142 0.508 −0.083 −0.831
(0.350) (2.224) (0.337) (2.226)
Constant 2 0.466 1.131 0.525∗ −0.208
(0.341) (2.266) (0.314) (2.181)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 712 694 712 694
Source: ULMS.
Note: Ordered probit estimation coefficients are reported. Dependent variable: a categorical variable with
three categories, which equal to 1 if earnings risk in the new occupation (2007) is high, i.e. above the 66th
percentile (in columns (1) and (2)) or low, i.e. below the 33rd percentile (in columns (3) and (4)). The
dependent variable is equal to 2 if the earnings risk in the new occupation is between the 33rd and the 66th
percentile. The dummy variable ’High risk attitude’ is equal to 1 if individual’s risk attitude is above the
66th percentile of the sample risk attitude distribution, ’Medium risk attitude’ is equal to 1 if individual’s
risk attitude is between the 33rd and the 66th percentile, ’Low risk attitude’ is equal to 1 if individual’s risk
attitude is below the 33rd percentile. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance stars indicate
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample contains individuals who were employed in 1986 and in 2007, and
have changed their occupation in between. Additional controls are: age, gender, tenure, years of schooling,
an indicator for public sector employment, an indicator for residence in the capital city, marital status, and
height.
The coefficient on “High risk attitude” is positive and significant in columns
(1) and (2), which means that individuals who are on average more willing to take
risks are more likely to switch to occupations with high earnings variance after
transition. Individuals with average or low willingness to take risks, in contrast,
are more likely to switch to occupations with low earnings variance, as can be seen
from columns (3) and (4). Additional analyses show that the most risk averse
individuals are more likely to withdraw from participation in the labour market in
2007, conditional on age and on being employed in 1986, which suggests that for
a certain share of workers, the increase in average earnings accompanying the rise
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while it is positive and significant (ρ = .44, p < 0.06) for the sub-sample with
higher mobility.
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unlikely to drive the results stems from recent empirical work that indicates that
risk attitudes are rather stable over time (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m,
2008; Reynaud and Couture, 2012; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and
Wagner, 2012).17 Taken together, our findings in Table 3.4 and in Table 3.5 thus
support the hypothesis that individuals sort into occupations that differ with re-
spect to earnings risk based on their risk attitudes.
In order to investigate whether less risk-averse people indeed switch to occu-
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about 0.6 in different samples. Using data on the risk attitude measures available in the SOEP,
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After five years, the correlation is still 0.47. These results indicate that risk preferences are
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and (4) the scale of this variable is reversed, such that higher values correspond to
lower earnings risk.
Table 3.6: Switching to an occupation with high or low earnings risk
High earnings risk Low earnings risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 if Medium risk attitude −0.060 −0.086
(0.112) (0.089)
1 if High risk attitude 0.383∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.099)
1 if Medium risk attitude 0.442∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.097)
1 if Low risk attitude 0.383∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.099)
Constant 1 −0.142 0.508 −0.083 −0.831
(0.350) (2.224) (0.337) (2.226)
Constant 2 0.466 1.131 0.525∗ −0.208
(0.341) (2.266) (0.314) (2.181)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 712 694 712 694
Source: ULMS.
Note: Ordered probit estimation coefficients are reported. Dependent variable: a categorical variable with
three categories, which equal to 1 if earnings risk in the new occupation (2007) is high, i.e. above the 66th
percentile (in columns (1) and (2)) or low, i.e. below the 33rd percentile (in columns (3) and (4)). The
dependent variable is equal to 2 if the earnings risk in the new occupation is between the 33rd and the 66th
percentile. The dummy variable ’High risk attitude’ is equal to 1 if individual’s risk attitude is above the
66th percentile of the sample risk attitude distribution, ’Medium risk attitude’ is equal to 1 if individual’s
risk attitude is between the 33rd and the 66th percentile, ’Low risk attitude’ is equal to 1 if individual’s risk
attitude is below the 33rd percentile. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance stars indicate
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample contains individuals who were employed in 1986 and in 2007, and
have changed their occupation in between. Additional controls are: age, gender, tenure, years of schooling,
an indicator for public sector employment, an indicator for residence in the capital city, marital status, and
height.
The coefficient on “High risk attitude” is positive and significant in columns
(1) and (2), which means that individuals who are on average more willing to take
risks are more likely to switch to occupations with high earnings variance after
transition. Individuals with average or low willingness to take risks, in contrast,
are more likely to switch to occupations with low earnings variance, as can be seen
from columns (3) and (4). Additional analyses show that the most risk averse
individuals are more likely to withdraw from participation in the labour market in
2007, conditional on age and on being employed in 1986, which suggests that for
a certain share of workers, the increase in average earnings accompanying the rise
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in occupational earnings risk was insufficient to compensate for utility losses due
to higher uncertainty.18
3.6 Robustness
To check the robustness of our findings, we analyse data from another survey,
the European Social Survey (ESS), which contains information on occupation and
income to calculate an alternative measure of the earnings risk. We pool observa-
tions from three cross-sections (2004, 2006, and 2008), and regress the percentile of
household income19 on a similar set of covariates as in the analysis in section 3.5.
The standard deviation (on the level of occupations) of the residuals from this
regression serves as a dependent variable in column (2) of Table 3.7. Column (1)
replicates the analysis of column (2) from Table 3.3 presented above. The regressors
are the same in both columns.20 The documented positive relationship between risk
attitudes and the occupation-specific earnings risk is a robust result, independent
of the sample definition or the method of earnings variance calculation.
One potential concern might be that our definition of occupations (two-digit
ISCO-88 code) is too broad and therefore hides important heterogeneity within
occupations. The concern would be that occupations, that potentially require dif-
ferent skills and job tasks and that therefore might have earnings distributions
with little common support, are aggregated. In that case the broad occupation
would be classified as more risky according to our definition than it is from the
individual’s perspective. This kind of aggregation would bias our estimated coeffi-
cients downwards. Due to problems of small sample size, we cannot check for the
correlation between risk attitudes and earnings risk of occupations defined on the
three-digit ISCO-88 level.21
Another concern might be that our measure of the earnings risk is not the
relevant earnings risk measure if individuals possess information about where they
would end up in the earnings distribution of a particular occupation. For exam-
ple, if the earnings variance in an occupation reflects differences in ability and if
18The results are available on request.
19Instead of wages, the ESS asks about the estimated percentile of household income, which we
use as a proxy for labour earnings.
20 The self-employment indicator is excluded from the set of controls because the coding of
self-employment differs across the data sets.
21Two recent studies using a similar methodology to ours, Fouarge at al. (2012) and Bonin et
al. (2007) use samples that are large enough to permit estimation on 2-digit as well as on
3-digit ISCO-88 level. Both studies confirm the positive correlation between risk attitude and
occupational earnings risk for more narrowly defined occupations.
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Table 3.7: Earnings risk and individual risk attitudes: External data set
ULMS ESS
(1) (2)
Risk attitude 0.027∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.012) (0.007)
1 if Male 0.169 −0.074
(0.152) (0.112)
Tenure 0.010 −0.002
(0.007) (0.006)
Age 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
Years of schooling 0.062∗ 0.116∗∗
(0.035) (0.046)
1 if Public sector −0.093 0.073
(0.144) (0.101)
1 if Capital residence −0.097 0.209∗∗
(0.110) (0.093)
1 if Married −0.037 −0.018
(0.047) (0.030)
Log wage 0.091 0.152∗
(0.085) (0.085)
Height 0.006∗ 0.002
(0.003) (0.002)
Constant −2.640∗∗ −2.969∗∗∗
(1.165) (1.026)
R2 0.0603 0.1064
Observations 2912 2815
Source: ULMS; ESS.
Note: OLS regression coefficients are reported. Dependent variable in column (1): the standard devi-
ation of residuals from Mincer type wage regression, as defined in section 3.4; in column (2): standard
deviation (per occupation) of household income percentile (pooled over 2004, 2006, and 2008, ESS data).
Dependent variables are standardised. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance stars in-
dicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Risk attitude is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, 0 meaning
that one is not at all willing to take risks.
individuals know their ability, the earnings risk they would face is much smaller
than the variance of earnings distribution suggests. It is unlikely, however, that
individuals know exactly where they end up in the earnings distribution. As long
as the variance of earnings in occupations is a good indicator of the residual earn-
ings risk for a given level of known ability, our results remain qualitatively valid.
In addition, recent evidence indicates that information on ability is not driving the
results. Berkhout, Hartog, and Webbink (2010) use information on student’s sec-
ondary and tertiary school grades in the Netherlands as a proxy for ability. Their
53
3 Risk attitudes and occupational choice
in occupational earnings risk was insufficient to compensate for utility losses due
to higher uncertainty.18
3.6 Robustness
To check the robustness of our findings, we analyse data from another survey,
the European Social Survey (ESS), which contains information on occupation and
income to calculate an alternative measure of the earnings risk. We pool observa-
tions from three cross-sections (2004, 2006, and 2008), and regress the percentile of
household income19 on a similar set of covariates as in the analysis in section 3.5.
The standard deviation (on the level of occupations) of the residuals from this
regression serves as a dependent variable in column (2) of Table 3.7. Column (1)
replicates the analysis of column (2) from Table 3.3 presented above. The regressors
are the same in both columns.20 The documented positive relationship between risk
attitudes and the occupation-specific earnings risk is a robust result, independent
of the sample definition or the method of earnings variance calculation.
One potential concern might be that our definition of occupations (two-digit
ISCO-88 code) is too broad and therefore hides important heterogeneity within
occupations. The concern would be that occupations, that potentially require dif-
ferent skills and job tasks and that therefore might have earnings distributions
with little common support, are aggregated. In that case the broad occupation
would be classified as more risky according to our definition than it is from the
individual’s perspective. This kind of aggregation would bias our estimated coeffi-
cients downwards. Due to problems of small sample size, we cannot check for the
correlation between risk attitudes and earnings risk of occupations defined on the
three-digit ISCO-88 level.21
Another concern might be that our measure of the earnings risk is not the
relevant earnings risk measure if individuals possess information about where they
would end up in the earnings distribution of a particular occupation. For exam-
ple, if the earnings variance in an occupation reflects differences in ability and if
18The results are available on request.
19Instead of wages, the ESS asks about the estimated percentile of household income, which we
use as a proxy for labour earnings.
20 The self-employment indicator is excluded from the set of controls because the coding of
self-employment differs across the data sets.
21Two recent studies using a similar methodology to ours, Fouarge at al. (2012) and Bonin et
al. (2007) use samples that are large enough to permit estimation on 2-digit as well as on
3-digit ISCO-88 level. Both studies confirm the positive correlation between risk attitude and
occupational earnings risk for more narrowly defined occupations.
52
3.6 Robustness
Table 3.7: Earnings risk and individual risk attitudes: External data set
ULMS ESS
(1) (2)
Risk attitude 0.027∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.012) (0.007)
1 if Male 0.169 −0.074
(0.152) (0.112)
Tenure 0.010 −0.002
(0.007) (0.006)
Age 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
Years of schooling 0.062∗ 0.116∗∗
(0.035) (0.046)
1 if Public sector −0.093 0.073
(0.144) (0.101)
1 if Capital residence −0.097 0.209∗∗
(0.110) (0.093)
1 if Married −0.037 −0.018
(0.047) (0.030)
Log wage 0.091 0.152∗
(0.085) (0.085)
Height 0.006∗ 0.002
(0.003) (0.002)
Constant −2.640∗∗ −2.969∗∗∗
(1.165) (1.026)
R2 0.0603 0.1064
Observations 2912 2815
Source: ULMS; ESS.
Note: OLS regression coefficients are reported. Dependent variable in column (1): the standard devi-
ation of residuals from Mincer type wage regression, as defined in section 3.4; in column (2): standard
deviation (per occupation) of household income percentile (pooled over 2004, 2006, and 2008, ESS data).
Dependent variables are standardised. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance stars in-
dicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Risk attitude is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, 0 meaning
that one is not at all willing to take risks.
individuals know their ability, the earnings risk they would face is much smaller
than the variance of earnings distribution suggests. It is unlikely, however, that
individuals know exactly where they end up in the earnings distribution. As long
as the variance of earnings in occupations is a good indicator of the residual earn-
ings risk for a given level of known ability, our results remain qualitatively valid.
In addition, recent evidence indicates that information on ability is not driving the
results. Berkhout, Hartog, and Webbink (2010) use information on student’s sec-
ondary and tertiary school grades in the Netherlands as a proxy for ability. Their
53
3 Risk attitudes and occupational choice
findings remain unchanged after correcting for school grades. Berkhout, Hartog,
and Webbink (2010) conclude that unobserved heterogeneity does not seem to be
as important as it is often claimed. Similar findings were reported based on ability
bias correction by IQ deciles on NLSY data (Hartog, 2011). To eliminate possi-
ble unobserved heterogeneity reflected in the already realised wage distributions,
Schweri, Hartog, and Wolter (2011) elicited student’s subjective expectations re-
garding the form of their expected earnings risk. They report that it is unlikely
that students possess superior private information regarding their career prospects.
Schweri, Hartog, and Wolter (2011) also find no effect of math grade on expected
median wages, which again suggests that individuals do not have a good idea about
where they end up in the earnings distribution.
We argue that heterogeneity in job tasks and conditions is not a threat to
our findings. Hartog and Vijverberg (2007b) analysed uncertainties in returns to
schooling using a similar measure as is employed in the current analysis. Their
estimates were not sensitive to the inclusion of multiple kinds of job disameni-
ties, such as physically challenging or toxic conditions. Additionally, we estimated
specifications (on individual level), that control for working hours per week and
health state, both in the first stage (Mincer wage regression), and in the second
stage (similar to the ones presented in Table 3.3, not reported here). There was no
difference in the coefficient of risk attitude. Lastly, we do not find a positive rela-
tionship between risk attitudes and the earnings risk before the transition whereas
differences in job requirements existed then, too.
Given the absence of occupational sorting based on individual risk attitudes
and the earnings risk in 1986, it is informative to study whether there was some
preference-based sorting before 1991. An inspection of the average risk attitudes
of workers in specific occupations in 1986 reveals that that the most risk-loving
individuals were concentrated in military occupations.22 The fact that huge Soviet
territories required mobility from soldiers and officers, as well as the Afghanistan
war in which the Soviet Union was involved during the 1980’s, readily explains
high riskiness of the occupation and risk-loving people that it attracted.
The relationship between risk attitudes and risky non-monetary characteris-
tics supports the idea that individuals sort into occupations based on their risk
preferences. Interestingly, risk attitudes were not related to earnings risk in 1986,
when earnings risk was not a relevant sorting dimension, as occupations did not
vary with respect to unexplained earnings variance. During the transition to a
market economy, differences in earnings risk across occupations grew, making it a
22Military occupations are excluded from the main analysis. The results hold with the inclusion
of military occupations.
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relevant dimension of occupational choice, and a relationship between risk prefer-
ences and occupational earnings risk evolved.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we provide evidence that suggests a causal relationship between
individual risk attitudes and occupational sorting. We show that in the circum-
stances in which earnings variance was an irrelevant characteristic of occupations
due to strict command economy regulations, individual attitude towards risk was
unrelated to the occupation-specific earnings risk. Using the economic transition
as a source of an exogenous shock to the occupational wage structure and a re-
cently available data source with direct risk attitude measures and wage income
data from the pre-transition period, as well as from the post-transition period, we
document that labour market participants in Ukraine adjusted their occupational
choices in a predictable way.
More specifically, as the distribution of earnings risks across occupations ex-
panded and became heterogenous due to exogenous factors related to transition,
individuals that are more willing to take risks switched to occupations with large
earnings risk, and individuals that are less willing to take risks switched to occu-
pations with low earnings risk. This led to the evolvement of the sorting pattern
similar to the one documented in Western labour markets, where labour market
participants are more likely to be employed in occupations in which their risk
attitudes are well-aligned with the earnings risk in their occupation.23
A number of additional robustness checks corroborate the findings and our as-
sumptions. For example, we assure reliability of the retrospective wage information
from the ULMS using an official statistics record: we find remarkable similarity be-
tween the mean earnings per industry from the official statistics source and based
on the responses from the ULMS. By varying the estimation sample, we show that
our findings are not sensitive to sample composition, sample ageing or outliers. We
also discuss other potential sources of bias, such as aggregation of information and
ability based sorting, to conclude that it is unlikely that these factors affect the
results.
This study focuses on the cross-sectional unexplained earnings variance risk
as a relevant dimension of occupational earnings risk. Other dimensions of earnings
risk, such as unemployment risk and intertemporal variation of earnings might still
be important for occupational choice. However, it is likely that these characteristics
23DeLeire and Levy (2004); Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2007); Fouarge, Kriechel,
and Dohmen (2012).
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of occupational wage risk are to a certain extent reflected in the cross-sectional
unexplained earnings variance, therefore, qualitatively we would expect to receive
similar results using a different measure of occupational earnings risks.24
A potentially interesting question that arises from the finding that risk atti-
tudes play an important role in occupational choice would be studying the conse-
quences of ‘wrong’ sorting, due to, for example, inflexibility of the labour market
or resulting from forced or limited educational and occupational choices. Such
consequences may include, but are not limited to, lower life and job satisfaction,
health problems such as chronic conditions, abuse of psycho-active substances, and
related losses in productivity.
24Fouarge, Kriechel, and Dohmen (2012) use a range of measures of occupational earnings risk
(including the occupational probability of unemployment) and find that the positive corre-
lation between individual willingness to take risks and occupational earnings variance holds
irrespectively of the measure used.
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4 Risk attitudes and self-employment
4.1 Introduction
Self-employment is an important driver of economic activity.1 Not surprisingly,
what determines self-employment has occupied research agendas of economists for
a long time, and several factors have been identified.2 Already in 1755, Cantillon
recognised that entrepreneurial activities are risky. He argues that self-employed
face a more variable stream of earnings because of uncertain product demand,
which results in revenue fluctuations and can lead to business failure.3
Given the risky nature of self-employment, heterogeneity in risk preferences
across individuals should affect the choice of employment status.4 A host of em-
pirical studies have established a robust positive correlation between individual
willingness to take risks and the probability of being self-employed (e.g. Cramer,
Hartog, Jonker, and Van Praag, 2002; Ekelund, Johansson, Ja¨rvelin, and Lichter-
mann, 2005; Fossen, 2011). Recently, Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos (2009), using
German data, showed that risk attitudes measured in 2004 predict transition into
self-employment in 2005, which might suggest a causal effect of risk attitude on the
probability of becoming self-employed. Similarly, Brown, Dietrich, Ortiz-Nun˜ez,
and Taylor (2011), based on PSID data, document that risk attitudes measured
in 1996 predicted self-employment transition up to nine years later. They also
rightly caution the reader that an unobserved fixed effect might influence both the
decision to become self-employed and the risk attitude.
A plausible unobserved factor is the effect that parents have on children’s
decision to become self-employed and the effect that parents have on children’s
risk attitudes. We illustrate this relationships in Figure 4.1. Two arrows from the
family to self-employment point out that families can directly and indirectly affect
the probability that their children will become self-employed. The most obvious
1This chapter is joint work with Thomas Dohmen and Ben Kriechel. The chapter was presented
at Maastricht University (2012), the ZEW (2013) and EALE (2013). A revised version of this
chapter is published as Skriabikova, Dohmen, and Kriechel (2014).
2A non-exhaustive list of micro-level self-employment determinants includes financial aspects,
e.g. liquidity constraints, access to credit markets, wealth (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Lindh
and Ohlsson, 1996; Hundley, 2006); human capital, e.g. formal education, skills, labour mar-
ket experience (Rees and Shah, 1986; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Lazear, 2004, 2005); en-
trepreneurial ability (Hartog and van Praag, 2010); social capital and networks (Gomez and
Santor, 2001); risk attitude (Van Praag and Cramer, 2001; Ekelund, Johansson, Ja¨rvelin, and
Lichtermann, 2005) and personality traits (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Schiller and Crewson,
1997; Burke, FitzRoy, and Nolan, 2002).
3Empirical studies on earnings distributions consistently show that self-employed earnings are
more variable than wages. See, for example, Falter (2007b), Rosen and Willen (2002); Parker
(1999) and references therein.
4The role of the entrepreneur as a risk-bearer has been discussed already in early theoretical
work (Knight, 1921; Schumpeter, 1934, 1939).
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channel is a direct transfer of business from parents to children.5 There might
also be indirect channels that increase the likelihood that children of self-employed
parents become self-employed themselves (Hout and Rosen, 2000; Falter, 2007a;
Andersson and Hammarstedt, 2010). In particular, growing up in a self-employed
family can provide children with invaluable information on what it is like to be
self-employed. Recently, studies have also argued and provided empirical evidence
that (risk) attitudes are transmitted from parents to children (Bisin and Verdier,
2001; Tabellini, 2008b; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde, 2012).
Figure 4.1: Intrafamily transmission of risk attitudes, information, self-
employment
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If self-employed become more willing to take risks because of exposure to the
risky environment that the self-employed face, self-employed parents are more will-
ing to take risks (on average) than non-self-employed parents. Hence, children of
5The majority of the studies analysing channels of transmission of self-employment from parents
to children argue that intra-family business take-overs play a minor role. However, Fairlie and
Robb (2007) report that 8.2% of current business owners inherited their business or received
it as a gift. Based on the exact match between occupation-sector combination of fathers and
sons, Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) report that 36% of second generation self-employed sons
are occupational followers as compared to 8% of those who never become self-employed.
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self-employed parents would be more willing to take risks than children of non-self-
employed parents due to intergenerational transmission of risk attitudes. In fact,
this is born out by the data. In the West German sample of the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP), individuals whose fathers were self-employed are
significantly more willing to take risks than individuals whose fathers were in regu-
lar employment.6 This link is illustrated by the arrow from family to risk attitudes
in Figure 4.1. In light of this evidence, the relationship between risk attitudes and
self-employment might not be causal even if it is identified using a measure of risk
attitudes prior to the actual transition because both these measured risk attitudes
and the propensity to become self-employed were influenced by parents.7
In this chapter, we analyse a setting in which the scope for such a third factor
explanation is limited or even non-existent. We provide new evidence to support a
causal interpretation of the correlation between risk attitude and the probability of
becoming self-employed. We exploit the fact that self-employment was banned for
at least 45 years in Ukraine8 and heavily regulated in East Germany,9 so that there
6The difference of .32 in the mean of risk attitudes between children of fathers who were self-
employed when children were 15 years of age and children of fathers who were not self-employed
(when children were 15 years of age) is statistically significant (two tailed t-test, p-value<
0.001).
7Using risk attitudes of the father as an instrument, we find a significant positive effect of own
(instrumented) risk attitudes on the probability of being self-employed in the West German
sample of the SOEP. This estimation suggests a causal interpretation of the role of willingness
to take risk for the probability of becoming self-employed since it is unlikely that risk atti-
tude of fathers were influenced by self-employment experience of their children. However, the
instrument is likely to be invalid because of the third factor such as father’s self-employment
experience.
8In Soviet Ukraine, an extremely restricted institutional regulation with respect to free trade
and entrepreneurial activities was in force since the late 1920’s (in the East), or since the World
War II (in the West), until the end of 1980’s. Any private for-profit activity was illegal, until
approximately 1985, when the ‘Perestroika’ initiatives had grown and the total control over the
population had declined substantially. The first legally registered self-employed appeared in
1987, but the number of self-employed individuals started growing in the 1990’s, after the official
separation of Ukrainian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) from the Soviet Union in 1991. (See
Figure 1.2b in Chapter 1 for the dynamics of self-employment in Ukraine since 1986). Before
that, commercial activities conducted not by the state and not for the state were considered a
criminal offence (for example, Gelfand, 1964; Trofimov, 1975; Andruhin, 2011).
9In (former) East Germany, the communist government limited self-employment severely, sub-
jecting it to strict rules and regulations. Starting with agriculture in 1950’s and production
firms in 1960’s, self-employment was virtually abolished. Remnants in specific sectors and
occupations formally constituted self-employment in the GDR (Pickel, 1992). Local planning
authorities had the power to decide on the entry, allocation of labour and other production
factors, amount of output in terms of goods and services, and even on customer service (Prantl
and Spitz-Oener, 2009). Under such conditions, even though these ‘enterprises’ were consid-
ered private, they were not comparable to private enterprises in West Germany or in other
market economies. Only after reunification, the German Trade and Crafts Code valid in West
Germany were extended to East Germany, in 1990. These conditions precluded transmission of
information or creation of business networks in the former GDR (Lechner and Pfeiffer, 1993).
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were two generations who grew up without having experienced from their parents
what it is like to be self-employed. This feature of the institutional regulation
allows investigating the effect of risk attitude on self-employment separately from
the effect of family.
In the empirical analysis, we use two panel household surveys: the Ukrainian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) and the East Germany sub-sample of
the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). Next to general demographic
and socio-economic characteristics, the data sets contain a direct measure of risk
attitude and information on parental education and occupation. The SOEP con-
tains measures of self-employment intentions elicited just before reunification of
Germany. In the additional analysis we use the Noord-Brabant cohort study to
illustrate the role of risk attitudes for the decision to become self-employed for
individuals who are born in entrepreneurial families.
The main features of the data sets, study samples and variable definitions are
tackled in section 4.2. In section 4.3, the empirical approach and the findings from
the empirical analysis are displayed and discussed. The last section concludes.
4.2 Data and variables
The ULMS panel consists of three waves, which were collected in 2003, 2004,
and 2007.10 The analysis in this chapter is based on the last wave, as in 2007
information on risk attitudes was collected. This sample is restricted to individuals
between 18 and 65 years old. It excludes individuals who are not participating in
the labour market, military occupations, farmers, individuals receiving pension or
involved in full-time education, as well as individuals who are family members
helping a self-employed one.
The self-employment status variable is equal to one if the answer to the ques-
tion about current status on the labour market is either self-employed, entrepreneur
or employer in 2007. The reference zero category corresponds to individuals who
are in paid employment. Risk attitude is measured by a subjective self-assessment
of willingness to take risk in general on the scale from zero to ten, in which higher
values reflect greater willingness to take risks. The exact wording of the ques-
tion, translated from Ukrainian or Russian reads: “How do you see yourself: Are
you generally a person who is fully willing to take risks or do you try to avoid
taking risks? Please give me a number from 0 to 10, where the value 0 means:
‘Risk averse’ and the value 10 means: ‘Fully prepared to take risks’. You can use
10For the detailed overview of the ULMS, see Lehmann, Muravyev, and Zimmermann (2012).
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the values in between to make your estimate.” Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde,
Schupp, and Wagner (2011) have shown that this question is significantly related
to paid lottery choices, and it explains behaviour in a range of important real life
decision domains. Descriptive statistics with mean and standard deviation of the
main variables are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
ULMS SOEP1
Variable Mean SD2 Mean SD
1 if (ever) Self-employed 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30
1 if Intends to become self-employed 0.08 0.27
Risk attitude 3.89 2.86 4.41 1.68
1 if Male 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50
Age 38.79 10.80 38.77 11.35
1 if Higher education 0.454 0.50 0.35 0.48
Log household income3 6.33 0.69 7.56 0.33
Sample 2726 1624
1 SOEP. Sample: former East Germany.
2 SD means standard deviation.
3 Log household income is the mean of monthly household income over 2003 and 2004 in the ULMS (in the
national currency: hryvnya). In the SOEP: in 1990 (national currency: Deutsche Mark).
4 Education was considered a priority in the Soviet Union (A˚slund, 2007), access to higher education was cheap
and universal. The share of adult population with tertiary education in Ukraine is high compared to countries
such as Austria (18%), Germany (25%), the UK or the Netherlands (30%). See Kupets, Leshchenko, Osinkina,
Taran, and Komarov (2009).
Easy access to information on self-employment, access to wealth and to social
networks enhance business opportunities and potentially can also reduce perceived
uncertainty associated with self-employment. We use information on occupational
status and educational achievement of both parents to control for access to infor-
mation and networks.11 The egalitarian policy of the Soviet Union assured that
there was little income inequality, and therefore, the distribution of wealth across
households was quite homogenous in the beginning of transition.12 However, many
apartments and houses were privatised in the early years of transition, increasing
heterogeneity across households with respect to access to credit since home own-
ership serves as a collateral to get credit in a bank. To control for this, we use
household income information collected in 2003/2004 and home ownership in 2003.
11More educated individuals would be more likely to have been former members of the official
ruling Communist party and they could have retained some personal access to politically and
economically important networks.
12According to the official Gini coefficient measure, income inequality did not increase dramati-
cally during the transition years. The Gini coefficient remained at about 28-30 in 2003-2007.
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The SOEP is a large representative panel survey, which covers the popula-
tion of former East Germany from 1990 onwards.13 In 1990, right before the full
reunification of Germany, self-employment aspirations were elicited. The exact
wording of the question measuring self-employment intention is: “What are your
expectations for the future as far as your occupation is concerned? How probable
do you consider it to be that you become self-employed in the next two years?:
Highly Probable; Probable; Not Very Probable; Highly Improbable”. The answer
is used to construct a binary variable, which is equal to one if the answer is ‘highly
probable’ or ‘probable’. The variable is equal to zero if it is ‘not very probable’ or
‘highly improbable’.
The measure of risk attitude (standardised in regressions) is identical to the
one in the ULMS: the answer to the general risk question, with higher values
reflecting higher risk-tolerance.14 In fact, the ULMS borrowed this question from
the SOEP. We use household income in 1990 and home ownership (in 1990) as
proxies for access to capital markets. We construct a dummy that equals one if an
individual was self-employed at any time between 1991 and 2011.
The SOEP sample is restricted to exclude individuals of non-German nation-
ality or born outside of Germany, individuals who have never worked; individuals
above the age of 65 and those who were in civil or military service in 1990. Addi-
tionally, individuals whose fathers were self-employed or self-employed farmers, as
well as individuals who were self-employed themselves at the moment of the survey
(less than 1% of the sample) are excluded.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Evidence from Ukraine
We first analyse the determinants of self-employment in Ukraine, and estimate
a probit model in which the dependent variable is the indicator variable for self-
employment status. Marginal effect estimates of this probit regression evaluated at
sample means are presented in Table 4.2. In column (1) the standardised measure
of risk attitude is the only explanatory variable in the model. In the following
columns, sets of explanatory variables are added: demographic characteristics, size
of a place of birth, household wealth proxies, education and marital status, as well
13For the details on the SOEP data see Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007).
14In the SOEP, general willingness to take risks was measured several times during the panel,
with the first time in 2004. We take the person average of all available measures to minimise
potential measurement error.
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3 Log household income is the mean of monthly household income over 2003 and 2004 in the ULMS (in the
national currency: hryvnya). In the SOEP: in 1990 (national currency: Deutsche Mark).
4 Education was considered a priority in the Soviet Union (A˚slund, 2007), access to higher education was cheap
and universal. The share of adult population with tertiary education in Ukraine is high compared to countries
such as Austria (18%), Germany (25%), the UK or the Netherlands (30%). See Kupets, Leshchenko, Osinkina,
Taran, and Komarov (2009).
Easy access to information on self-employment, access to wealth and to social
networks enhance business opportunities and potentially can also reduce perceived
uncertainty associated with self-employment. We use information on occupational
status and educational achievement of both parents to control for access to infor-
mation and networks.11 The egalitarian policy of the Soviet Union assured that
there was little income inequality, and therefore, the distribution of wealth across
households was quite homogenous in the beginning of transition.12 However, many
apartments and houses were privatised in the early years of transition, increasing
heterogeneity across households with respect to access to credit since home own-
ership serves as a collateral to get credit in a bank. To control for this, we use
household income information collected in 2003/2004 and home ownership in 2003.
11More educated individuals would be more likely to have been former members of the official
ruling Communist party and they could have retained some personal access to politically and
economically important networks.
12According to the official Gini coefficient measure, income inequality did not increase dramati-
cally during the transition years. The Gini coefficient remained at about 28-30 in 2003-2007.
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The SOEP is a large representative panel survey, which covers the popula-
tion of former East Germany from 1990 onwards.13 In 1990, right before the full
reunification of Germany, self-employment aspirations were elicited. The exact
wording of the question measuring self-employment intention is: “What are your
expectations for the future as far as your occupation is concerned? How probable
do you consider it to be that you become self-employed in the next two years?:
Highly Probable; Probable; Not Very Probable; Highly Improbable”. The answer
is used to construct a binary variable, which is equal to one if the answer is ‘highly
probable’ or ‘probable’. The variable is equal to zero if it is ‘not very probable’ or
‘highly improbable’.
The measure of risk attitude (standardised in regressions) is identical to the
one in the ULMS: the answer to the general risk question, with higher values
reflecting higher risk-tolerance.14 In fact, the ULMS borrowed this question from
the SOEP. We use household income in 1990 and home ownership (in 1990) as
proxies for access to capital markets. We construct a dummy that equals one if an
individual was self-employed at any time between 1991 and 2011.
The SOEP sample is restricted to exclude individuals of non-German nation-
ality or born outside of Germany, individuals who have never worked; individuals
above the age of 65 and those who were in civil or military service in 1990. Addi-
tionally, individuals whose fathers were self-employed or self-employed farmers, as
well as individuals who were self-employed themselves at the moment of the survey
(less than 1% of the sample) are excluded.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Evidence from Ukraine
We first analyse the determinants of self-employment in Ukraine, and estimate
a probit model in which the dependent variable is the indicator variable for self-
employment status. Marginal effect estimates of this probit regression evaluated at
sample means are presented in Table 4.2. In column (1) the standardised measure
of risk attitude is the only explanatory variable in the model. In the following
columns, sets of explanatory variables are added: demographic characteristics, size
of a place of birth, household wealth proxies, education and marital status, as well
13For the details on the SOEP data see Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007).
14In the SOEP, general willingness to take risks was measured several times during the panel,
with the first time in 2004. We take the person average of all available measures to minimise
potential measurement error.
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as parental background characteristics (education and occupation of father and
mother), and regional dummies.
Table 4.2: Self-employment in Ukraine
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Risk attitude 0.033∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age squared/100 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1 if Male 0.042∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
1 if Born in village −0.040∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
1 if Born in town −0.040∗∗ −0.044∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
1 if Birth place unknown −0.009 −0.010 −0.019
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
1 if Home owner1 0.043∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
Log income in 2003/20042 −0.025∗∗ −0.020∗∗
(0.011) (0.010)
1 if High income3 0.059∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019)
1 if Higher education −0.008 −0.005
(0.012) (0.012)
1 if Medium education −0.027∗∗ −0.024∗
(0.014) (0.013)
1 if Married −0.014 −0.015
(0.013) (0.012)
1 if Has children 0.028∗ 0.028∗
(0.017) (0.016)
Parental background No No Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies No No No No Yes
Sample 2706 2706 2706 2706 2706
Source: ULMS.
Note: Dependent variable is equal to 1 if individual is self-employed (zero if paid employment). Entries in the
table are marginal effects after a probit estimation, evaluated at means of variables. Constant is included in
all specifications. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on household level. Significance stars indicate
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficient on risk attitude is standardised. Reference categories are: Lower
education; Born in City. Parental background includes controls for education and occupation of mother and
father.
1 1 if household resided in own property (as opposed to rented) in 2003.
2 Log household income is an average of monthly household income from 2003/2004.
3 1 if household income in 2003/2004 was higher or equal to 90th percentile of household income distribution.
The resulting coefficient on risk attitude suggests that a one standard devi-
ation increase in willingness to take risks is associated with a 2.5 to 3 percentage
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points higher probability of being self-employed. Compared to the sample mean of
9% (see Table 4.1), this is a sizeable effect. It is comparable to half of the gender
effect or to being a home owner.
The fact that risk attitude is significantly related to self-employment even
when circumstances in which direct and indirect channels through which family can
affect self-employment of the children are (partially) blocked by institutional reg-
ulations suggests that the relationship between risk attitude and self-employment
that has been documented in the literature (see Cramer, Hartog, Jonker, and
Van Praag, 2002; Ekelund, Johansson, Ja¨rvelin, and Lichtermann, 2005; Caliendo,
Fossen, and Kritikos, 2009; Brown, Dietrich, Ortiz-Nun˜ez, and Taylor, 2011) is un-
likely to be an artifact of a third factor related to transmission of risk attitudes and
self-employment within the family or the proximate social environment.15 In that
sense, our findings support a causal interpretation of the effect of risk preference of
self-selection into self-employment, as suggested by Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos
(2009) and Brown, Dietrich, Ortiz-Nun˜ez, and Taylor (2011).16
In contrast to previous literature showing that individuals from wealthier
households have a higher likelihood of becoming self-employed,17 we do not find a
significant effect of household income measured three years prior to the analysis
year on the probability of being self-employed. In line with the findings of Hurst
and Lusardi (2004), members of households in the top percentiles of the wealth
distribution are more likely to become self-employed. This result follows from spec-
ifications (4) and (5), which include a dummy variable indicating that a household
is at or above the 90th percentile of the household income distribution. Formal ed-
ucation is not related to the probability of being self-employed in Ukraine, whereas
being born in a village, which might illustrate lack of social connections important
for setting up a business, is negatively related to self-employment.
4.3.2 Evidence from the former East Germany
The regulations of the Soviet Union, which prohibited private entrepreneurship
in Ukraine and promoted redistribution policies in order to equalise incomes and
wealth, created a setting, in which it is unlikely that self-employment experience
15Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2012) provide evidence for intergenerational transmission
of risk attitudes, while Lindquist, Sol, and van Praag (2012) document evidence for intergen-
erational correlation in self-employment.
16Some regions of Ukraine, namely in the West, were annexed to the Soviet Ukraine later than the
others, which might bring about some heterogeneity in the information set. Adding regional
dummies (column (5)) does not affect the results.
17(E.g., Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994; Lindh and Ohlsson, 1996; Blanchflower and
Oswald, 1998)
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as parental background characteristics (education and occupation of father and
mother), and regional dummies.
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Source: ULMS.
Note: Dependent variable is equal to 1 if individual is self-employed (zero if paid employment). Entries in the
table are marginal effects after a probit estimation, evaluated at means of variables. Constant is included in
all specifications. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on household level. Significance stars indicate
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficient on risk attitude is standardised. Reference categories are: Lower
education; Born in City. Parental background includes controls for education and occupation of mother and
father.
1 1 if household resided in own property (as opposed to rented) in 2003.
2 Log household income is an average of monthly household income from 2003/2004.
3 1 if household income in 2003/2004 was higher or equal to 90th percentile of household income distribution.
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distribution are more likely to become self-employed. This result follows from spec-
ifications (4) and (5), which include a dummy variable indicating that a household
is at or above the 90th percentile of the household income distribution. Formal ed-
ucation is not related to the probability of being self-employed in Ukraine, whereas
being born in a village, which might illustrate lack of social connections important
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4.3.2 Evidence from the former East Germany
The regulations of the Soviet Union, which prohibited private entrepreneurship
in Ukraine and promoted redistribution policies in order to equalise incomes and
wealth, created a setting, in which it is unlikely that self-employment experience
15Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2012) provide evidence for intergenerational transmission
of risk attitudes, while Lindquist, Sol, and van Praag (2012) document evidence for intergen-
erational correlation in self-employment.
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others, which might bring about some heterogeneity in the information set. Adding regional
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was transmitted from the parents. However, as the analysis of self-employment in
Ukraine pertains to 2007, it might be that some information on self-employment
from the neighbouring countries or previous early-transition entrepreneurial ex-
perience could have intervened with the relationship between risk attitudes and
self-employment. In the following, we turn to the estimation of the effect of risk
attitude on the probability of stated intentions to become self-employed in East
Germany just before reunification.
Table 4.3: Self-employment intentions in 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk attitude 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
1 if Home owner in 19901 0.036∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Log household income in 1990 0.031 0.029 0.009
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
1 if High household income2 −0.021 −0.022 −0.015
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024)
1 if Male 0.023∗∗
(0.011)
Age in 1990 0.013∗∗
(0.005)
(Age in 1990)2/100 −0.018∗∗∗
(0.006)
1 if Medium education −0.001
(0.033)
1 if Higher education 0.024
(0.034)
Father’s occupation No No No Yes
Regional dummies No No No Yes
Sample 1626 1626 1626 1624
Source: SOEP. Sample: former East Germany.
Notes: Estimation: probit. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means are reported. Dependent variable:
self-employment aspiration. The binary dependent variable is equal to 1 if individual intends to become self-
employed (elicited in 1990). The mean of dependent variable is 0.08. Risk attitude is the standardised average
of general willingness to take risks. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance stars indicate
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: Individuals from the East Germany, sampled in 1990.
1 1 if household resides in own property (as opposed to rented).
2 1 if household income in 1990 was higher or equal to 90th percentile of household income distribution.
Table 4.3 presents the result of the probit estimation in which the dependent
variable is equal to one if an individual stated that he or she is likely to become self-
employed (entries in the table are marginal effects evaluated at sample means). In
column (1), only willingness to take risks (standardised) is included as an explana-
tory variable. The positive and significant effect of risk attitudes on the intention
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Table 4.4: Self-employment in East Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 if Self-employment intention 0.188∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.016)
Risk attitude 0.047∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
1 if Home owner in 19901 0.016 0.005 0.013
(0.016) (0.015) (0.012)
Log household income in 1990 0.110∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.025) (0.021)
1 if High household income2 −0.032 −0.026 −0.015
(0.028) (0.026) (0.021)
1 if Male 0.022∗∗
(0.011)
Age in 1990 0.005
(0.004)
(Age in 1990)2/100 −0.011∗∗
(0.005)
1 if Medium education 0.037
(0.031)
1 if Higher education 0.073∗∗
(0.032)
Father’s occupation No No No No Yes
Regional dummies No No No No Yes
Sample 1626 1626 1626 1626 1624
Source: SOEP. Sample: former East Germany.
Notes: Estimation: probit. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means are reported. Dependent variable:
self-employment between 1991 and 2011. The binary dependent variable is equal to 1 if individual was self-
employed at least in one year between 1991 and 2011. The mean of dependent variable is 0.10. Risk attitude
is the standardised average of general willingness to take risks. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance stars indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1 1 if household resides in own property (as opposed to rented).
2 1 if household income in 1990 was higher or equal to 90th percentile of household income distribution.
to become self-employed confirms that higher willingness to take risk is associated
with a higher probability to become self-employed even in conditions of very limited
knowledge about self-employment transmitted by the previous generation. This re-
sult indicated that the correlation between risk attitudes and self-employment is
unlikely driven by parental background, as the intergenerational transmission of
self-employment experience was limited in the German Democratic Republic.
In column (2), we regress the intention to become self-employed on several
measures of access to capital in 1990, but exclude risk attitudes. There is no effect
of household wealth, but being a home owner is positively and significantly related
to the intention to become self-employed. In column (3), when risk attitude and
access to capital measures are included as explanatory variables at the same time,
there is no change in the coefficients: willingness to take risks and the possibility to
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gain access to credit (using real estate as a collateral) are significant predictors of
the self-employment intentions just before reunification. These two effects are also
independent of each other, and their effect is virtually unchanged when a set of
control variables, including socio-demographic characteristics, father’s occupation,
and regional dummies, is added in specification (4).
Making use of the rich panel structure of the SOEP, we analyse to what
extent future self-employment is predicted by the stated intentions in 1990. The
dependent variable in Table 4.4 is the actual probability of being self-employed
between 1991 and 2011. The upshot of the estimates presented in Table 4.4 is that
entrepreneurial intentions are a significant predictor of future self-employment.
Predicted probabilities of becoming self-employed from column (5), when a full set
of control variables is added, including risk attitudes and access to capital measures,
are significantly different for individuals who intended to become self-employed in
1990 vs. those who had no such intention: 32% and 8% respectively.
Interestingly, household income in 1990 has no effect on the self-employment
intention, whereas it is significantly related to the probability of becoming self-
employed in the years following reunification. In contrast, while residence owner-
ship predicts self-employment intentions, it is irrelevant for the actual probability
of becoming self-employed. The effect of household income in 1990 (as a proxy
for credit constraints) decreases once risk attitudes and self-employment intentions
are included as control variables. The coefficient on willingness to take risks de-
creases somewhat when the self-employment intention from 1990 is included in the
regression, but there is no significant interaction effect. The data suggests that
willingness to take risks, access to wealth, and previously stated self-employment
intention increase the probability of the transition into self-employment.
4.3.3 Evidence from the Netherlands
The additional analysis of this section illustrates the risk-decreasing role of infor-
mation on self-employment. For this, we use the Noord-Brabant cohort study from
the Netherlands (for more information on the data, see van Praag (1992); Hartog,
Jonker, and Pfann (2002)). The advantage of this data set is that in addition to
the information on self-employment status and the risk attitude measure, informa-
tion on how someone became self-employed is also included. We split the sample
into two: the sample of individuals whose father was a regular employee and the
sample of individuals whose father was self-employed.18 We also define two binary
18This cohort study contains individuals who were 12 years of age in 1952. In the 1950’s it was not
common for Dutch women to be formally employed, therefore we treat father’s self-employment
as an indicator of an entrepreneurial family.
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Table 4.5: Self-employment in the Netherlands
Panel A Father employee Father self-employed
Dependent variable Started own business Took over
(1) (2) (3)
Risk attitude 0.029∗∗∗ 0.017 −0.005
(0.010) (0.020) (0.022)
Constant 0.075∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
Panel B
Risk attitude 0.024∗∗ 0.014 −0.017
(0.010) (0.020) (0.022)
IQ measure −0.000 0.001 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
1 if Male 0.029 0.107∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.041) (0.042)
1 if Firstborn 0.026 0.026 0.014
(0.022) (0.047) (0.047)
1 if Vocational education 0.009 0.027 −0.053
(0.027) (0.056) (0.055)
1 if Higher education 0.011 −0.076 −0.230∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.051) (0.050)
1 if Missing education 0.061 0.131∗ −0.010
(0.041) (0.069) (0.070)
Constant 0.101 0.021 −0.209
(0.096) (0.188) (0.186)
Sample 713 297 301
Mean of dependent variable 0.074 0.131 0.143
Source: Noord-Brabant.
Notes: Dependent variable: in columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is equal to 1 if individual started
his or her own business, to 0 if he/she is an employee. In column (3) the dependent variable is equal to 1 if
individual took over a business from a family member, it is equal to 0 if he/she is an employee. Estimation: OLS.
Estimation sample: in column (1) individuals who were born to fathers in regular employment. In columns
(2) and (3) the estimation sample consists of individuals born to fathers who were self-employed. Additional
control variables in panel B include dummies for parental education. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance stars indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
dependent variables with zero corresponding to regular employment. The first de-
pendent variable is equal to 1 if an individual became self-employed by starting
his or her own business; the second one is equal to one if an individual became
self-employed by taking over a business from a family member.
The results are shown in Table 4.5, in which Panel A presents the results
without control variables. Control variables are added in Panel B. The share of
individuals who become self-employed is almost double in the sample of individuals
coming from entrepreneurial families as compared to non-entrepreneurial (the last
row of Table 4.5), independently of the mode of becoming self-employed. The
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gain access to credit (using real estate as a collateral) are significant predictors of
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independent of each other, and their effect is virtually unchanged when a set of
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intention increase the probability of the transition into self-employment.
4.3.3 Evidence from the Netherlands
The additional analysis of this section illustrates the risk-decreasing role of infor-
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the Netherlands (for more information on the data, see van Praag (1992); Hartog,
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into two: the sample of individuals whose father was a regular employee and the
sample of individuals whose father was self-employed.18 We also define two binary
18This cohort study contains individuals who were 12 years of age in 1952. In the 1950’s it was not
common for Dutch women to be formally employed, therefore we treat father’s self-employment
as an indicator of an entrepreneurial family.
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Table 4.5: Self-employment in the Netherlands
Panel A Father employee Father self-employed
Dependent variable Started own business Took over
(1) (2) (3)
Risk attitude 0.029∗∗∗ 0.017 −0.005
(0.010) (0.020) (0.022)
Constant 0.075∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
Panel B
Risk attitude 0.024∗∗ 0.014 −0.017
(0.010) (0.020) (0.022)
IQ measure −0.000 0.001 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
1 if Male 0.029 0.107∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.041) (0.042)
1 if Firstborn 0.026 0.026 0.014
(0.022) (0.047) (0.047)
1 if Vocational education 0.009 0.027 −0.053
(0.027) (0.056) (0.055)
1 if Higher education 0.011 −0.076 −0.230∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.051) (0.050)
1 if Missing education 0.061 0.131∗ −0.010
(0.041) (0.069) (0.070)
Constant 0.101 0.021 −0.209
(0.096) (0.188) (0.186)
Sample 713 297 301
Mean of dependent variable 0.074 0.131 0.143
Source: Noord-Brabant.
Notes: Dependent variable: in columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is equal to 1 if individual started
his or her own business, to 0 if he/she is an employee. In column (3) the dependent variable is equal to 1 if
individual took over a business from a family member, it is equal to 0 if he/she is an employee. Estimation: OLS.
Estimation sample: in column (1) individuals who were born to fathers in regular employment. In columns
(2) and (3) the estimation sample consists of individuals born to fathers who were self-employed. Additional
control variables in panel B include dummies for parental education. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance stars indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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estimates show that while risk attitude is significantly related to the probability of
being self-employed (starting an own business) when born to a family in regular
employment (column (1)), there is no such relationship between willingness to take
risks and the probability of being self-employed when born to an entrepreneurial
family (columns (2) and (3)). Moreover, in column (3) the coefficient on risk
attitude even turns negative (insignificant), suggesting that in case of taking over
a family business when one’s father was self-employed might even be a less risky
option than choosing regular employment. The results of this additional analysis
imply that having access to valuable information about self-employment from the
family might influence how risky self-employment is perceived.
4.4 Concluding remarks
The analysis of the role of risk attitude for the propensity of becoming self-
employed in conditions in which parents cannot transmit information about own
self-employment experience enhances our understanding of the nature of the re-
lationship between willingness to take risks and entrepreneurship. Our results
indicate that it is unlikely that this relationship is driven by parental background
variables that affect risk attitudes and the propensity to become self-employed.
Using data on individuals from Ukraine and East Germany, whose ancestors could
not experience what it is like to be self-employed as entrepreneurial activities were
banned or at least heavily regulated by the political regime, we provide field ev-
idence supporting the causal interpretation of the effect of risk attitude on self-
employment.
We do not claim that we can prove causality. One caveat is that other factors
that we have not identified in our study could potentially drive the correlation
between risk attitudes and self-employment. But we have arguably identified the
most plausible channel, namely parental transmission of experience, resources, in-
formation and preferences, that might generate a spurious correlation between risk
preference and self-employment, and we have shown that this channel is an unlikely
candidate. A second caveat is that, although the communist regimes in Ukraine
and East Germany strived to equalise financial means across households, there still
existed privileges that we cannot observe in our survey data and hence cannot fully
account for. In particular, some individuals might have had preferential access to
knowledge and capital from the West, or might have received such information
from friends or relatives living in Western countries. These individuals might also
be more likely to be risk-takers. However, we believe that such mechanisms are
unlikely to drive the strong and significant correlation between risk attitudes and
72
4.4 Concluding remarks
self-employment as the communist governments did their best to minimise com-
munication across borders, so that there is little scope for such channels to drive
the results we have documented.
We at least partially shut down the channel through which family can directly
or indirectly affect self-employment of the children, and thereby show that it is un-
likely that the documented relationship between risk attitudes and self-employment
is driven by a third factor. Our additional analysis illustrates how access to infor-
mation on self-employment, as indicated by coming from an entrepreneurial family
and taking over the business, diminishes the role of willingness to take risks for
self-employment. Combined with previous evidence that discards reverse causality,
i.e. shows that is unlikely that exposure to self-employment affects risk attitudes
(e.g. Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2009), our results hence suggest a causal effect
of risk preferences on the decision to become self-employed.
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5 Job mobility during the early career
5.1 Introduction
The majority of life time job changes occur during the first ten years of labour
market experience (Topel and Ward, 1992; Dustmann and Pereira, 2008).1 This
period is also accompanied by largest wage increases (Topel and Ward, 1992). The
proposition that job mobility affects wages has been extensively studied in the
literature. Positive effects of early career job mobility are explained in theoretical
models (e.g. Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979a) and supported by empirical evidence
(Topel and Ward, 1992; Hunt, 2001; le Grand and Taehlin, 2002; Fuller, 2008).
It has also been argued that higher returns are associated with longer tenure.
The productivity of a job match is not certain ex ante because job characteristics
only reveal over time, suggesting that high job mobility can be counterproductive
(Jovanovic, 1979b; Johnson, 1978). Empirical evidence in favour of this explanation
has also been collected (Light and McGarry, 1998; Zimmermann, 1998; Neumark,
2002). The debate about whether job mobility is beneficial for wage growth has
not been resolved so far.
In this paper, we argue that the willingness to take risks is a key factor
that affects job changing behaviour of labour market entrants, who subsequently
experience heterogeneous patterns of wage growth. Risk attitudes have been shown
to influence various labour market outcomes. In particular, individuals who are
more willing to take risks are more likely to invest in human capital (Shaw, 1996;
Brown and Taylor, 2005; Budria, Diaz-Serrano, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, and Hartog,
2012), become private sector employees (Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2005;
Pfeifer, 2010) or self-employed (Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2009; Fossen, 2011,
Chapter 4 of this dissertation), and, in general, sort into occupations with high
earnings variance (Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde, 2007, Chapter 3 of
this dissertation) or high mortality risk (DeLeire and Levy, 2004).
We argue that risk attitudes matter for job changing behaviour because job
change is a risky decision. Costs of a job change are quantitatively large (van den
Berg, 1992). Benefits of a new job are uncertain because employment contracts are
typically incomplete. Thus, to change jobs, workers need to incur several kinds of
costs while future benefits are uncertain at the moment the decision is taken. This
implies that risk averse individuals will make fewer job changes than more risk
tolerant individuals, assuming that job match quality and an external flow of job
offers are independent of risk attitudes. Additionally, since risk averse individuals
1This chapter is joint work with Bethlehem A. Argaw and Michael F. Maier. We would like to
thank the participants of the seminars at Maastricht University and the ZEW for their helpful
comments. The chapter also benefitted from the participants of the Scottish Economic Society
conference (SES, 2014).
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demand higher compensation for the same risk compared to more risk tolerant
individuals, job changes of risk averse individuals will be accompanied by larger
wage increases relative to risk tolerant individuals.
We test these predictions empirically using the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study (SOEP) data, a household panel survey, which contains a direct measure
of individual risk attitudes. We first relate risk attitudes of labour market par-
ticipants to the number of job changes they make during the early years of their
career. Second, we analyse whether the relationship between the total number of
job changes and the wage growth is affected by risk attitudes. Our first result is
that individuals who are more willing to take risks make more job changes than
individuals who are less willing to take risks in a given period of time. We then
document a significant difference in the wage growth associated with job changes of
risk averse individuals compared to more risk tolerant individuals, such that wage
gains associated with job changes are higher, on average, for risk averse individuals.
Our results shed some light on the contradictory findings in the literature
studying the effects of job mobility on wage growth. Different wage growth pat-
terns associated with job changes made by risk averse and risk tolerant individuals
that we empirically document in this paper enhance our understanding of the re-
lationship between job mobility and wage growth. The paper proceeds as follows.
In the next section we summarise previous literature. In section 5.3 we sketch our
conceptual framework to explain why risk attitudes should affect job changes and
how the relationship between job changes and associated wage growth depends on
the willingness to take risks. In section 5.4, our empirical approach and data are
described. Section 5.5 presents our main findings, which are tested for sensitivity
in Section 5.6. The last section concludes.
5.2 Previous literature
An early strand of the literature explains the effects of changing job on wage growth
in theoretical models. Mobility from job to job is given a structural explanation
and the wage evolution is predicted according to different mobility patterns. Job
mobility in these models is generated by individuals learning about their true
productivity at the current job match or by learning about external opportunities.
The jobs are treated as ‘experience goods’ or as ‘search goods’, respectively.2
The predictions of search good models and experience good models with re-
spect to wage growth are different. In an experience good model (e.g. Johnson,
2The terms ‘experience goods’ and ‘search goods’ follow the terminology of Nelson (1970).
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1978; Jovanovic, 1979b), the match quality is not known ex ante. Productivity-
related information of the current job accumulates over time and is learned by
the worker. In this model, an exogenous flow of job (wage) offers is assumed, so
there are no search costs. Individuals change the job, when the productivity of a
current job match (and therefore the wage) falls below an ex-ante expected level.
Experience good models predict either a positive or a negative relation between job
mobility and wage growth due to imperfect information on the ex-ante productivity
of the match.
In a search good model (e.g. Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979a), individuals
process new information about the productivity of alternative job matches and
change the job if a more productive job match associated with a higher wage is
offered. In these models the match quality of the offered job is known ex ante.
Workers can shift the distribution of arrivals of job offers by searching. The search
good model predicts that individuals accept only job offers with higher match
productivity associated with higher wages.
The different assumptions for models on job mobility and their predictions
with respect to related wage growth call for empirical testing. An early analysis
for the US by Topel and Ward (1992) finds decreasing job mobility during the first
ten years on labour market as experience accumulates, which is consistent with
a search good model. The authors find wage growth on average to be positively
associated with job mobility.
The empirical investigation of the relationship between job mobility and wage
growth crucially depends on the consideration of factors which cause heterogene-
ity. Light and McGarry (1998) show for the US that overall job mobility during
the eight years after school exit is negatively associated with the wage level when
accounting for job specific effects. Job mobility is driven by time-varying hetero-
geneity, which is consistent with a theoretical model in which jobs are considered
experience goods. Neumark (2002) stresses unobserved factors which can either
cause a positive or a negative bias when neglected. Consistent with an experience
good model, his results for the US indicate that job mobility negatively affects
adult wages. Positive effects of job mobility on wage growth are also documented
by e. g. le Grand and Taehlin (2002) for Sweden and Fuller (2008) for the US.
However, evidence on negative effects or no effects of job mobility on wage growth
has also been accumulated (e.g. Munasinghe and Sigman, 2004). Perez and Sanz
(2005) provide cross country evidence in the European context.
The case of Germany is not directly comparable to the results from the US, as
mobility patterns differ considerably. In Germany, individuals during their career
change jobs less often (Dustmann and Pereira, 2008; Borghans and Golsteyn, 2012).
78
5.3 Conceptual framework
Dustmann and Pereira (2008) also suggest that the characteristics of job movers
in Germany are different. Movers might be a negative selection as sticky wages
on the current job or information asymmetries on worker’s ability play a role in
job mobility patterns. Other studies for Germany find job mobility to be a crucial
factor that positively affects wage growth. Zimmermann (1998) finds for West
Germany that male workers who change firms have a five percent lower yearly
growth in monthly wage. Hunt (2001) reports that during the 1990’s, 20 percent
of wage growth could be attributed to job changes. A recent study by Alm, Engel,
and Weyh (2013) finds that in East Germany, wage growth of job changers is about
three percent per year higher than wage growth of job stayers.
Given the risk associated with changing jobs, it is likely that risk attitudes
can influence the decision to move to another job. Risk attitudes affect a vari-
ety of labour market decisions, which in turn, can significantly affect wages. In
particular, risk averse individuals are more likely to follow a career in a public
sector (Pfeifer, 2010), whereas risk-averse individuals are more likely to become
self-employed (see Chapter 4 of this dissertation). High earnings risk occupations,
which tend to pay higher wages, attract individuals who are more willing to take
risks (Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde, 2007; Hartog and Vijverberg,
2007a). Shaw (1996) shows empirically that risk attitudes can affect wages because
more risk-tolerant individuals are more likely to invest into risky human capital.
Risk averse individuals, on the contrary, have lower wage growth due to lower re-
turns to education, experience and tenure. For the UK the study of Brown and
Taylor (2005) shows a negative correlation between risk aversion and wage growth.
Budria, Diaz-Serrano, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, and Hartog (2012) replicate Shaw (1996)
for four different countries and find mixed evidence concerning the relationship be-
tween risk attitude and wage growth.
5.3 Conceptual framework
Conceptually, our starting point is the fact that young labour market partici-
pants tend to change jobs more frequently than older workers (Topel and Ward,
1992). Recent empirical evidence suggests that younger individuals are initially un-
sure about their skills and abilities and experiment with jobs to learn about them
(Antonovics and Golan, 2012). The explanation for this behaviour was proposed
by Johnson (1978) in his theoretical model of ‘job-shopping’ behaviour. Following
Johnson’s (1978) ‘experience good’ approach, we assume that quality of any given
job match is not known ex ante and that the external flow of job offers is indepen-
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dent of searching.3 The distribution of this flow is constant and it is the same for
all people independent of their risk attitude. We also assume that match quality
in a specific job is unrelated to risk attitudes.4
To change jobs, workers need to incur costs while benefits are not certain.
Costs include loss of fringe benefits or pension claims acquired on the current job
but also include costs of adaption to a new living environment (van den Berg,
1992). The benefits of a new job are uncertain because of incomplete contracts,
as it is impossible to fully specify employment conditions (Grossman and Hart,
1981; Bull, 1987). Changing jobs is a risky decision because workers have to incur
costs with out being fully certain about the the benefits of the new job. In the
expected utility framework this implies that risk averse individuals demand higher
compensation for the risk associated with a job change, than more risk tolerant
individuals do.
If we disregard non-monetary aspects of employment compensation,5 workers
will voluntarily change their job only if they receive a job offer which exceeds a
specific monetary threshold. We argue that this threshold is higher for risk averse
individuals compared to risk tolerant individuals, because job change is a risky
decision. Risk averse individuals will switch jobs only if offered a wage which is
higher than their current wage but also higher than the wage which would induce
more risk tolerant but otherwise similar individuals to change their jobs.
Given that all other conditions are equal, including the distribution of external
wage offers, the proposition that risk averse individuals demand higher monetary
compensation for the same risk associated with a job change generates two empir-
ical predictions. First, risk tolerant individuals change jobs more frequently rela-
tive to more risk averse individuals. Second, job changes of risk averse individuals
are associated with larger wage increases than for more risk tolerant individuals.
These predictions are schematically illustrated in Figure 5.1. The solid line shows
the wage growth pattern associated with job changes of a risk tolerant individual.6
Each ‘step’ is a wage increase due to a job change. The different pattern of wage
3In fact, this framework can be extended by the fact that job search is costly. Since costs of job
search cannot perfectly predict the next job match, risk averse individuals would be less likely
to start searching while on the job.
4In the empirical analysis, we control for a range of observable factors, conditional on which the
assumption of exogeneity of a particular job match quality to risk attitudes is likely to hold.
5For simplicity, we assume that the value of a new job is solely reflected in wage compensation.
However, other factors, such as an opportunity to gain better information about one’s skills,
as well as other forms of non-monetary compensation, can also affect a worker’s decision to
change a job.
6For simplicity, we do not show wage growth during current employment in this figure. We also
disregard the possibility that, because job changes can occur for other reasons than monetary
gains, not each job change will empirically be associated with a wage increase.
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growth associated with job changes of a risk averse individual is shown by the
dashed line.
Figure 5.1: Expected relationship between risk attitude and wage growth depend-
ing on job changing behaviour
Time
Wages
Note: Job changes are associated with wage increases for risk averse as well as for risk tolerant
individuals. Risk tolerant individuals (solid line) make more job changes and experience lower
wage increases relative to risk averse individuals (dashed line), who make less job changes with
higher associated wage increases.
5.4 Empirical approach
5.4.1 Empirical strategy
We use the following specification to estimate the effect of risk attitude on the
total number of job changes of labour market entrants.
Jobchangei = α0 + α1Riskattitudei + δXi + µi (5.1)
where Jobchangei is the total number of job changes that an individual i makes
in the first few years of employment, Riskattitudei measures individual i’s risk
attitude in occupational matters, with higher values reflecting more risk toler-
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ance. Xi includes control variables capturing demographic characteristics, socio-
economic characteristics and business cycle effects.
We focus on voluntary job changes, i.e., job changes that are initiated by
the worker. Following the literature, such as Perez and Sanz (2005); Pavlopoulos,
Fouarge, Muffels, and Vermunt (forthcoming), we distinguish voluntary changes
from changes for other reasons using the unemployment duration workers experi-
ence between jobs. We consider a job change as voluntary if individuals did not
have a break longer than six months between employments. It could be argued
that the ex-ante risk of unemployment is part of the risk that workers face when
they make a job change.7 By focusing on the workers with only short breaks in
employment, we might be underestimating the effect of risk attitude on total num-
ber of job changes. Furthermore, since we control for initial sorting factors, we can
regard job changes resulting from, for example, fixed contracts if not necessarily
voluntary in the strict sense but as foreseeable from the standpoint of workers.
Individuals who experience a better matched entry job in terms of produc-
tivity and preferences are less likely to switch jobs than individuals with a worse
match. To hold the initial job match quality constant, we use various measures
that capture match quality of the first job. These include measures for workers’ job
satisfaction, indicators for whether the task that workers perform matches their
qualification and whether the worker is on apprenticeship or on-the-job training.
To control for external factors which can affect job opportunities and hence the
probability of finding a good initial job match, we include year fixed effects, indi-
cators for residing in West Germany (in 1989) and for German nationality.
We estimate equation (5.1) using ordinary least squares regression (OLS).
Factors other than those listed in equation (5.1) may affect the number of job
changes that labour market entrants make. However, as long as these factors are
not correlated with risk attitude, OLS regression gives a consistent estimate for the
effect of risk attitude on job mobility. The number of job changes that workers in
general and labour market entrants in particular make in Germany is low compared
to the US and the UK. Dustmann and Pereira (2008) attribute this to the higher
costs of firing and the substantial job entry screening by employers. As a robustness
check in section 5.6, we estimate a an ordered logit to reflect the discrete nature of
job changes in Germany.8 We also performed a negative binomial model estimation,
7Unemployment risk ex-post, i.e. in case the following match turns out to be of a lower produc-
tivity than expected, is a relevant dimension of the risk a worker faces when s/he decides to
change jobs. In the current set-up this part of the risk is neglected.
8See section 5.4.2 for details on variable measurement.
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because the count data model is better fit for the dependent variable. The results
are very similar to our preferred OLS estimates.9
We use the following specification to estimate the effect of job mobility on
wage growth. In order to capture heterogeneous effect with respect to risk attitude,
we interact job mobility and risk attitude in the equation:
Wagegrowthi = β0 + β1Jobchangei + β2Riskattitudei
+β3Jobchangei ∗Riskattitudei + γXi + 
i (5.2)
where Wagegrowthi is defined as the difference between the log real wage after
several years in the labour market and the log real wage at labour market entry.
Jobchangei, Riskattitudei and Xi are defined as in equation (5.1). While equation
(5.1) shows the relationship between risk attitude and job changes, we examine
how this relationship translates into wage growth using equation (5.2).
We draw two predictions on the sign of the coefficients on the variables of
interest from equation (5.1) and (5.2) based on the ideas discussed in section 5.3.
The risks associated with a job change imply that risk averse individuals change
jobs less often compared to risk-tolerant workers, given the same productivity
match and an independent flow of wage offers. That is, the least squares estimate of
α1 in equation (5.1) is predicted to be positive. Similarly, when risk averse workers
change jobs, they require higher wage compensation compared to risk tolerant
workers. Holding the number of job changes constant, the difference between final
and initial log real wages is expected to be larger for risk averse than for more
risk-tolerant workers. Hence, the least squares estimate of β3 in equation (5.2) is
expected to be negative.
Previous studies find that individuals with high risk tolerance invest more in
human capital (Brown and Taylor, 2005; Budria, Diaz-Serrano, Ferrer-i-Carbonell,
and Hartog, 2012), sort into occupation with high earning variance (Bonin et al.
2007; Chapter 3 of this dissertation) and become self-employed (see Chapter 4 of
this dissertation), whereas risk averse individuals sort into public sector employ-
ment (Bellante and Link, 1981; Pfeifer, 2010). The least squares estimates of the
risk attitude effect in equation (5.1) and (5.2) can be biased if initial sorting is
ignored. We capture differences in educational choice using an indicator for upper
secondary school leaving certificate, known as Abitur in Germany, and an indicator
for university degree. We also use occupation fixed effects and occupation-specific
earnings variance to control for occupational sorting. In addition, we check the
9The negative binomial regression does not converge when the extensive set of control variables
is included.
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robustness of the estimation results by restricting the sample to labour market
entrants who started their career as dependent workers in the private sector.
5.4.2 Data
The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) is a representative household
panel survey. Individuals and households in the SOEP are followed since 1986.10
Our research question pertains to early career job mobility. Hence, we restrict
the sample to individuals who enter the labour market when they are already in
the SOEP since 1998. To focus on a homogeneous group of young labour market
entrants, we confine our sample to individuals who are between 17 and 35 years of
age in their entrance year, and who do not have gaps in employment of more than
six months during the first seven consecutive years of labour market experience.11
There is no widely accepted definition of how many years the labour market ex-
perience of entrants is considered to be the ‘early career’. For example, Light and
McGarry (1998) study early career job mobility in the US during the first two,
four, and eight years of labour market experience. Since job mobility is lower in
Germany than in the US, we use the seven years definition in order to accumulate
a sufficient number of job changes and to maintain an adequate number of obser-
vations for the analysis.12 In Table 5.B (Appendix) job change frequencies for the
selected years of experience are displayed.
The dependent variable in our first equation is the total number of job changes
during the first seven years of employment. This variable is constructed using the
job change variable, which is equal to one if the respondent has started a new
job since the last interview or in the previous year.13 The dependent variable in
our second equation is the percentage wage growth during the first seven years of
labour market experience. It is measured as the log real wage difference between
the first job on and the job after seven years of consecutive employment. The
sample distributions of the main variables is shown in Table 5.1.14
The main explanatory variable is willingness to take risks in occupational
matters. This variable is measured on a scale from zero to ten, in which higher
values reflect greater willingness to take risks. The exact wording of the question,
10For the details on the SOEP data see Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007).
11Table 5.A in the Appendix describes step by step the procedure of sample selection and reasons
for deletion of observations.
12In section 5.6, we test sensitivity of our findings using alternative definitions of early career.
13The variable is constructed to provide longitudinal consistency (DIW, 2010).
14We have conducted additional estimations using the mean wage growth over the first years of
employment. Results are qualitatively similar and are available on request.
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5.5 Results
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD1 Min Max
Share of individuals changing jobs 0.57 0.50 0 1
Number of job changes (at least 1) 1.40 0.65 1 4
Wage growth (percentage) 0.78 0.64 -1.37 2.88
Wage growth (absolute) 1110.85 908.56 -1658.18 4040.49
Risk attitude 4.60 2.33 0 10
1 if Male 0.49 0.50 0 1
Age at first employment 22.61 5.08 17 35
1 if has Abitur 0.45 0.50 0 1
Education degree2 1.17 0.62 0 2
Log of initial wage 6.81 0.85 4.06 8.76
1 if has German nationality 0.86 0.35 0 1
1 if Originates from West Germany 0.73 0.44 0 1
Initial job satisfaction 7.73 1.74 3 10
Initial wage variance in occupation 0.35 0.06 0.22 0.60
1 if not Trained for the occupation 0.08 0.27 0 1
1 if in Apprenticeship or training 0.53 0.50 0 1
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants.
Notes: The descriptive statistics are presented for the main estimation sample.
1 SD is standard deviation.
2 Education degree is equal to 0 if individual’s education is at a basic level, it is equal to 1 in case of intermediate
education, and it is equal to 2 in case higher education was completed.
translated from German reads:“People can behave differently in different situations.
How would you rate your willingness to take risks in the following areas. How is
it in your occupation? Please give me a number from 0 to 10, where the value 0
means: ‘Risk averse’ and the value 10 means: ‘Fully prepared to take risks’. You
can use the values in between to make your estimate.” Dohmen, Falk, Huffman,
Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2011) have shown that this question is significantly
related to paid lottery choices, and it explains behaviour in a range of important
real life decision domains.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Risk attitudes and job changes
First, we analyse whether individuals who are more willing to take risks are more
likely to change jobs during the first years on the labour market. The results
of an OLS estimation, in which the dependent variable is the total number of
job changes during the first seven years on the labour market, are presented in
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Table 5.2.15 In column (1), simple correlation between individual willingness to
take risks and the number of job changes is displayed. In the following columns,
sets of variables are added to control for basic demographic and socio-economic
characteristics, business cycle effects, initial occupational sorting and initial job
match quality. The coefficient on risk attitude remains positive and significant
irrespective of the specification. This result is in line with the empirical prediction
from section 5.3, supporting the proposition that risk averse individuals are less
likely to switch jobs.
Interpreting the effect of risk attitude from column (4), one standard devi-
ation increase in willingness to take risks in occupational matters increases the
probability of the next job change by approximately 20%. This effect is about one
third of the Abitur effect. Higher education has a positive effect on job mobility
of graduates because it provides them with a broader set of skills, which increases
the range of job opportunities compared to intermediate education. Higher initial
wage has a significant negative effect on the total number of job changes in the first
years of the labour market. This is consistent with the prediction of the ‘experience
good’ model (Johnson, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979b) according to which workers change
jobs when the value of an outside offer is higher than the value of the current
productivity match. It is less likely to receive a higher wage offer relative to the
current wage if the initial draw is from the higher end of the wage distribution. Ini-
tial job satisfaction, as an indicator of job match quality, has an expected negative
effect on the number of job changes, however the coefficient is not significant.
An intriguing question to study in more detail would be to analyse to which
extent risk attitude matters for job changes across occupations (i.e. to a different
occupation than the initial one) as compared to job changes within occupation.
Given the sample size, it is not possible to analyse different kinds of job changes
separately. However, adding fixed effects of the first occupation (on one-digit
ISCO-88 code16) does not affect the estimated coefficients, which means that risk
attitude matters for changes within as well as across occupations.
Earnings variance in the initial occupation, which has been shown to attract
individuals with higher tolerance for taking risks,17 has a positive but insignificant
effect on the total number of job changes. This is consistent with the idea that
because more risk-tolerant individuals sort into more risky jobs, they also would
15The results from a count data model estimation (a negative binomial regression) are qualita-
tively similar.
16ISCO stands for International Standard Classification of Occupations (edition of 1988).
17See, for example, Fouarge, Kriechel, and Dohmen (2012); Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
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Table 5.2: Risk attitudes and the total number of job changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Willingness to take risks 0.063∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
1 if Male −0.158 −0.147 −0.171
(0.120) (0.121) (0.155)
Age at first employment −0.011 −0.025 −0.023
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
1 if has Abitur 0.689∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.160) (0.164)
1 if Education is low or missing −0.124 −0.041 −0.026
(0.246) (0.245) (0.250)
1 if Intermediate education 0.125 0.214 0.248
(0.172) (0.172) (0.161)
Log of initial wage −0.231∗ −0.276∗∗ −0.356∗∗
(0.119) (0.137) (0.141)
1 if German nationality −0.043 −0.041 −0.123
(0.166) (0.173) (0.174)
1 if Originates from West Germany 0.084 0.121 0.166
(0.125) (0.127) (0.135)
Initial job satisfaction −0.030 −0.039
(0.039) (0.041)
1 if not Trained for the occupation −0.190 −0.112
(0.218) (0.234)
Initial wage variance in occupation 1.729 0.821
(1.075) (1.242)
1 if in Apprenticeship or training −0.275 −0.290∗
(0.169) (0.168)
Constant 0.477∗∗∗ 2.258∗∗∗ 2.600∗∗ 3.482∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.740) (1.008) (1.074)
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation fixed effects No No No Yes
R2 0.033 0.283 0.309 0.379
Sample 173 173 173 173
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants. Dependent variable: total number of job changes during the
first seven years of experience on the labour market.
Notes: Estimation: OLS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels.
foresee more frequent job changes as a result of choosing a particular occupation.
In that sense, even if not all job changes captured by our measure are voluntary
in the strict sense, they were foreseen by labour market entrants at the moment of
making their occupational choice.
In this analysis, we assume that risk attitudes are stable over time. Several re-
cent studies support this assumption, providing empirical evidence which suggests
that although some variation is possible, there are no systematic shifts related to
any other demographic characteristic than age (e.g. Harrison, Johnson, McInnes,
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16ISCO stands for International Standard Classification of Occupations (edition of 1988).
17See, for example, Fouarge, Kriechel, and Dohmen (2012); Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
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Table 5.2: Risk attitudes and the total number of job changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Willingness to take risks 0.063∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
1 if Male −0.158 −0.147 −0.171
(0.120) (0.121) (0.155)
Age at first employment −0.011 −0.025 −0.023
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
1 if has Abitur 0.689∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.160) (0.164)
1 if Education is low or missing −0.124 −0.041 −0.026
(0.246) (0.245) (0.250)
1 if Intermediate education 0.125 0.214 0.248
(0.172) (0.172) (0.161)
Log of initial wage −0.231∗ −0.276∗∗ −0.356∗∗
(0.119) (0.137) (0.141)
1 if German nationality −0.043 −0.041 −0.123
(0.166) (0.173) (0.174)
1 if Originates from West Germany 0.084 0.121 0.166
(0.125) (0.127) (0.135)
Initial job satisfaction −0.030 −0.039
(0.039) (0.041)
1 if not Trained for the occupation −0.190 −0.112
(0.218) (0.234)
Initial wage variance in occupation 1.729 0.821
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(0.169) (0.168)
Constant 0.477∗∗∗ 2.258∗∗∗ 2.600∗∗ 3.482∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.740) (1.008) (1.074)
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation fixed effects No No No Yes
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Sample 173 173 173 173
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants. Dependent variable: total number of job changes during the
first seven years of experience on the labour market.
Notes: Estimation: OLS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels.
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and Rutstro¨m, 2005; Sahm, 2012; Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m, 2008;
Baucells and Villas´ıs, 2009; Reynaud and Couture, 2012). Additionally, using the
full SOEP sample, we correlated risk attitudes (in occupational matters) measured
in 2004 with risk attitudes measured in 2009 (the last years in which this measure
is available): the correlation coefficient was .47. We also correlated willingness to
take risks (in general) as measured in 2004 with the same measure taken in 2011:
the correlation coefficient was again .47. The median of the change of each of
the measures was zero, suggesting that even if there might be some random noise
around the risk attitude measure, on average it remains stable over time. Using
a structured approached to testing stability of economic preferences, Salamanca
(2014), using the SOEP data, found that after accounting for individual charac-
teristics, the correlation coefficient between measures taken in different years was
above .9. This evidence supports the assumption of the stability of risk attitudes,
at least within the relatively short time horizon relevant for this study.
5.5.2 Risk attitude, job mobility and wage growth
Given the robust positive association between risk attitudes and the number of
job changes among labour market entrants, we examine the subsequent effect on
wage growth in the second step. In this section, we specifically analyse the hetero-
geneity of the relationship between job mobility and wage growth with respect to
individuals’ attitude towards risk. Table 5.3 presents estimation results from OLS
regressions in which wage growth is the dependent variable.
Column (1) shows the correlation between the number of job changes and
the mean wage growth that workers experience during the first seven years in the
labour market. In columns (2) and (3), risk attitude and control variables captur-
ing demographic characteristics, socio-economic characteristics and business cycle
effects are added. The total number of job changes workers experience during the
first seven years in the labour market is associated with higher mean wage growth.
However, the positive correlation between job mobility and wage growth declines
both in magnitude and significance once we take into account risk attitudes. This
result is an indication of a modifying effect of risk attitudes on the relationship
between job changes and wage growth. In columns (4) to (6) we, therefore, in-
teract the number of job changes with risk attitudes. These specifications allow
to estimate the heterogeneous effect of job mobility on wage growth depending on
risk attitude. The monetary and non-monetary risks associated with a job change
are evaluated differently depending on workers’ willingness to take risk. To make
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Table 5.3: Risk attitudes, total number of job changes and total wage growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total job changes 0.159∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.076∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.046) (0.045) (0.112) (0.102) (0.100)
Risk attitude 0.040∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
Job changes*Risk attitude −0.050∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗ −0.037∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
1 if Male 0.200∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.127∗
(0.067) (0.068) (0.063) (0.061) (0.073)
Age at first employment −0.034∗∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.004 0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Log of initial wage −0.518∗∗∗ −0.564∗∗∗ −0.557∗∗∗ −0.557∗∗∗ −0.539∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.087) (0.081) (0.072) (0.065)
1 if West Germany origin 0.102 0.111 0.078 0.021 0.016
(0.072) (0.071) (0.072) (0.070) (0.074)
1 if German nationality −0.121 −0.140 −0.143 −0.155∗ −0.188∗∗
(0.096) (0.095) (0.092) (0.087) (0.088)
1 if has Abitur 0.150 0.163 0.163 0.196∗ 0.218∗∗
(0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.107) (0.110)
1 if Low education −0.273∗∗ −0.315∗∗ −0.278∗ −0.244∗∗ −0.267∗∗
(0.138) (0.135) (0.142) (0.108) (0.103)
1 if Intermediate education 0.117 0.125 0.124 0.125 0.045
(0.118) (0.117) (0.111) (0.106) (0.110)
Initial job satisfaction 0.045∗∗ 0.039∗
(0.018) (0.018)
Initial wage variance in occ. 0.162 −0.211
(0.470) (0.582)
1 if not Trained for the occ. −0.018 −0.003
(0.140) (0.131)
1 if in Training 0.428∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.110)
Constant 0.656∗∗∗ 4.886∗∗∗ 4.977∗∗∗ 4.924∗∗∗ 3.446∗∗∗ 4.094∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.520) (0.500) (0.503) (0.554) (0.546)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occup. Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.041 0.588 0.606 0.647 0.716 0.739
Observations 173 173 173 173 173 173
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants. The dependent variable is wage growth during the first seven
years of labour market experience and it is defined as the difference between final and entry log real wage.
Notes: Estimation: OLS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels.
a job change, risk averse workers demand higher wage compensation than more
risk tolerant workers. Such a heterogeneous pattern is supported by the data.
The interaction term between job changes and risk attitude is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating that the wage increase associated with each job change is, on
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a job change, risk averse workers demand higher wage compensation than more
risk tolerant workers. Such a heterogeneous pattern is supported by the data.
The interaction term between job changes and risk attitude is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating that the wage increase associated with each job change is, on
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average, lower for risk tolerant individuals compared to risk averse individuals.18
The number of job changes that risk averse workers make is strongly associated
with a positive mean wage growth. In terms of magnitude, each job change made
by risk-averse workers during the first seven years into the labour market increases
wage by about 28 percent relative to the labour market entry wage. On the other
hand, for individuals with risk attitude at the median, each job change results in
a 9.8 percent higher wage growth whereas it reduced mean wage growth by 1.2
percent for risk tolerant individuals. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Wage growth and job mobility profiles by risk attitude:
out of sample prediction
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The relationship between the number of job changes and the predicted wage
growth are shown separately for risk averse, risk attitude at the median and risk
tolerant individuals. At zero job changes, risk averse individuals have lower pre-
dicted mean wage growth compared to individuals with risk attitude at the median
and risk tolerant individuals. As individuals make more job changes, the relation-
ship is reversed. The average wage growth increases with the total number of job
changes for both risk averse and individuals with risk attitude at the median, al-
18For ease of interpretation, we use the 5th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the risk attitude
distribution to define risk averse workers, workers with risk attitude at the median and risk
tolerant workers respectively. These corresponds to risk attitude values of zero, five and eight
respectively on a scale from zero to ten.
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5.6 Robustness checks
beit at a lower rate for the latter group. On the contrary, risk tolerant individuals
experience a lower mean wage growth as they make more job changes.
5.6 Robustness checks
Empirical findings suggest that risk-tolerant individuals are more likely to make
risky choices. The risk associated with a job change and the subsequent wage
growth are likely to differ between public sector and private sector employment on
the one hand and self-employment and dependent employment on the other. In
order to net out the initial sorting into different employment-types, in this section
we further restrict the sample to labour market entrants who started their career as
dependent workers in the private sector. In Table 5.4 the estimation results using
this restricted sample are displayed. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the
number of job changes. In Panel B, the dependent variable is wage growth. The
upshot of the estimates in Table 5.4 is that excluding initial sorting with respect
to different employment-types does not significantly alter the results.
Our second robustness check concerns with the definition of early labour mar-
ket experience. There is no widely accepted definition of how many years the
labour market experience of entrants is considered to be ‘early career’. Moreover,
the number of job changes that workers experience in Germany is considerably
lower compared to the US and the UK, where the majority of the studies investi-
gating the effect of job mobility on wage come from. In our sample, labour market
entrants change three jobs in the first six years of experience and it reaches five
jobs after nine years in the labour market (see Table 5.B in the Appendix).
Table 5.5 presents the results of estimations across different definitions of early
career job mobility (5 to 10 years of the early career working experience). The
structure of the table is similar to Table 5.4, however each column corresponds
to the sample constructed using a different number of years of labour market
experience. The estimates reported in this table are qualitatively similar to the
findings reported in the main results section. In Panel A, the association between
risk attitude and the total number of job changes is positive. The positive effect
of risk attitudes on the number of job changes is estimated imprecisely in the first
five and six years of labour market experience, as columns (1) and (2) indicate.
The effect of risk attitude increases in terms of magnitude and significance with the
number of years workers stay employed. Panel B of Table 5.5 shows the subsequent
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Table 5.4: Robustness check accounting for initial sorting factors
Panel A. Dependent variable: Number of job changes
(1) (2) (3)
Risk attitude 0.082∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Background characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Job match indicators No Yes Yes
Occupation fixed effects No No Yes
R2 0.305 0.327 0.393
Observations 163 163 163
Panel B. Dependent variable: wage growth
(1) (2) (3)
Total number of job changes 0.295∗∗ 0.254∗∗ 0.231∗∗
(0.117) (0.112) (0.103)
Risk attitude 0.073∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.020)
Total job changes * Risk attitude −0.050∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.031∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016)
Background characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Job match indicators No Yes Yes
Occupation fixed effects No No Yes
R2 0.669 0.691 0.764
Observations 163 163 163
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants.
Notes: Estimation: OLS. Dependent variable: the number of job changes during the first seven years of labour
market experience in Panel A; wage growth during the first seven years of labour market experience in Panel
Bs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.
effect on wage growth for the samples constructed using a different number of years
of labour market experience. The interaction effect of risk attitude and job changes
on wage growth remains negative and significant in most cases.
As the next robustness check, we construct a categorical job change variable to
reflect the discontinuous nature of job change behaviour in Germany. The variable
is equal to zero if a worker made zero job changes during the first seven years of
employment. The variable is equal to one if a worker made one job change. It is
equal to two if a worker made two of more job changes. Column (1) of Table 5.6
shows the estimation result from an ordered logit model using the categorical job
change as a dependent variable. The effect of risk attitude on job mobility remains
significant at an one percent significance level. The estimated odds ratio on risk
attitude is greater than one indicating that as risk attitude increases, the odds
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Table 5.5: Robustness check using different years of experience
Panel A. Dependent variable: Number of job changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5 Years 6 Years 7 Years 8 Years 9 Years 10 Years
Risk attitude 0.018 0.039 0.084∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.142∗∗
(0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.042) (0.054)
R2 0.211 0.237 0.379 0.429 0.497 0.518
Observations 248 207 173 137 102 74
Panel B. Dependent variable: wage growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5 Years 6 Years 7 Years 8 Years 9 Years 10 Years
Job changes1 0.272∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.219∗ 0.349∗∗
(0.077) (0.079) (0.100) (0.086) (0.113) (0.141)
Risk attitude 0.053∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.038)
Job ch.*Risk2 −0.036∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗ −0.016 −0.032 −0.046∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023) (0.027)
R2 0.633 0.644 0.606 0.772 0.762 0.780
Observations 248 207 173 137 102 74
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants.
Notes: Estimation: OLS. Dependent variable: the number of job changes during the first years of labour
market experience indicated in the header of each column in the top panel; wage growth during the first years
of labour market experience indicated in the header of each column in the bottom panel. All specifications
include controls for background characteristics, job match indicators, business cycle effects and occupational
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 levels.
1 Total number of job changes made during the number of years as shown in the column.
2 Interaction term between risk attitude and the total number of job changes.
to make a job change increases. Specifically, a one unit change in risk attitudes
increases the odds of two or more job changes as compared to one or no job change
by 0.25. In column (2) of Table 5.6, the least squares estimation of the wage growth
model are shown. The effect of job changes on wage remains positive for risk averse
workers and it increases as they make more job changes. The interaction between
risk attitudes and job changes remains negative when job change is measured as a
discrete variable, although the effect is estimated imprecisely for two or more job
changes.
5.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that risk attitudes is an important factor that influences
job mobility decisions and generates heterogeneous wage growth patterns. Job
change is a risky decision which entails significant costs while benefits (in terms of
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Table 5.4: Robustness check accounting for initial sorting factors
Panel A. Dependent variable: Number of job changes
(1) (2) (3)
Risk attitude 0.082∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Background characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Job match indicators No Yes Yes
Occupation fixed effects No No Yes
R2 0.305 0.327 0.393
Observations 163 163 163
Panel B. Dependent variable: wage growth
(1) (2) (3)
Total number of job changes 0.295∗∗ 0.254∗∗ 0.231∗∗
(0.117) (0.112) (0.103)
Risk attitude 0.073∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.020)
Total job changes * Risk attitude −0.050∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.031∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016)
Background characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Job match indicators No Yes Yes
Occupation fixed effects No No Yes
R2 0.669 0.691 0.764
Observations 163 163 163
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants.
Notes: Estimation: OLS. Dependent variable: the number of job changes during the first seven years of labour
market experience in Panel A; wage growth during the first seven years of labour market experience in Panel
Bs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.
effect on wage growth for the samples constructed using a different number of years
of labour market experience. The interaction effect of risk attitude and job changes
on wage growth remains negative and significant in most cases.
As the next robustness check, we construct a categorical job change variable to
reflect the discontinuous nature of job change behaviour in Germany. The variable
is equal to zero if a worker made zero job changes during the first seven years of
employment. The variable is equal to one if a worker made one job change. It is
equal to two if a worker made two of more job changes. Column (1) of Table 5.6
shows the estimation result from an ordered logit model using the categorical job
change as a dependent variable. The effect of risk attitude on job mobility remains
significant at an one percent significance level. The estimated odds ratio on risk
attitude is greater than one indicating that as risk attitude increases, the odds
92
5.7 Conclusion
Table 5.5: Robustness check using different years of experience
Panel A. Dependent variable: Number of job changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5 Years 6 Years 7 Years 8 Years 9 Years 10 Years
Risk attitude 0.018 0.039 0.084∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.142∗∗
(0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.042) (0.054)
R2 0.211 0.237 0.379 0.429 0.497 0.518
Observations 248 207 173 137 102 74
Panel B. Dependent variable: wage growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5 Years 6 Years 7 Years 8 Years 9 Years 10 Years
Job changes1 0.272∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.219∗ 0.349∗∗
(0.077) (0.079) (0.100) (0.086) (0.113) (0.141)
Risk attitude 0.053∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.038)
Job ch.*Risk2 −0.036∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗ −0.016 −0.032 −0.046∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023) (0.027)
R2 0.633 0.644 0.606 0.772 0.762 0.780
Observations 248 207 173 137 102 74
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants.
Notes: Estimation: OLS. Dependent variable: the number of job changes during the first years of labour
market experience indicated in the header of each column in the top panel; wage growth during the first years
of labour market experience indicated in the header of each column in the bottom panel. All specifications
include controls for background characteristics, job match indicators, business cycle effects and occupational
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 levels.
1 Total number of job changes made during the number of years as shown in the column.
2 Interaction term between risk attitude and the total number of job changes.
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Table 5.6: Robustness check using a categorical job change variable
Dependent variable Job mobility Wage growth
(1) (2)
Risk attitude 1.251∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.023)
One job change 0.395∗∗
(0.152)
Two or more job changes 0.480∗∗
(0.239)
One job change * Risk attitude −0.069∗∗
(0.029)
Two or more job changes * Risk attitude −0.066
(0.041)
Constant 1 −5.820
(3.234)
Constant 2 −3.362
(3.162)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Occupation fixed effects Yes Yes
Model Ordered logit OLS
Sample 173 173
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants.
Notes: Estimation: column (1) Ordered logit; column (2) OLS. Dependent variable: in column (1): a categor-
ical variable equal to 0 if there were no job changes, equal to 1 if there was one change, and equal to 2 if the
total number of job changes during the first seven years of experience on the labour market is more than one;
in column (2): the wage growth during the first seven years of labour market experience. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.
the conditions of another employment) cannot be entirely foreseen. Based on our
conceptual framework we test two hypotheses: First, more risk averse individuals
are less likely to change jobs than more risk tolerant individuals, all other condi-
tions equal. And second, the wage increase associated with each job change for
the risk averse individuals is larger than for risk tolerant individuals since a risk
averse individual demands more compensation associated with a risky job change.
These two hypotheses are supported by our empirical findings: Risk tolerant indi-
viduals are more likely to switch jobs and their subsequent wage growth is lower
in magnitude than wage growth of risk averse individuals, given the same number
of job changes.
We test the sensitivity of our findings in a number of robustness checks.
Namely, we address sample heterogeneity and sample composition in more de-
tail and analyse whether a more robust specification of the job mobility variable
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can affect our findings. There are, however, some reasons why the results should
be interpreted with caution. One concern is the low number of observations. This
follows from the sample restrictions that we impose to have a sufficiently long ob-
servation period (of consecutive employment) for each individual and a reasonably
homogeneous sample. For the future, we consider using an alternative data set to
check the external validity of our results. With a larger data set we also intend
to investigate the effect of risk attitudes on job mobility and wage growth with
respect to different levels of education. Second, although we control for all factors
which we suspect to drive initial sorting we do not have exogenous variation in job
changes. The causal link between risk attitudes, job mobility and subsequent wage
growth could be estimated by exploiting a policy change.
Our measure of job changes may not comprise all the risks inherent to job
changes. In particular, some job changes in our sample might have been job
changes within the same enterprise, which entails significantly less uncertainty
than job change to another employer. We also cannot account for the aspects
of non-monetary compensation at the new job. Non-monetary compensation of
another employment increases uncertainty even further because it is even more
difficult to fully specify in a contract. Since there are aspects of uncertainty that
our job mobility measure does not capture, our estimates of the effect of risk atti-
tudes on job mobility and the subsequent wage growth can be considered as lower
bound.
The analysis performed in this paper is motivated by the ‘experience good’
model of job mobility, according to which an external flow of job offers is assumed
independently of workers’ characteristics. However, search on-the-job is costly,
which would reduce willingness of risk-averse individuals to search for alternative
employment. From this perspective, the ‘search good’ model would generate a
similar prediction on the effect of risk attitudes on job mobility decisions and
the subsequent wage growth. Our conceptual framework could be extended by
including the fact that individuals can search on-the-job. Our analysis contributes
to two previously distinct fields in the literature. On the one hand, our results
shed some light on the contradictory findings in the literature concerned with the
effects of job mobility on wage growth during the early career. On the other hand,
we extend the empirical evidence on the effect of risk attitudes on labour market
outcomes. To our knowledge, we are the first to document a robust correlation
between willingness to take risks and the number of job changes.
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Appendix
Table 5.A: Sample selection procedure
Respondents Sample selection steps
45338 SOEP sample starting from 1998
−42525 selecting the sample of labour market entrants
2813
−32 keeping labour market entrants between 17 and 35 years of age
2781
−650 measure of willingness to take risk unavailable
2131
−13 missing wage information
2118
−304 no gaps in employment (yearly)
1814
−831 no gaps in employment (no longer than six months unemployed)
983
−790 at least seven years of employment
193
−20 missing data on control variables
173 Final estimation sample
Source: SOEP.
Notes: Step by step deletion of respondents which do not fit the sample definition or for which essential
information is missing.
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Table 5.B: Distribution of job changes during the early career
5 Years2 6 Years 7 Years 8 Years 9 Years
Number of job changes N1 % N % N % N % N %
0 127 51.21 95 45.89 76 43.93 56 40.88 35 34.31
1 100 40.32 83 40.1 68 39.31 51 37.23 36 35.29
2 18 7.26 25 12.08 24 13.87 22 16.06 23 22.55
3 3 1.21 4 1.93 4 2.31 6 4.38 5 4.9
4 1 0.58 2 1.46 2 1.96
5 1 0.98
Sample size 248 207 173 137 102
Mean (number of changes) 0.58 0.70 0.76 0.88 1.08
SD3 (number of changes) 0.68 0.76 0.82 0.93 1.05
Source: SOEP.
Notes: Sample: Labour market entrants.
1 Number of respondents in a given category.
2 Years of (uninterrupted) working experience indicating different samples of labour market entrants which are
observed.
3 SD stands for standard deviation.
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6 Conclusions
This dissertation contributes to the rapidly expanding literature that doc-
uments the importance of heterogeneous preferences, norms and values for be-
haviour. The investigation of the role of preferences for economic decision-making
is conducted in four separate studies, using large representative panel surveys.
Chapter 2 has analysed how trust affects co-evolvement of economic and political
systems and Chapters 3 to 5 have investigated how willingness to take risks is
related to occupational choice and mobility. By using structural changes in insti-
tutions realised during the economic and political transition of Ukraine and taking
advantage of a recently available data set with direct measures of preferences (the
ULMS), Chapters 2 to 4 shed some light on causality of the observed relationships.
In Chapter 2, investigation of the origins of civic capital, a set of pro-cooperative
values and norms of behaviour facilitated by social trust, in two historically dif-
ferent parts of Ukraine highlighted the critical role of (historical) institutions for
accumulation of civic capital. Using the fact that Soviet occupation blocked the
opportunities for establishing institutions that would be aligned with the level of
cooperative norms and values on the whole territory of Ukraine, Chapter 2 pre-
sented field evidence supporting the causal interpretation of the role of civic capital
for the formation of preferences for economic and political systems.
The findings of Chapter 2 suggest that there is no direct causal link between
economic and democratic development. Political preferences for certain types of
political and economic systems co-evolve in the dimension of regulation, such that
trusting individuals in a trusting environment prefer systems with little regulation.
This finding is important for the discussion of whether economic liberalisation has
a causal effect on democratic development, or whether democratic institutions
facilitate economic growth (Barro, 1999; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Giavazzi
and Tabellini, 2005; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared, 2008; Grosjean and
Senik, 2011). In fact, it implies that it is unlikely that efforts to create functioning
democratic institutions and to promote economic growth by liberalising markets
will be successful in distrustful populations. Because of historical roots of civic
capital, it is difficult to restore trust once it was damaged by unfavourable historical
conditions.
Chapter 3 illustrated the causal effect of risk attitudes on occupational sorting
using the fact that the economic transition of Ukraine exogenously shifted the
distribution of earnings risks across occupations. Lack of correlation between risk
attitudes and earnings risk in occupations before transition, when earnings risk
was similar in all occupations, and the positive correlation between the earnings
risk and individual willingness to take risks that emerged after transition, when
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heterogeneity of earnings risk across occupations increased dramatically, point to
the causal effect of risk attitude on occupational choice and mobility.
The fact that earnings risk is a relevant dimension of occupational choice
implies that risk attitudes affect the allocation of workers across occupations, such
that workers who are more willing to take risks self-select into occupations with
higher earnings risk. More risk-averse workers sort into occupations with lower
earnings variance trading off wages for security. Another implication is that if the
overall earnings risk is high, some individuals are discouraged from participating in
the labour market, since their expected earnings are not sufficient to compensate
them for the risk.
Since occupational choice is directly influenced by educational choice, the
findings of Chapter 3 are relevant for human capital investment decisions. Timely
information provision to facilitate good matching between occupational charac-
teristics and individual preferences is warranted. A wrong occupational choice is
likely to lead to several adverse consequences, including stress, anxiety, feeling of
underutilised potential, and loss of human capital in case of changing occupations
later in life.
The empirical approach of Chapter 4 exploited the fact that Ukraine and East
Germany had no or very limited experience with self-employment because of the
centrally-planned economic structure imposed by the communist regime. By (par-
tially) shutting down the channel of intra-family transmission of self-employment
and information about what it is like to be self-employed, the study provided
field evidence supporting the causal interpretation of the effect of risk attitudes on
the probability of being self-employed. Additional evidence from the Netherlands
points out that access to information about what it is like to be self-employed can
decrease the risk associated with self-employment.
The contribution of Chapter 4 is to document the effect of risk attitudes on
self-employment in the conditions when other factors or unobserved fixed effects
are unlikely to matter. In this sample, risk attitude is a stable predictor of self-
employment, unlike household income. This implies that financial stimulation
of self-employment might not achieve desired increases in self-employment rates
among the unemployed if the majority of the unemployed are risk-averse. The
findings of this chapter indicate that the provision of information may mitigate the
risk associated with self-employment. Heterogenous risk attitudes can explain the
differences in self-employment in various populations (e.g. Hout and Rosen, 2000).
Chapter 5 showed that risk-averse individuals change jobs less frequently than
more risk-tolerant individuals because they demand a higher compensation to make
a job change than more risk-tolerant individuals do. The expected benefits of the
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new job are uncertain, which makes job change a risky decision. Consequently,
more risk-tolerant individuals make job changes more often, but these job changes
are associated with lower wage increases than less frequent job changes of risk
averse individuals. This explanation is supported by empirical findings based on a
sample of labour market entrants observed during their early career in the SOEP.
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature by suggesting a mechanism, which
can explain mixed evidence on the effect of job mobility of young labour market
participants on the subsequent wage growth (Topel and Ward, 1992; Light and
McGarry, 1998; Hunt, 2001; Neumark, 2002). Chapter 5 is also the first study to
empirically document the relationship between willingness to take risks and the
total number of job changes during the early career. The fact that risk attitude
affects job mobility decisions is important to take into consideration when efforts to
stimulate mobility among workers are undertaken. Especially in the case of older
workers, who are on average more risk-averse than younger workers, incentives to
change jobs need to be high enough to compensate for the loss of security associated
with the old job.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 demonstrated that the method of historical investigation
of a single country with a turbulent history and exogenous variation in institutions
provides useful insights in the origin of preferences and their role for economic
decision-making. The added value of this approach is that structural changes in
historical institutions can be used as a source of exogenous variation to highlight
causal effects of preferences on economic outcomes in the field setting, using survey
data. Caution is warranted, however, for the conclusions of Chapter 2 and 3
are based on a single country study. Such conclusions may not be general in
case the effect of civic capital on the co-evolution of political preferences in the
Ukrainian population was facilitated by some country-specific geographic or ethnic
factor. Similarly, the link between risk attitudes and occupational sorting might be
corrupted if risk attitudes and the evolvement of the occupational wage structure
in Ukraine were simultaneously affected by some other factor.
In Chapter 4, the Ukrainian evidence is supplemented by the evidence from
East Germany, which experienced similar restrictions of private entrepreneurship
because of the communist regime. A test of the hypothesis of whether informa-
tion about self-employment decreases the risk of self-employment, comes from the
Netherlands, a country with a rich history of entrepreneurship. The data set from
the Netherlands contains information on whether a business was a start-up or
whether it was transferred from a family member. A combined use of three data
sets from three different populations provides an interesting set-up, in which data
from each population serve to address different sub-questions. A limitation of this
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approach is that the conditions under which the results are valid in one population,
might not hold in another population.
In Chapter 5, evidence supporting the theoretical explanation of the relevance
of risk attitudes for occupation mobility patterns and the subsequent wage growth
is presented. The fact that risk attitudes matter for job mobility decisions on the
German labour market, which is characterised by high regulation and infrequent
change of employers, suggests that the role of risk attitudes might be even larger
in more flexible labour markets. A causal interpretation of these findings is limited
because of the descriptive nature of the study and a low number of observations.
The chapters of this dissertation largely rely on self-reported data with re-
spect to measures of preferences as well as of economic outcomes. The analysis in
Chapter 3, in particular, relies on self-reported information about the past as part
of the identification. While all the efforts to verify the validity of this information
are taken, in an ideal setting an administrative data set with the occupation and
wage data before transition would have been used. The argument of Chapters 2 to
5 is based on the assumption about the stability of economic preferences, such as
trust and risk attitudes, over time. Recent empirical studies generally agree that
economic preferences can be treated as stable parameters. However, in an ideal
world, preferences were measured before the outcomes.
This dissertation has shown that economic preferences affect economic activ-
ity. Individuals make different decisions in very similar situations because they
have heterogeneous preferences. While the analyses in this dissertation naturally
have limitations, the importance of these findings demonstrates the need for further
research.
Some relevant questions are beyond the scope of the current dissertation. For
example, the investigation of how historical events ruin trust and exploration of
the ways to restore broken trust are not addressed here. Can fair and transpar-
ent institutions created exogenously repair civic capital faster than under natural
evolution? Risk attitudes affect occupational choice with respect to cross-sectional
earnings risk. It is likely that cross-sectional earnings risk incorporates the risk
of unemployment and longitudinal earnings risk to some extent, but how do dif-
ferent facets of risk in the future occupation impact educational choices? What
kind of information can reduce the risk of self-employment for the risk-averse?
Which personality traits can compensate for the lack of willingness to take risks?
The causality of the link between risk attitudes and the total number of voluntary
job changes documented here can be investigated by exploiting a policy change. A
larger data set from a more flexible labour market can provide a possibility to study
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new job are uncertain, which makes job change a risky decision. Consequently,
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are associated with lower wage increases than less frequent job changes of risk
averse individuals. This explanation is supported by empirical findings based on a
sample of labour market entrants observed during their early career in the SOEP.
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature by suggesting a mechanism, which
can explain mixed evidence on the effect of job mobility of young labour market
participants on the subsequent wage growth (Topel and Ward, 1992; Light and
McGarry, 1998; Hunt, 2001; Neumark, 2002). Chapter 5 is also the first study to
empirically document the relationship between willingness to take risks and the
total number of job changes during the early career. The fact that risk attitude
affects job mobility decisions is important to take into consideration when efforts to
stimulate mobility among workers are undertaken. Especially in the case of older
workers, who are on average more risk-averse than younger workers, incentives to
change jobs need to be high enough to compensate for the loss of security associated
with the old job.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 demonstrated that the method of historical investigation
of a single country with a turbulent history and exogenous variation in institutions
provides useful insights in the origin of preferences and their role for economic
decision-making. The added value of this approach is that structural changes in
historical institutions can be used as a source of exogenous variation to highlight
causal effects of preferences on economic outcomes in the field setting, using survey
data. Caution is warranted, however, for the conclusions of Chapter 2 and 3
are based on a single country study. Such conclusions may not be general in
case the effect of civic capital on the co-evolution of political preferences in the
Ukrainian population was facilitated by some country-specific geographic or ethnic
factor. Similarly, the link between risk attitudes and occupational sorting might be
corrupted if risk attitudes and the evolvement of the occupational wage structure
in Ukraine were simultaneously affected by some other factor.
In Chapter 4, the Ukrainian evidence is supplemented by the evidence from
East Germany, which experienced similar restrictions of private entrepreneurship
because of the communist regime. A test of the hypothesis of whether informa-
tion about self-employment decreases the risk of self-employment, comes from the
Netherlands, a country with a rich history of entrepreneurship. The data set from
the Netherlands contains information on whether a business was a start-up or
whether it was transferred from a family member. A combined use of three data
sets from three different populations provides an interesting set-up, in which data
from each population serve to address different sub-questions. A limitation of this
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approach is that the conditions under which the results are valid in one population,
might not hold in another population.
In Chapter 5, evidence supporting the theoretical explanation of the relevance
of risk attitudes for occupation mobility patterns and the subsequent wage growth
is presented. The fact that risk attitudes matter for job mobility decisions on the
German labour market, which is characterised by high regulation and infrequent
change of employers, suggests that the role of risk attitudes might be even larger
in more flexible labour markets. A causal interpretation of these findings is limited
because of the descriptive nature of the study and a low number of observations.
The chapters of this dissertation largely rely on self-reported data with re-
spect to measures of preferences as well as of economic outcomes. The analysis in
Chapter 3, in particular, relies on self-reported information about the past as part
of the identification. While all the efforts to verify the validity of this information
are taken, in an ideal setting an administrative data set with the occupation and
wage data before transition would have been used. The argument of Chapters 2 to
5 is based on the assumption about the stability of economic preferences, such as
trust and risk attitudes, over time. Recent empirical studies generally agree that
economic preferences can be treated as stable parameters. However, in an ideal
world, preferences were measured before the outcomes.
This dissertation has shown that economic preferences affect economic activ-
ity. Individuals make different decisions in very similar situations because they
have heterogeneous preferences. While the analyses in this dissertation naturally
have limitations, the importance of these findings demonstrates the need for further
research.
Some relevant questions are beyond the scope of the current dissertation. For
example, the investigation of how historical events ruin trust and exploration of
the ways to restore broken trust are not addressed here. Can fair and transpar-
ent institutions created exogenously repair civic capital faster than under natural
evolution? Risk attitudes affect occupational choice with respect to cross-sectional
earnings risk. It is likely that cross-sectional earnings risk incorporates the risk
of unemployment and longitudinal earnings risk to some extent, but how do dif-
ferent facets of risk in the future occupation impact educational choices? What
kind of information can reduce the risk of self-employment for the risk-averse?
Which personality traits can compensate for the lack of willingness to take risks?
The causality of the link between risk attitudes and the total number of voluntary
job changes documented here can be investigated by exploiting a policy change. A
larger data set from a more flexible labour market can provide a possibility to study
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6 Conclusions
whether the relationship between risk attitudes, job changes and wage increases is
the same for different schooling levels.
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Summary in Dutch
Voorkeuren, historische instituties, en economische
uitkomsten: een empirische studie
Een van de klassieke economische vraagstukken betreft het vaststellen van de be-
langrijke factoren van individuele keuzes op de arbeidsmarkt, zoals de beslissing
om te gaan werken of studeren, de keuze van een beroep, het veranderen van
baan en de loonontwikkeling. De effecten van de verschillende ‘harde’ factoren,
zoals de prijs van arbeid, marktrentes, rijkdom, onderwijsniveau, gezinssamen-
stelling, beroep van de ouders enz. zijn in de literatuur uitgebreid beschreven.
Er is echter veel minder bekend over de effecten van ‘zachte’ factoren, zoals per-
soonskenmerken en individuele voorkeuren. Het is belangrijk om te weten hoe deze
factoren menselijk gedrag kunnen be¨ınvloeden, omdat recente bevindingen laten
zien dat mensen in vergelijkbare situaties wel verschillende keuzes maken (Kahne-
man en Tversky, 1979). Belangrijke economische keuzes, zowel op arbeidsmarkt
als ook in bredere zin, zoals de keuze voor een bepaalde type van economische en
politieke systemen, kunnen beter worden verklaard als er rekening wordt gehouden
met de persoonlijke individuele voorkeuren.
Het belang van voorkeuren en persoonskenmerken wordt algemeen erkend.
Theoretische overwegingen van de klassieke auteurs zien vertrouwen en risicov-
oorkeuren als belangrijke drijfveren van economische groei. Vertrouwen werkt
als maatschappelijk smeermiddel en maakt economische transacties mogelijk (Ar-
row, 1972). Ondernemers moeten bereid zijn risico’s te nemen om succesvol te
kunnen handelen bij een fluctuerende vraag. In recente empirische studies wordt
gesuggereerd dat in maatschappijen waar men elkaar wantrouwt, er minder wordt
ge¨ınvesteerd, de economische groei lager is en dat er meer overheidstoezicht nodig
is (Ahgion et al., 2010; Algan en Cahuc 2010). Daarnaast zijn er structurele
correlaties tussen de risicovoorkeur van mensen en de arbeidsmarktkeuzes die als
riskant kunnen worden gekarakteriseerd. Bijvoorbeeld: risicomijdende mensen
werken vaker in de publieke sector en kiezen minder vaak voor het zelfstandig
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ondernemerschap. De causaliteit van deze relaties is echter moeilijk vast te stellen,
omdat er vaak andere factoren zijn die zowel de metingen van de voorkeuren als
de economische keuzes van individuen kunnen be¨ınvloeden.
Doel en methode
Het doel van dit proefschrift is het vaststellen van de causale effecten van de belan-
grijke individuele economische voorkeuren, zoals de risicovoorkeuren en het collec-
tieve vertrouwen in onbekende mensen ten opzichte van de bekende, op een aantal
economische uitkomsten. De uitkomsten, die in verschillende hoofstukken worden
behandeld, zijn als volgt: hoofdstuk 2 laat zien hoe het collectieve vertrouwen de
keuze voor verschillende politieke en economische systemen be¨ınvloedt. In hoofd-
stuk 3 wordt aangetoond dat de individuele risicovoorkeur een effect heeft op de
beroepskeuze, gemeten aan de verschillen in de loonspreiding tussen verschillende
beroepen. De focus van hoofdstuk 4 ligt op het identificeren van de effecten van
risicovoorkeuren op de keuze van het type dienstverband, met name de keuze om
werknemer of zelfstandig ondernemer te willen worden. In hoofdstuk 5 staat de
relatie tussen risicovoorkeuren, baanmobiliteit en de loonontwikkeling van jonge
werknemers centraal.
Deze relaties worden onderzocht door het uitvoeren van econometrische anal-
yses van grote panel databestanden die afkomstig zijn van jaarlijkse enqueˆtes onder
de Oekra¨ıense bevolking (ULMS) en in Duitsland (SOEP). Een aanvullende analyse
in hoofdstuk 4 is gebaseerd op een Nederlandse databestand (Noord-Brabant). De
keuze van de casuslanden wordt deels gedicteerd door beschikbaarheid van de data
(hoofdstuk 5). Echter de belangrijkste reden om te focussen op Oekra¨ıne (hoofd-
stuk 2, hoofdstuk 3 en een deelanalyse in hoofdstuk 4) is het feit dat verschillende
instituties in Oekra¨ıne een aantal belangrijke verschillen op het geografisch territo-
rium kennen en een drastische verandering ondergingen in de loop der geschiede-
nis. Hetzelfde geldt voor Oost-Duitsland (deelanalyse in hoofdstuk 4). Het begrip
instituties wordt in dit proefschrift breed ge¨ınterpreteerd. Het omvat zowel in-
stituties die de politieke regimes karakteriseren, als economische instituties, zoals
de inrichting van een bepaalde type van economisch systeem, alsook sociale en
maatschappelijke instituties, die medebepalen hoe een maatschappij in elkaar zit
en hoe mensen met elkaar omgaan.
Dankzij de unieke methode die in dit proefschrift gehanteerd wordt, is het mo-
gelijk om in sommige gevallen conclusies te trekken met betrekking tot causaliteit
van de ge¨ıdentificeerde relaties. Met name het gebruik van de onverwachte ve-
randeringen in de instituties, die door de economische en politieke transitie in
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Oekra¨ıne en in Oost-Duitsland werden veroorzaakt, maakt het mogelijk om een
aantal factoren als exogeen te beschouwen. Exogeniteit van de factoren is van be-
lang, omdat als mensen door hun keuzes en (omgevings-)factoren elkaar wederzijds
kunnen be¨ınvloeden (d.w.z. dat de factoren endogeen zijn), het onmogelijk is om
zekerheid te krijgen over de causale relatie tussen oorzaak en gevolg. Het vast-
stellen van causale relaties kan helpen om betere beleidsmaatregelen te nemen die
individuele keuzes kunnen be¨ınvloeden.
Vertrouwen en de keuze van economische en politieke
systemen
Hoe kan het collectieve vertrouwen in onbekende mensen (ten opzichte van het ver-
trouwen in bekende relaties, zoals hechte familie- en vriendenkringen) de keuze van
een economisch en politiek systeem be¨ınvloeden? In hoofdstuk 2 wordt deze vraag
beatwoord middels een analyse die gebruik maat van verschillen in de historische
instituties die bestonden in verschillende delen van de Oekra¨ıne.
De geschiedenis van Oekra¨ıne door de eeuwen heen wordt gekenmerkt door
langdurige periodes van overheersing door naburige heersers. Met name het oosten
van het land werd eeuwenlang bestuurd door het Russische Rijk, terwijl het westen
onder de invloed van Polen, Litouwen, en later het Habsburgse Rijk was. De bevin-
dingen uit verschillende disciplines laten zien dat het Habsburgse Rijk, door het re-
spect hebben voor de verschillende, multinationale bevolking van het Rijk tezamen
met een bureaucratische benadering van de relaties met de lokale bevolking, het
collectieve vertrouwen in het westen minder negatief be¨ınvloedde dan het regime
van het Russische Rijk in het oosten van het land. Het beoogde doel van het Rus-
sische Rijk was om de lokale bevolking onderdeel van het Russische Rijk te maken,
middels repressies en vervolgingen (Magocsi, 2010). Gebaseerd op de geschiedenis
van de Oekra¨ıne, is aan te tonen dat de instituties verschillend waren in het oosten
en het westen totdat de bolsjewieken aan de macht zijn gekomen. Oekra¨ıne is een
sovjet-socialistisch republiek geworden na 1922 in het oosten en na 1945 in het
westen. In 1991 met de val van de Sovjetunie is Oekra¨ıne een onafhankelijke staat
met gelijke economische en politieke instituties op het gehele territorium geworden.
In recente wetenschappelijke studies wordt aangetoond dat het collectieve
vertrouwen (i.e. tot hoever mensen het vertrouwen hebben in de mensen die ze
nog nooit gekend hebben ten opzichte van de mensen met welke ze een hechte
relatie hebben, zoals familie en vrienden) negatief be¨ınvloed wordt door externe
gebeurtenissen, zoals oorlogen, slavenhandel, repressieve autoritaire politieke regimes
enz. (Nunn en Wantchekon, 2011). Het vertrouwen wordt ‘doorgegeven’ aan de
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van het land werd eeuwenlang bestuurd door het Russische Rijk, terwijl het westen
onder de invloed van Polen, Litouwen, en later het Habsburgse Rijk was. De bevin-
dingen uit verschillende disciplines laten zien dat het Habsburgse Rijk, door het re-
spect hebben voor de verschillende, multinationale bevolking van het Rijk tezamen
met een bureaucratische benadering van de relaties met de lokale bevolking, het
collectieve vertrouwen in het westen minder negatief be¨ınvloedde dan het regime
van het Russische Rijk in het oosten van het land. Het beoogde doel van het Rus-
sische Rijk was om de lokale bevolking onderdeel van het Russische Rijk te maken,
middels repressies en vervolgingen (Magocsi, 2010). Gebaseerd op de geschiedenis
van de Oekra¨ıne, is aan te tonen dat de instituties verschillend waren in het oosten
en het westen totdat de bolsjewieken aan de macht zijn gekomen. Oekra¨ıne is een
sovjet-socialistisch republiek geworden na 1922 in het oosten en na 1945 in het
westen. In 1991 met de val van de Sovjetunie is Oekra¨ıne een onafhankelijke staat
met gelijke economische en politieke instituties op het gehele territorium geworden.
In recente wetenschappelijke studies wordt aangetoond dat het collectieve
vertrouwen (i.e. tot hoever mensen het vertrouwen hebben in de mensen die ze
nog nooit gekend hebben ten opzichte van de mensen met welke ze een hechte
relatie hebben, zoals familie en vrienden) negatief be¨ınvloed wordt door externe
gebeurtenissen, zoals oorlogen, slavenhandel, repressieve autoritaire politieke regimes
enz. (Nunn en Wantchekon, 2011). Het vertrouwen wordt ‘doorgegeven’ aan de
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volgende generaties, omdat de ouders hun kinderen opvoeden zodat de kinderen
de voorkeuren en persoonskenmerken die gelijk aan hun ouders zijn. Op deze
manier blijft het niveau van vertrouwen relatief stabiel, zolang geen andere externe
gebeurtenissen het be¨ınvloeden. Het vertrouwen dat eeuwen geleden negatief is
be¨ınvloed, blijft daarom ook op een laag niveau.
Door de ontwikkeling van de (historische) instituties in Oekra¨ıne verschillen
de niveaus van vertrouwen in het oosten en het westen. Het Russische Rijk heeft
het vertrouwen in het oosten zodanig negatief be¨ınvloed, dat de gevolgen ervan
nog vandaag de dag zichtbaar zijn. Het ontbreken van het collectief vermogen tot
een relatie van vertrouwen in te gaan met onbekende mensen zorgt ervoor dat de
mensen liever geen vrije markt economie en geen democratisch politiek systeem
willen hebben. Een vrije markt economie houdt in dat mensen, onbeperkt door
de regering, vrij kunnen handelen. Als een partner in handel zich niet aan de af-
spraken houdt, terwijl de andere partner dat wel doet, wordt die laatstgenoemde
partner daar een dupe van. Om deze situatie te voorkomen, kiest de bevolking voor
een sterke staatstoezicht in de vorm van een door de staat gecontroleerde economie.
Anderzijds, kan een democratisch politiek systeem niet zonder onderliggend ver-
trouwen functioneren. Om de onverwachte uitkomsten van een democratisch proces
tegen te gaan, kiest de bevolking liever een autocratisch politiek regime.
In het westen van Oekra¨ıne daarentegen, hebben mensen meer vertrouwen
door de eeuwen heen kunnen opbouwen. Omdat de mensen in het westen meer
vertrouwen hebben in onbekende mensen met welke ze economische relaties ingaan
of die hun politieke keuzes moeten representeren, willen ze liever voor minder
staatsingreep in de regulering van de maatschappij. Ze geven de voorkeur aan
meer liberale systemen, zoals een vrije markteconomie en een democratisch politiek
systeem. Deze onderliggende verschillen in het collectieve vertrouwen schijnen
vandaag de dag (anno 2014) te echon in keuzes dat bevolking in het westen maakt
richting de ontwikkeling van het democratische staat tegenover de keuzes in oosten,
die de sterk reguleerde systemen ondersteunen.
Risicovoorkeuren: beroepskeuze
De transitie, die in 1991 begon met een referendum waarin de meerderheid van de
bevolking ervoor koos om een onafhankelijk land te worden, heeft een aantal belan-
grijke economische instituties veranderd. Met name is de loonstructuur in verschil-
lende beroepen veranderd van een gecentraliseerde stelsel, dat gebruikt werd toen
het land onderdeel van de Sovjetunie uit maakte, naar een markt-gedreven struc-
tuur. Deze verandering in de structuur van beloning leent zich ervoor om het effect
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van risicovoorkeur op de beroepskeuze te analyseren. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt hier
nader op ingegaan. Het gecentraliseerde stelsel van de Sovjetunie zorgde ervoor dat
de onverklaarde loonvariabiliteit binnen beroepen heel klein was. De onverklaarde
loonvariabiliteit is datgene wat van de totale loonvariabiliteit overblijft nadat deze
gecorrigeerd is voor de ‘harde factoren’ die de loonvariabiliteit verklaren (menselijk
kapitaal variabelen). Lage onverklaarde variabiliteit betekent dat individuen met
hoge zekerheid kunnen verwachten wat hun verdiensten zullen zijn. Hoge onverk-
laarde variabiliteit is daarentegen risicovol, omdat mensen niet weten of ze veel of
weinig gaan verdienen in dat beroep. Omdat het Sovjetstelsel de lonen centraal
vaststelde, was de zekerheid in alle beroepen zeer hoog.
Met de politiek-economische transitie werd het instituut van loonbepaling
veranderd, zodat de loonvariabiliteit in veel beroepen gegroeid is, terwijl in an-
deren niet. Bijvoorbeeld, binnen de functie ‘bedrijfsmanager’ nam de variabiliteit
drastisch toe, terwijl in het beroep ‘hulpdocenten’ de variabiliteit bijna hetzelfde
bleef als voor de transitie. Hoewel de andere baankarakteristieken ongeveer gelijk
zijn gebleven, is de loonvariabiliteit heel anders geworden ten opzichte van het
moment dat mensen hun oorspronkelijke beroepskeuze op de arbeidsmarkt maak-
ten. Zoals verwacht had de risicovoorkeur voor de transitie (in 1986) geen invloed
op de beroepskeuze, afgemeten aan de loonvariabiliteit. Na de transitie (in 2007)
heeft risicovoorkeur echter een significant effect op de keuze van beroep. Met name
de mensen die van beroep wisselen tussen 1986 en 2007 laten zien hoe de corre-
latie tussen risicovoorkeur en beroepskeuze ontstaat na de transitie. In hoofdstuk 3
wordt het bewijs gepresenteerd dat het effect van risicovoorkeur op de beroepskeuze
een causaal karakter heeft.
Risicovoorkeuren: dienstverband
Een andere belangrijke institutionele beperking die door de transitie werd opge-
heven, was het verbod op ondernemerschap. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt dit thema
nader uitgewerkt. Het centraal gecontroleerd economisch systeem in Oekra¨ıne als
onderdeel van de Sovjetunie stond geen particulier ondernemerschap toe. Door de
strenge regelgeving in Oost-Duitsland tot 1989 leek zelfstandig ondernemerschap
nauwelijks op wat wij nu onder ondernemerschap verstaan. Deze institutionele
voorwaarden zorgden ervoor dat er begin jaren 1990 weinig of geen zelfstandige
ondernemers waren. Deze bevinding is belangrijk omdat het laat zien dat mensen
in de Oekra¨ıne en het Oost-Duitsland geen specifieke vaardigheden en ondernemer-
schapskennis via hun familie konden krijgen.
Recente bevindingen laten zien dat ouders hun voorkeuren, zoals het ver-
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volgende generaties, omdat de ouders hun kinderen opvoeden zodat de kinderen
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be¨ınvloed, blijft daarom ook op een laag niveau.
Door de ontwikkeling van de (historische) instituties in Oekra¨ıne verschillen
de niveaus van vertrouwen in het oosten en het westen. Het Russische Rijk heeft
het vertrouwen in het oosten zodanig negatief be¨ınvloed, dat de gevolgen ervan
nog vandaag de dag zichtbaar zijn. Het ontbreken van het collectief vermogen tot
een relatie van vertrouwen in te gaan met onbekende mensen zorgt ervoor dat de
mensen liever geen vrije markt economie en geen democratisch politiek systeem
willen hebben. Een vrije markt economie houdt in dat mensen, onbeperkt door
de regering, vrij kunnen handelen. Als een partner in handel zich niet aan de af-
spraken houdt, terwijl de andere partner dat wel doet, wordt die laatstgenoemde
partner daar een dupe van. Om deze situatie te voorkomen, kiest de bevolking voor
een sterke staatstoezicht in de vorm van een door de staat gecontroleerde economie.
Anderzijds, kan een democratisch politiek systeem niet zonder onderliggend ver-
trouwen functioneren. Om de onverwachte uitkomsten van een democratisch proces
tegen te gaan, kiest de bevolking liever een autocratisch politiek regime.
In het westen van Oekra¨ıne daarentegen, hebben mensen meer vertrouwen
door de eeuwen heen kunnen opbouwen. Omdat de mensen in het westen meer
vertrouwen hebben in onbekende mensen met welke ze economische relaties ingaan
of die hun politieke keuzes moeten representeren, willen ze liever voor minder
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meer liberale systemen, zoals een vrije markteconomie en een democratisch politiek
systeem. Deze onderliggende verschillen in het collectieve vertrouwen schijnen
vandaag de dag (anno 2014) te echon in keuzes dat bevolking in het westen maakt
richting de ontwikkeling van het democratische staat tegenover de keuzes in oosten,
die de sterk reguleerde systemen ondersteunen.
Risicovoorkeuren: beroepskeuze
De transitie, die in 1991 begon met een referendum waarin de meerderheid van de
bevolking ervoor koos om een onafhankelijk land te worden, heeft een aantal belan-
grijke economische instituties veranderd. Met name is de loonstructuur in verschil-
lende beroepen veranderd van een gecentraliseerde stelsel, dat gebruikt werd toen
het land onderdeel van de Sovjetunie uit maakte, naar een markt-gedreven struc-
tuur. Deze verandering in de structuur van beloning leent zich ervoor om het effect
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van risicovoorkeur op de beroepskeuze te analyseren. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt hier
nader op ingegaan. Het gecentraliseerde stelsel van de Sovjetunie zorgde ervoor dat
de onverklaarde loonvariabiliteit binnen beroepen heel klein was. De onverklaarde
loonvariabiliteit is datgene wat van de totale loonvariabiliteit overblijft nadat deze
gecorrigeerd is voor de ‘harde factoren’ die de loonvariabiliteit verklaren (menselijk
kapitaal variabelen). Lage onverklaarde variabiliteit betekent dat individuen met
hoge zekerheid kunnen verwachten wat hun verdiensten zullen zijn. Hoge onverk-
laarde variabiliteit is daarentegen risicovol, omdat mensen niet weten of ze veel of
weinig gaan verdienen in dat beroep. Omdat het Sovjetstelsel de lonen centraal
vaststelde, was de zekerheid in alle beroepen zeer hoog.
Met de politiek-economische transitie werd het instituut van loonbepaling
veranderd, zodat de loonvariabiliteit in veel beroepen gegroeid is, terwijl in an-
deren niet. Bijvoorbeeld, binnen de functie ‘bedrijfsmanager’ nam de variabiliteit
drastisch toe, terwijl in het beroep ‘hulpdocenten’ de variabiliteit bijna hetzelfde
bleef als voor de transitie. Hoewel de andere baankarakteristieken ongeveer gelijk
zijn gebleven, is de loonvariabiliteit heel anders geworden ten opzichte van het
moment dat mensen hun oorspronkelijke beroepskeuze op de arbeidsmarkt maak-
ten. Zoals verwacht had de risicovoorkeur voor de transitie (in 1986) geen invloed
op de beroepskeuze, afgemeten aan de loonvariabiliteit. Na de transitie (in 2007)
heeft risicovoorkeur echter een significant effect op de keuze van beroep. Met name
de mensen die van beroep wisselen tussen 1986 en 2007 laten zien hoe de corre-
latie tussen risicovoorkeur en beroepskeuze ontstaat na de transitie. In hoofdstuk 3
wordt het bewijs gepresenteerd dat het effect van risicovoorkeur op de beroepskeuze
een causaal karakter heeft.
Risicovoorkeuren: dienstverband
Een andere belangrijke institutionele beperking die door de transitie werd opge-
heven, was het verbod op ondernemerschap. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt dit thema
nader uitgewerkt. Het centraal gecontroleerd economisch systeem in Oekra¨ıne als
onderdeel van de Sovjetunie stond geen particulier ondernemerschap toe. Door de
strenge regelgeving in Oost-Duitsland tot 1989 leek zelfstandig ondernemerschap
nauwelijks op wat wij nu onder ondernemerschap verstaan. Deze institutionele
voorwaarden zorgden ervoor dat er begin jaren 1990 weinig of geen zelfstandige
ondernemers waren. Deze bevinding is belangrijk omdat het laat zien dat mensen
in de Oekra¨ıne en het Oost-Duitsland geen specifieke vaardigheden en ondernemer-
schapskennis via hun familie konden krijgen.
Recente bevindingen laten zien dat ouders hun voorkeuren, zoals het ver-
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trouwen en de risicovoorkeur aan kinderen doorgeven (Tabellin 2008b; Dohmen
et al., 2012). Dat betekent dat ouders die risiconemend zijn ook vaker kinderen
hebben, die hoger dan gemiddeld risicovoorkeur hebben. Gezien dat ondernemer-
schap vaak via de familie wordt doorgegeven, is het mogelijk dat de vaak geob-
serveerde relatie tussen risicovoorkeur en de keuze voor zelfstandig ondernemer-
schap een schijncorrelatie kan zijn. De kinderen erven dan niet alleen de risicovoor-
keur maar ook de vakspecifieke kennis die de keuze voor zelfstandig ondernemer-
schap veel minder risicovol maakt. Uit de in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde analyse
van Oekra¨ıne en Oost-Duitsland blijkt dat de nieuwe generatie geen vakkennis van
hun ouders had kunnen erven omdat hun ouders nooit zelfstandig zijn geweest. De
positieve relatie tussen de risicohouding en de keuze voor zelfstandig ondernemer-
schap onder deze condities bewijst daarom dat de risicovoorkeur een causaal effect
heeft op zelfstandig ondernemerschap. Aanvullend bewijs wordt geleverd met data
uit Nederland, waar zelfstandig ondernemerschap een lange traditie kent. Hieruit
blijkt dat er geen effect van de risicovoorkeur op de keuze voor zelfstandig onderne-
merschap is als een persoon vanuit een ondernemend gezin komt en het bedrijf van
de ouders overneemt.
Risicovoorkeuren: mobiliteit
In hoofdstuk 5 staat de relatie tussen risicovoorkeur en baanmobiliteit centraal.
De relatie tussen het aantal verschillende banen van jonge werknemers en de
loonontwikkeling tijdens de werkcarrire is in de vakliteratuur vaak bestudeerd.
De conclusies lopen echter uiteen: de baanmobiliteit kan een positief, negatief of
geen effect hebben op de loonontwikkeling (Topel en Ward, 1992; Light en Mc-
Garry, 1998). In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een mechanisme gepresenteerd dat deze tegen-
overgestelde resultaten kan verklaren. Wanneer men de factor risicovoorkeur in de
analyse meeneemt blijkt dat dit een belangrijke factor is die de baanmobiliteit kan
be¨ınvloeden, omdat van baan veranderen een risicovolle stap is. Mensen willen
voor risico’s gecompenseerd worden en mensen die meer risicomijdend zijn, vragen
een hogere compensatie voor hetzelfde risico dan meer risiconemende mensen. Dit
leidt ertoe dat mensen die minder van risico’s houden, een hogere compensatie
zullen vragen bij het veranderen van baan.
Aannemend dat alle andere factoren gelijk blijven, zullen risicomijdende werkne-
mers minder vaak van baan veranderen dan risiconemende werknemers. Tegelijk-
ertijd is de loongroei gerelateerd aan baanverandering van risicomijdende mensen
hoog, omdat risicomijdende mensen alleen van baan veranderen als de compen-
satie hoog genoeg is (en dus hoger is dan voor mensen die minder risicomijdend
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zijn). Dit verschil in gedrag van risicomijdende en risiconemende mensen brengt
verschillende patronen van loonontwikkeling met zich mee. De bevindingen uit
de Duitse data komen overeen met de theoretische hypothese. Het aantal banen
dat risicomijdende mensen houden in de eerste jaren op arbeidsmarkt is lager dan
het aantal banen dat risiconemende mensen houden. De loongroei gerelateerd aan
baanwisselingen daarentegen hoger is voor risicomijdende werknemers ten opzichte
van risiconemende werknemers.
Conclusie
Dit proefschrift toont aan dat individuele voorkeuren, zoals de risicovoorkeur en
het vertrouwen, economische keuzes be¨ınvloeden. Het collectieve vertrouwen in
onbekende mensen, dat door de generaties heen wordt doorgegeven, schijnt een
causale effect te hebben op de keuze van economische en politieke systemen. Als er
weinig vertrouwen is in de maatschappij, kunnen de vrije markt en het democratis-
che politieke systeem niet naar behoren functioneren. Deze conclusie wordt mede
ondersteund door de eerdere ontwikkelingen in de postcommunistische landen na
de val van de Sovjetunie. Terwijl de kennis en de ondersteuning van de West-
Europese landen en de V.S. prominent aanwezig was, onder andere in Oekra¨ıne in
de jaren 1990, bleek het invoeren van een democratische staat en een marktgeor-
inteerd economisch systeem is weinig succesvol. Een van de redenen hiervoor is
het ontbrekend sociaal vertrouwen. In 2007, tijdens de zogenaamde Oranjerevo-
lutie in Oekra¨ıne, waren de politieke keuzes van de bevolking duidelijk verdeeld,
zodat het westen grotendeels het Europese model van democratie en marktrelaties
ondersteunde. De bevolking in het oosten daarentegen voorkeur had voor het her-
stellen het autocratisch, sterk gereguleerd systeem dat meer gelijk zou zijn aan dat
van de Sovjetunie. Daarnaast laten de recente gebeurtenissen in 2014 zien dat de
onderliggende verschillen in de voorkeuren nog altijd een prominente rol kunnen
spelen.
De risicovoorkeur is een belangrijke drijfveer van de arbeidsmarketkeuzes,
zoals beroepskeuze, de keuze van dienstverband en baanmobiliteit. Risicomij-
dende mensen willen liever een baan hebben die zekerheid biedt. Ze zijn dan
ook bereid om gemiddeld een lager salaris te accepteren zolang ze meer zekerheid
hebben over hun verdiensten. Deze bevinding laat zien hoe belangrijk de oor-
spronkelijke beroepskeuze op de arbeidsmarkt is, omdat de mensen die een beroep
kiezen dat niet bij hun risicovoorkeuren past, eerder geneigd zijn om van beroep
te wisselen. Het menselijke kapitaal dat opgebouwd word tijdens de studie en de
jaren van arbeidsmarktervaring wordt minder waardevol in dat geval. Dit heeft
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De relatie tussen het aantal verschillende banen van jonge werknemers en de
loonontwikkeling tijdens de werkcarrire is in de vakliteratuur vaak bestudeerd.
De conclusies lopen echter uiteen: de baanmobiliteit kan een positief, negatief of
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overgestelde resultaten kan verklaren. Wanneer men de factor risicovoorkeur in de
analyse meeneemt blijkt dat dit een belangrijke factor is die de baanmobiliteit kan
be¨ınvloeden, omdat van baan veranderen een risicovolle stap is. Mensen willen
voor risico’s gecompenseerd worden en mensen die meer risicomijdend zijn, vragen
een hogere compensatie voor hetzelfde risico dan meer risiconemende mensen. Dit
leidt ertoe dat mensen die minder van risico’s houden, een hogere compensatie
zullen vragen bij het veranderen van baan.
Aannemend dat alle andere factoren gelijk blijven, zullen risicomijdende werkne-
mers minder vaak van baan veranderen dan risiconemende werknemers. Tegelijk-
ertijd is de loongroei gerelateerd aan baanverandering van risicomijdende mensen
hoog, omdat risicomijdende mensen alleen van baan veranderen als de compen-
satie hoog genoeg is (en dus hoger is dan voor mensen die minder risicomijdend
124
zijn). Dit verschil in gedrag van risicomijdende en risiconemende mensen brengt
verschillende patronen van loonontwikkeling met zich mee. De bevindingen uit
de Duitse data komen overeen met de theoretische hypothese. Het aantal banen
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het vertrouwen, economische keuzes be¨ınvloeden. Het collectieve vertrouwen in
onbekende mensen, dat door de generaties heen wordt doorgegeven, schijnt een
causale effect te hebben op de keuze van economische en politieke systemen. Als er
weinig vertrouwen is in de maatschappij, kunnen de vrije markt en het democratis-
che politieke systeem niet naar behoren functioneren. Deze conclusie wordt mede
ondersteund door de eerdere ontwikkelingen in de postcommunistische landen na
de val van de Sovjetunie. Terwijl de kennis en de ondersteuning van de West-
Europese landen en de V.S. prominent aanwezig was, onder andere in Oekra¨ıne in
de jaren 1990, bleek het invoeren van een democratische staat en een marktgeor-
inteerd economisch systeem is weinig succesvol. Een van de redenen hiervoor is
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ondersteunde. De bevolking in het oosten daarentegen voorkeur had voor het her-
stellen het autocratisch, sterk gereguleerd systeem dat meer gelijk zou zijn aan dat
van de Sovjetunie. Daarnaast laten de recente gebeurtenissen in 2014 zien dat de
onderliggende verschillen in de voorkeuren nog altijd een prominente rol kunnen
spelen.
De risicovoorkeur is een belangrijke drijfveer van de arbeidsmarketkeuzes,
zoals beroepskeuze, de keuze van dienstverband en baanmobiliteit. Risicomij-
dende mensen willen liever een baan hebben die zekerheid biedt. Ze zijn dan
ook bereid om gemiddeld een lager salaris te accepteren zolang ze meer zekerheid
hebben over hun verdiensten. Deze bevinding laat zien hoe belangrijk de oor-
spronkelijke beroepskeuze op de arbeidsmarkt is, omdat de mensen die een beroep
kiezen dat niet bij hun risicovoorkeuren past, eerder geneigd zijn om van beroep
te wisselen. Het menselijke kapitaal dat opgebouwd word tijdens de studie en de
jaren van arbeidsmarktervaring wordt minder waardevol in dat geval. Dit heeft
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negatieve economische (en emotionele) consequenties zowel voor de werknemers
als voor de maatschappij, die voor deze keuzes moet betalen. Daarnaast zullen
verschillende maatregelen ter bevordering van ondernemerschap het beoogde doel
bereiken zolang ze gericht zijn op de mensen die met risico’s kunnen omgaan. Risi-
comijdende mensen zijn veel minder geneigd zelfstandig ondernemers te worden
tenzij ze de kennis een vaardigheden kunnen krijgen die de risico van ondernemer-
schap aanzienlijk kunnen verminderen.
Risicovoorkeur schijnt ook invloed te hebben op de manier waarop mensen
beslissingen nemen om nieuwe, onbekende ervaringen in een andere baan op te
doen. Risicomijdende mensen willen alleen van baan veranderen als de risico,
die de baanverandering met zich mee brengt, aanzienlijk gecompenseerd wordt.
Deze bevinding heeft implicatie voor het beleid dat mensen moet stimuleren om
mobiel en vitaal te blijven. Omdat mensen naarmate ze ouder worden, meer risi-
comijdend worden, moeten de maatregelen die baanmobiliteit stimuleren, rekening
houden met het feit dat oudere werknemers die van baan moeten veranderen, een
grotere compensatie ervoor zouden willen hebben dan jongere, in het algemeen
meer risiconemende werknemers. Het is belangrijk om zich te realiseren dat de
veranderingen, die altijd het risico van het onbekende met zich mee brengen, meer
(emotionele) kosten betekenen voor risicomijdende mensen.
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Preferences, institutions, and economic outcomes: an
empirical investigation
One of the classical economic problems involves determining factors that affect
individual choices on the labour market, such as the decision to take paid employ-
ment or to go study, occupational choice and mobility. The effects of various ‘hard’
factors, such as price of labour, market rents, wealth, education level, family com-
position, parental occupation etc. have been extensively studied in the literature.
Nevertheless, much less is known about the effects of ‘soft’ factors, such as person-
ality characteristics and preferences. It is important to know how these factors can
affect human behaviour, since recent findings indicate that people make different
choices in similar situations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Important labour
market phenomena can be explained better if underlying differences in preferences
are taken into account.
The role of preferences and personality traits has been recognised long ago.
Theoretical arguments of classical authors involve trust and risk preference as im-
portant causes of economic growth. Trust works as a lubricant in a society and
makes economic transactions possible (Arrow 1972). Entrepreneurs should be will-
ing to accept risk in order to be able to successfully manage production in the
conditions of fluctuating demand. Recent empirical findings suggest that in dis-
trustful societies there are less financial investments, economic growth is slower
and more control from the state is demanded by the citizens (Ahgion et al., 2010,
Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Robust correlations are also found between risk attitudes
and labour market choices characterised by a certain amount of risk. For example,
risk-averse individuals are more often employed in a public sector and are less of-
ten self-employed. Causality of these relationships is however difficult to establish
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because many factors can have an impact on the measurements of preferences, as
well as on economic choices.
Goal and methods
The goal of this dissertation is to shed light on causality of the important economic
preferences, such as trust and risk attitudes, on several economic outcomes. The
outcomes that are treated in separate chapters are as follows: Chapter 2 shows
how trust affects choice of different political and economic systems. In Chapter 3,
the focus is on the role of risk attitudes for occupational choice, as measured by
unexplained variance of earnings across occupations. The goal of Chapter 4 is
to identify the effect of risk attitudes on the choice of status in employment, i.e.
whether to take a paid employment or to become self-employed. In Chapter 5,
the relationship between risk attitudes, job mobility and wage growth of young
employees is investigated.
These relationships are studied by means of econometric analyses of large
panel datasets coming from the yearly surveys in Ukraine (ULMS) and in Germany
(SOEP). An additional analysis in Chapter 4 is based on the Dutch data (Noord-
Brabant). The choice of the countries is partially given by availability of the data.
A more important reason to focus on Ukraine is however the fact that there were
very different institutions in different parts of Ukrainian territory, which underwent
some drastic changes caused by the transition (Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and part of
Chapter 4). The same reason is relevant for East Germany (part of the analysis in
Chapter 4). The notion of institutions is interpreted broadly in this dissertation. It
includes political institutions typical for a certain type of political regime, as well
as institutions that shape economic systems, and cultural institutions that shape
social structures.
The unique research method used in this dissertation allows to draw some
conclusions with respect to causality of the identified relationships. Using the un-
expected changes in institutions triggered by economic and political transition in
Ukraine and in East Germany makes it possible to treat several factors as ex-
ogenous. Exogeneity of the factors is important, because people can influence
factors by their behaviour and the other way around (i.e. factors are endogenous
to choices). Under such conditions it is impossible to be sure whether a certain
factor really has an effect. Establishing causality helps to implement policies that
can really affect behaviour.
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Social trust and choice of economic and political
systems
How can social trust (trust in unknown people as opposed to trusting in closed net-
works of family and friends) affect the choice of economic and political systems? In
Chapter 2, this question is answered by means of analysis that uses the differences
in historical institutions that existed on the territory of Ukraine.
The history of Ukraine is distinguished by long periods of repression by neigh-
bouring empires. In fact, the east of the country was ruled by the Russian Empire
during the centuries, whereas the west was under the influence of Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth and later, of Habsburg Empire. Habsburg Empire, because of the
well-established bureaucracy and respect to its various, multinational population,
was less damaging for trust than the regime of the Russian Empire. Russian Em-
pire tried to assimilate the local populations and to make it one whole with the
empire, using repressions and persecutions (Masocsi, 2010). Based on the history
of Ukraine, it is possible to argue that the institutions were different between the
east and the west until the Bolsheviks took the power. Ukraine became a soviet
socialist republic after 1922 in the East and after 1945 in the West. In 1991, with
the collapse of the Soviet Union Ukraine has become an independent state with
uniform political and economic institutions on the whole territory.
Recent research findings indicate that social trust (i.e. the collective ability
to trust in people who are strangers relative to the people with whom there is a
strong relationship, such as family and friends) can be damaged by external events,
such as wars, slavery, a repressive authoritarian political regime etc. (Nunn and
Wantchekon, 2011). Social trust is transmitted to the next generations, because
parents bring up their children such that children become more like parents. In
this way, the level of trust remains stable, as long as no other external events can
affect it. Social trust that was damaged centuries ago, remains low for generations.
Because of the differential paths of (historical) institutional development in
Ukraine, trust has been accumulated differently across west and east. The rule
of Russian Empire in the East has damaged social trust to such an extent that
the consequences can be seen nowadays. Lack of social trust, the inability to in-
vest in a relationship with unknown people leads to rejection of a market economy
and of a democratic political system. A free market economy implies that peo-
ple, unrestricted by the government, can freely engage in trade with each other.
However if the partner in trade does not keep up with their promises, while the
other party does, this lastly named party ends up in a bad position. To prevent
such situations, people prefer a stronger government regulation of the economy
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and chose a planned economy (Soviet style) economic system. On the other hand,
a democratic political system cannot function properly without underlying social
trust. To prevent unexpected outcomes of a democratic process, people choose an
autocratic political regime.
In contrast, in the West of Ukraine, people managed to keep more social trust
through the centuries. Because people in the West have more trust in unknown
people with whom they hold economic relationships or who they choose to rep-
resent their political choices, they prefer less control from the state in regulation
of economic and political matters. They chose more liberal systems, such as a
market-based economy and a democratic political system. Inherited differences
in social trust seem to echo in the choices Ukrainian population makes today (in
2014), when western Ukraine chooses the direction of a democratic state, whereas
eastern Ukraine supports strongly regulated systems.
Risk attitude: occupational choice
The transition that started in 1991 with a referendum that proclaimed Ukraine
as an independent state, has changed several important economic institutions. In
particular, the wage structure in various occupations changed to a market setting
wage system instead of a centralised system that was in use during the Soviet
Union times. This change in the reward structure lends itself to study the effect
of risk attitudes on occupational choice in Chapter 3. In the heavily centralised
system in Soviet Union wage setting took place centrally, so that the unexplained
wage variance in occupations was very low. The unexplained wage variance is
what remains of the overall variance after it has been corrected for observable
characteristics, such as education level, age, labour market experience etc. Low
unexplained variance means that individuals can more exactly predict what their
wages will be once they find employment. High unexplained variance is, on the
contrary, risky, since workers can end up either on the high as low end of wage
distribution. Because of the centralized wage setting in the Soviet Union, the
earnings risk reflected in wage variance was very low in all occupations.
The institute of wage setting has changed with the economic transition, so that
the earnings risk increased in various occupations. For example, in the occupation
‘Corporate managers’ the earnings risk has increased dramatically, whereas in the
occupation ‘Teaching associate professionals’ the earnings risk remained as low as
it was before transition. While most of the occupational characteristics remained
the same, earnings risk has became very different with respect to the risk people
where facing when they made their occupational choices before transition. As
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expected, risk attitudes had no effect on the choice of occupation, as measured by
the unexplained wage variance, before transition (in 1986). After transition (in
2007) risk attitudes have a significant effect on occupational choice. In particular,
the workers who change occupations between 1986 and 2007 explain the correlation
between risk attitudes and occupational choice that develops during transition.
This chapter presents field evidence that supports causal interpretation of the
effect of risk attitudes on occupational choice.
Risk attitude: self-employment
Another important institutional constraint that is removed by the transition is
the restriction on self-employment, which is the focus of Chapter 4. Centrally
controlled economic system in the Soviet Ukraine did not allow any private en-
trepreneurship. Because of strict regulation in East Germany until 1989, self-
employment there was hardly like what we understand under self-employment
nowadays. These institutional constraints brought about the situation in which
there were virtually no self-employed people on the whole territory of Ukraine and
in East Germany in the beginning of 1990’s. This finding is important because is il-
lustrates that one of the most important transmission channels of self-employment
was closed, namely the channel by which parents transmit self-employment to their
children. The parents in the Soviet Ukraine and in East Germany could not trans-
mit any specific self-employment knowledge or skills to their children because they
had never been self-employed themselves.
Recent findings show that parents transmit their preferences to the children
(Tabellini 2008b; Dohmen et al., 2012). This means that parents who are more
willing to take risks are more likely to have children who are also more risk-tolerant.
Because entrepreneurship is often transferred through the family, it is possible
that the relationship between risk preferences and the choice for self-employment
might be a spurious correlation. The children not only inherit the risk attitudes
from their parents, but also specific knowledge about what it is like to be self-
employed. This knowledge can make the choice for self-employment much less
risky. In our data from Ukraine and East Germany, people could not have inherited
any knowledge about self-employment because their parents have never been self-
employed. The positive relationship between risk attitudes and the choice for self-
employment under these conditions shows that risk attitudes have a causal effect on
self-employment. The additional evidence from the Netherlands, a country with
a long tradition in self-employment, demonstrates that there is no effect of risk
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attitudes on the choice for self-employment if individuals come from entrepreneurial
families and take over a business from their parents.
Risk attitude: job mobility
Chapter 5 analyses the relationship between willingness to take risks and job-to-
job mobility. The relationship between how many jobs young people hold and the
development of their wages later in the career is extensively studied in the litera-
ture (Topel and Ward, 1992; Light and McGarry, 1998). The findings are however
inconclusive: job mobility can have a positive, a negative, or zero effect on wage
growth. In Chapter 5 a mechanism is proposed which can explain the inconsis-
tent findings. Risk attitudes is an important factor which can affect job mobility,
because changing jobs is a risky decision. People want to be compensated for un-
certainty they need to deal with. Individuals who are more risk-averse demand
a higher compensation for the same risk than more risk-tolerant individuals do.
This implies that less risk-tolerant people would demand a higher compensation
for changing jobs.
Assuming all other factors are held constant, risk-averse workers will change
jobs less often than workers who are more willing to take risks. At the same time,
the wage increases related to each job change of risk-averse individuals are high,
since risk-averse people only change jobs if compensation is high enough (it is
higher than compensation demanded by less risk-averse people). This difference
in behaviour of risk-averse and risk-tolerant people causes different wage growth
patterns. The findings based on German data confirm the theoretical predictions.
The total number of jobs during the first years on the labour market is lower for
more risk-averse individuals, whereas the wage increases associated with the job
changes are higher.
Conclusion
This dissertation shows that individual preferences, such as risk attitude and social
trust, affect economic choices. Social trust transmitted through generations is likely
to have a causal effect on the choice of economic and political systems. If there
is little trust in the society, a market economy and a democratic political system
cannot function properly. This conclusion is supported by the early developments
in the post-Soviet countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite support
from the Western European countries and the US, among others in Ukraine in
1990’s, implementation of a democratic political system and of a market-oriented
economic system did not go as well as expected. In 2007, during the so-called
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Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the political choices were clearly divided, such that
the western part of Ukraine supported a Western model of democracy and a market
economy. The population in the East, in contrast, preferred to restore the auto-
cratic, strongly regulated system similar to the organisation of the Soviet Union.
Additionally, the recent events of 2014 demonstrate that underlying differences in
preferences still can play a prominent role.
Risk preference is an important factor that affects labour market choices, such
as occupational choice, the choice of employment status and job mobility. Risk-
averse individuals prefer to have a job with high security. They are also prepared
to accept lower wages as long as the stability of their earnings is guaranteed. This
finding illustrates how important is the first choice of occupation, since people
who are sorted in occupation that is not well-aligned with their risk attitudes, are
more likely to switch occupations. Human capital accumulated during the years of
studying and working in the original occupation loses its value in this case. This
brings negative economic (and emotional) consequences for employees but also for
the society, which has to pay for these choices. Apart from that, various measures
for promoting self-employment will only be successful in risk-tolerant populations.
Risk-averse individuals are much less likely to become self-employed, unless they
have access to information and skills that can diminish the uncertainty associated
with entrepreneurship.
Risk attitudes are likely to affect job mobility decisions. Changing jobs is a
way of receiving new experience and developing new competencies. However, risk-
averse people will change jobs only in case the risk, associated with changing jobs, is
generously compensated. This finding has an implication for the policy that intends
to stimulate people to remain vital and mobile on the labour market. Since people,
as they grow older, tend to become more risk-averse, the measures stimulating job
mobility in particular among older workers, should take into account that older,
more risk-averse people will need a larger compensation for changing jobs than
younger, in general more risk tolerant population. It is important to realise that
changes that always bring the uncertainty of unknown, imply higher (emotional)
costs for more risk-averse people.
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Valorisation addendum
Probably, the most important general conclusion of this dissertation is that people
are different. While this is not going to be a ground-breaking eye-opener from
the point of view of psychology, from the economic perspective of thinking, this
means an important shift of paradigm. Most of our economic policy decisions are
implicitly or explicitly based on the assumption that some underlying personal
preferences, the drivers of human behaviour, are the same across individuals. A
standard economic model thus assumes that everybody can deal with risks in a
similar way and that humans are to the same extent impatient about receiving
something today instead of waiting for tomorrow. As a result, the additional
financial stimulus necessary to induce someone to take an action associated with
risk or a delayed outcome is expected to be the same for every person. In other
words, rationally, people are expected to make the same choices under identical
circumstances.
The results presented in this dissertation show, in contrast, that depending
on their economic preferences, such as social trust and willingness to take risks,
people make different decisions. By making use of population wide representative
surveys, by combining different data sets and by using information of historical
development of institutions in three different countries, this dissertation shows
that usually unobservable personal characteristics have a causal, measurable effect
on economically relevant choices. The outcomes considered here vary from general
support for a particular type of political or economic system to important labour
market choices, such as choice of occupation, status in employment and the decision
to change jobs. When trying to explain, predict or influence behaviour and choices
people make, the influence of an essential factor is missing, if one does not take
individual preferences into account.
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The importance of social trust
In particular, the first empirical study of this dissertation considers the origins and
effects of social trust. Social trust is the ability of individuals to trust unknown
people, as opposed to relying on closed networks of family and friends. This very
basic economic preference underlies the existence of cooperative norms, values and
beliefs shared by the members of a particular society, and it has a tremendous
potential to influence the direction of the economic and political development.
Social trust is essential for the capacity to effectively solve a public good problem,
such as allocation of collective resources. The amount of social trust varies among
populations, because the accumulation of social trust is affected by external events.
The argument in this dissertation shows that negative historical events, such as
wars, slavery or severe repressions, destroy the ability to trust unknown individuals.
Instead, people prefer to deal with their closed circle of family and friends. This
inability persists through the generations because it is much more difficult to restore
social trust than to destroy it.
There are at least two negative consequences of lack of social trust. First,
since no market activity among unknown to each other traders can exist without
some amount of trust, lack of social trust undermines the functioning of a market
economic system. Even if a well-functioning law system exists and laws are legiti-
mately enforced, it is virtually impossible to specify every single nuance of a specific
situation in a contract. Contracts normally have an enforcing power, because peo-
ple who write the contracts expect and thus trust that the other party will respect
the conditions. If social trust is lacking, however, taking the other party to the
court every time the contract is breached brings about a very inefficient outcome.
It is then individually rational to only trust the partners who are well-connected
through blood or other close relationship, because they will have some very strong
incentives to keep their promises. The emergence of well-connected, economically
powerful families, who control key industry, is a logical outcome of this type of
economic development.
Another consequence of lack of social trust is the inability of a society to
deal with changing political forces and democratically elected leaders. A properly
functioning democracy rests on strong bureaucratic institutions with a well-defined
system of checks and balances that limit executive power. This system, in its
turn, relies on the contribution of citizens in elections, as the expression of societal
problems that need to be solved by governmental action. When citizens do not trust
that the election of leaders who are unrelated to them will serve to represent their
will, they have no incentives to contribute to a democratic process. On the other
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hand, governments need to rely on support of the electorate in order to achieve
meaningful changes and be able to implement unfavourable reforms. When social
trust is lacking, reliance on favours to close networks becomes necessary, leading
to corruption in the political process.
The developments in former Soviet Union countries, in particular in Ukraine,
readily illustrate the importance of the underlying level of social trust. Already
in the beginning of the 1990’s, reforms of the political and economic system did
not achieve the desired results. The hope of Western reformers was to initiate
market reforms, so that the ’invisible hand’ will correct imbalances of the outdated
centrally-planned economic system. Setting up the conditions for a democratic
political system by disbanding the rule of the communist elite and adopting some
democratic political institutions seemed to be sufficient to set the country on the
development path to a proper democratic state. One of the essential reasons for
the failure of these well-meant efforts is likely to be a lack of social trust. For the
reasons described above, the strongly regulated Soviet regime actually kept mafia
and corruption under control to some reasonable level. The moment the strong
control of the state ceased to exist, negative consequences of lack of social trust
became much more prominent.
As the history of Ukraine shows, the country was separated for centuries.
The East of Ukraine was under the influence of the Russian Empire and later,
in the 20th century, it became a part of the Soviet Union much earlier than the
West of Ukraine did. The treatment of the local population by the rulers from
Russia, and later, by the Soviet Union authorities, was not favourable for the
accumulation and preservation of social trust. Political repressions, a ban to use
the own language, cultural persecutions and the famine in the beginning of the
1930’s contributed to the damaging of social trust. In contrast, the conditions in
the West of Ukraine, even if they were not particularly favourable for building up
social trust, did not have such a devastating impact on the population. The rule of
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and later, of the Habsburg Empire, allowed some
important freedoms that were inaccessible for Ukrainians in the East. The ability
to form some local governance structures, to use the own language, to practice
religion in some accordance to the local rule helped to preserve social trust in the
West.
Tracing the development of political preferences of the Ukrainian population
in the East and in West since the beginning of the new, independent period in the
Ukrainian history shows that in the aftermath of the economic and political reforms
in the 1990’s that allowed more freedom to the citizens, the population in the
East developed preferences favouring stronger control by the government. On the
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contrary, the population in the West in the recent years developed support for more
liberal systems, such as a market economy and a democratic political state. The
conflicting views, in particular with respect to the way of organising the collective
decision-making, escalated when the majority of the Ukrainian population decided
to follow the direction of development characteristic for Western democratic states.
The population in the East, untrusting to systems with little government control,
demands a stronger rule impersonated in the Russian political leader.
These differences in choices could be explained by the underlying differences
in social trust. A market-based economy and the rules of the game necessary for a
properly functioning democracy cannot “land” in the population that lacks social
trust. Inasmuch trust in fellow though personally unknown citizens is necessary to
have political leaders to pursue reforms with the view of a more efficient organi-
sation of social, political and economic spheres of life, the conditions that ensure
preservation and accumulation of social trust are invaluable to achieve these goals.
The contribution of the research to the understanding of the mechanisms of ac-
cumulation of social trust illustrates the importance of counteracting oppressive
political regimes for they sow the seeds that grow deep and are cumbersome to
weed centuries after planting.
The role of risk attitudes in labour market choices:
Occupational sorting
The second study of this dissertation focuses on the effects of risk attitudes on
choice of occupation. Occupational choice is one of the very important choices
individuals make in their life. Individuals who work in occupations that fir their
preferences, are likely to be more successful in developing competencies to be pro-
ductive on the labour market and thus to contribute to economic development.
Workers who are sorted well in occupations, are less likely to switch to another.
Since the costs of investing in education are high, both from personal as from the
societal perspective, it is important to facilitate the right educational and occupa-
tional choice.
One of the important aspects of occupational choice is the earnings risk. Earn-
ings risk reflects the risk individuals are facing when they enter a particular oc-
cupation and do not know whether they will end up at the higher or the lower
part of the earnings distribution. For example, public sector jobs, in particular
in teaching, are currently regulated by the government so that the starting, the
intermediate and the senior level earnings are known in advance. On the contrary,
many private sector occupations have more variable earnings, such that it makes
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it difficult to predict at which level one may end up when he or she starts working
in this occupation.
This dissertation shows that this uncertainty about earnings has an important
effect. While some people are content with a high variance of earnings, which
is generally compensated by their level, other people feel very uncomfortable not
knowing what to expect from the next day. Consciously neglecting other important
content-related aspects of an occupation, the evidence presented here demonstrates
that when the earnings risk changes suddenly, workers change their occupation.
Workers prefer that the earnings risk is better aligned with their risk preferences,
such that risk-loving people prefer to work in occupations with high variance of
earnings, whereas risk-averse people prefer low earnings risk occupations. Wages
tend to compensate workers for the risk they need to deal with, be it a mortality
risk or an unemployment risk or the risk of earnings uncertainty. This is one of
the reasons that occupations with generally bad working conditions, also in terms
of stress, may result in better earnings. In safer occupations, on the other hand, a
worker “pays” for the certainty he or she enjoys.
This knowledge can help young people who start their career to realise that it
is not only the level of earnings that matters in their occupational choice. Having
to deal with excessive risks can be harmful for risk-averse people, because of the
stress they experience. Undesirable consequences of a wrong occupational choice
can bring about feelings of dissatisfaction, anxiety and even health problems. On
the other hand, changing occupations later in working career devaluates the in-
vestments in studying by reducing the value of human capital human capital build
up in another occupation. This is why good quality consulting and advice to indi-
viduals at the dawn of their career can facilitate a more efficient allocation of the
labour force.
The role of risk attitudes in labour market choices:
Self-employment
The third study focuses on the importance of risk preferences for the choice of self-
employment. Self-employment, as opposed to dependent employment, is a widely
recognised driver of entrepreneurship. Self-employed individuals contribute to the
forging of economic value, implementing innovations and creating new employ-
ment. In contrast to workers in dependent employment, however, self-employed
individuals face much more uncertainty related to fluctuations of demand and sup-
ply. In addition, social security schemes in many countries are designed for workers
in dependent employment, making it more complicated for self-employed workers
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to maintain the same level of social security. Since the majority of the population
is risk-averse rather than risk-taking, stimulating self-employment is a challenging
task, given the uncertainties self-employed are facing.
The field evidence showing the causal effect of risk attitudes on the deci-
sion to become self-employed provided in this dissertation, explains why the at-
tempts to stimulate self-employment by providing some initial capital are in many
cases insufficient. Although financial constraints to start a business are impor-
tant, lack of these constraints will not guarantee the effectiveness of the measures.
Namely, access to capital needed for a start-up does not reduce the riskiness of
self-employment, which makes it an unattractive option for risk-averse individuals.
The evidence presented in this dissertation indicates that having more in-
formation on what it is like to be self-employed can make self-employment less
risky. In particular, there seems to be no effect of risk attitudes on the decision
to become self-employed for individuals who grew up in entrepreneurial families.
Having access to important information on how to run a business, have a better
understanding of who your clients can be, how to organise administration and other
kinds of practical issues can reduce the objective risk of running a business. Being
familiar with the life-style as a self-employed can also reduce the perceived risk
of entrepreneurship and the feeling of uncertainty related to it. Since most of the
people are not born in entrepreneurial families, riskiness of self-employment can be
reduced by facilitating access to information, for example, by means of publishing
guides, bringing people together in meetings and round tables with entrepreneurs
and organising courses for practical information.
The role of risk attitudes in labour market choices:
Job mobility
The fourth study investigates the role of risk attitudes in job mobility. This is
the first empirical evidence showing the relationship between risk attitudes and
job mobility decisions. In many countries, labour market entrants change jobs
frequently in the beginning of their career. The question of whether this switching
behaviour is beneficial for subsequent wages has not been answered yet. It is
also not clear what drives this behaviour, since according to the human capital
theory, it is more profitable to stay in the same job because of the returns to the
accumulated firm-specific human capital. One reason can be that young people try
out and “experiment” with different jobs.
However, this experimentation has costs: not only in terms of lost returns to
firm-specific human capital, premiums and fringe benefits that reward individuals
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who stay on the job longer, but also in terms of having to change the known for
the unknown. Individuals who change jobs, have to get used to the new environ-
ment, new colleagues, find out what their specific tasks and wages will be. It is
virtually impossible to design a contract in which all the details and nuances of the
employment situation can be specified. These considerations make the decision to
change jobs risky and thus, unattractive to risk-averse workers.
Most of the current policies that tackle the problems of ageing workforce and
demographic transition, attempt to stimulate flexibility and mobility, in particular
for ageing workers, to keep the workforce vital and motivated. In the view of the
finding discussed above this might not be such a universally promising approach.
People tend to become more risk-averse as they grow older, which means that they
experience more disutility from unexpected changes, job changes in particular.
While younger and more risk-tolerant workers might get excited about challenges
associated with a new job, compared to staying where they are, more risk-averse
people value the status quo higher.
Concluding remarks
The development of the labour market into becoming more flexible, i.e. the more
commonly used temporary contracts that often are intended to stimulate workers to
function at the top of their productivity, might be undermining the workers’ overall
life-time productivity. Accumulation of stress caused by the necessity to deal with
unwanted risks can eventually lead to health problems. Another consequence of
excessive risk and uncertainty at the labour market is that people, who perceive the
situation as too risky, prefer to stay inactive. In other words, the most risk-averse
people may be pushed out of the labour force. These unintended consequences of
making contracts and payment schemes more flexible form a serious challenge to
success of these policies.
Various policy choices can be better informed if more is known about pref-
erences and their distribution in the target population. Public policy instruments
can be designed more effectively, if the choices that people are expected to make
are better aligned with their preferences. The needs of particular groups can be
addressed more directly, if we know more about their basic preferences, such as so-
cial trust and risk attitudes. This information is also important for firms, to take
into account in team composition and selecting managers. People with similar
preferences are likely to work better together, but for implementing organisational
changes willingness to accept certain risks is necessary. The fact that the majority
of individuals is risk-averse complicates implementing changes. For promoting co-
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guides, bringing people together in meetings and round tables with entrepreneurs
and organising courses for practical information.
The role of risk attitudes in labour market choices:
Job mobility
The fourth study investigates the role of risk attitudes in job mobility. This is
the first empirical evidence showing the relationship between risk attitudes and
job mobility decisions. In many countries, labour market entrants change jobs
frequently in the beginning of their career. The question of whether this switching
behaviour is beneficial for subsequent wages has not been answered yet. It is
also not clear what drives this behaviour, since according to the human capital
theory, it is more profitable to stay in the same job because of the returns to the
accumulated firm-specific human capital. One reason can be that young people try
out and “experiment” with different jobs.
However, this experimentation has costs: not only in terms of lost returns to
firm-specific human capital, premiums and fringe benefits that reward individuals
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who stay on the job longer, but also in terms of having to change the known for
the unknown. Individuals who change jobs, have to get used to the new environ-
ment, new colleagues, find out what their specific tasks and wages will be. It is
virtually impossible to design a contract in which all the details and nuances of the
employment situation can be specified. These considerations make the decision to
change jobs risky and thus, unattractive to risk-averse workers.
Most of the current policies that tackle the problems of ageing workforce and
demographic transition, attempt to stimulate flexibility and mobility, in particular
for ageing workers, to keep the workforce vital and motivated. In the view of the
finding discussed above this might not be such a universally promising approach.
People tend to become more risk-averse as they grow older, which means that they
experience more disutility from unexpected changes, job changes in particular.
While younger and more risk-tolerant workers might get excited about challenges
associated with a new job, compared to staying where they are, more risk-averse
people value the status quo higher.
Concluding remarks
The development of the labour market into becoming more flexible, i.e. the more
commonly used temporary contracts that often are intended to stimulate workers to
function at the top of their productivity, might be undermining the workers’ overall
life-time productivity. Accumulation of stress caused by the necessity to deal with
unwanted risks can eventually lead to health problems. Another consequence of
excessive risk and uncertainty at the labour market is that people, who perceive the
situation as too risky, prefer to stay inactive. In other words, the most risk-averse
people may be pushed out of the labour force. These unintended consequences of
making contracts and payment schemes more flexible form a serious challenge to
success of these policies.
Various policy choices can be better informed if more is known about pref-
erences and their distribution in the target population. Public policy instruments
can be designed more effectively, if the choices that people are expected to make
are better aligned with their preferences. The needs of particular groups can be
addressed more directly, if we know more about their basic preferences, such as so-
cial trust and risk attitudes. This information is also important for firms, to take
into account in team composition and selecting managers. People with similar
preferences are likely to work better together, but for implementing organisational
changes willingness to accept certain risks is necessary. The fact that the majority
of individuals is risk-averse complicates implementing changes. For promoting co-
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Valorisation addendum
operative behaviour and working together first the conditions for social trust need
to be created, because untrusting each other people do not cooperate.
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